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INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom concerning capital market development would have us believe that
dispersed ownership is the superior market structure for investors, while concentrated ownership is
often correlated with lower capital market growth. Similarly, privatization of public firms is viewed as
a necessary step for their success and surely for their global expansion. Private ownership is perceived
as one of the preconditions for prosperous firms and deep capital markets, while state ownership and
political influence are deemed to be impediments.
Four decades of economic development in China, however, indicate otherwise. China’s capital
market growth is quite striking—a sample of three randomly selected time-points over the last decade
reflects a largely constant and significant increase in capital market growth, as measured by the number
of firms listed and by total market capitalization.1 Additionally, market capitalization as a ratio of
GDP—an indicator that is used to assess over/under valuation of a certain market and implies
investors’ confidence—has been fast increasing and stabilized positively in recent years.2 At the end
of 2005, China’s stock exchanges had 1,377 public companies with a market capitalization of 401.8
billion USD at a 17.5 ratio to GDP. In 2010, the number of listed firms reached 2,063 with a total
market capitalization of 4.028 trillion USD and a market cap to GDP ratio of 66. By the end of 2017,
China’s capital market reached a striking 3,485 firms listed, with a total market capitalization of 8.7
trillion USD and a 71.2 ratio to GDP. Putting controversies on data reliability aside,3 these figures,

For simplicity reasons, unless stated otherwise, I use the singular term “capital market” in reference to both stock
exchanges together.
Despite some spikes and downturns, since 2007, shifts in total market capitalization in China overall correspond with
similar shifts in other global markets. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (% of GDP), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=1W-CN-US-JP-DE (last visited May 24, 2019)
(comparing total market capitalization of listed domestic companies with the same indicator at the world level, the United
States, Japan, and Germany). A slow-down in new issuances since the last market turmoil in 2015 is worth mentioning.
Yet the overall increase in the annual number of new issuances is maintained. For a comparable chart of Chinese IPOs
both in China and abroad from 2013–2017, see Number of Chinese Company IPOs Domestic and Abroad from 2013 to 2018,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/279616/number-of-chinese-company-ipos-in-the-country-and-abroad/
(last visited May 24, 2019).
2 The data in this paragraph was collected from the World Bank database. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic
Companies (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=CN (last
visited May 24, 2019) (providing a graph specific to China). The market capitalization to GDP ratio is applied to estimate
whether a certain market is over or undervalued and by implication reflects investors’ sentiments and overall assessment
of a given capital market. A ratio of market capitalization to GDP that is higher than 100 reflects an overvalued market,
while ratios lower than 50 are said to reflect undervaluation.
3 For example, data released by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2005 reports completely different figures:
1,381 listed companies, with a market capitalization of 1.06 trillion RMB (approximately 132 billion USD), standing for
only six percent of China’s GDP that year. See Donald C. Clarke, Law Without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance
Institutions, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 131, 152-153 (2010).
1
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while randomly selected, reflect an undeniable continuous upturn in the number of firms listed, total
capital market value, and a growing confidence of investors in the Chinese market.
China’s capital market growth also stands out when compared globally. As early as 2001, just
ten years after China opened its stock exchanges, China’s market capitalization was the largest among
developing countries. Its market capitalization increased from being the twentieth in the world in 2005,
representing only 1.17 percent of global market capitalization, to taking the second spot among all
countries in 2016, when its market represented 10.1 percent of global stock market capitalization.4
The achievements are worth noting at the individual firm level as well, where Chinese listed firms, and
particularly corporatized listed SOEs, have established significant presence in global capital markets,
a fact that has attracted broad attention. In 2018, China reached a record high of 120 Global Fortune
500 firms, second only to the United States with a gap of just 6 firms. Of course, this reflects mostly
on a limited number of Chinese listed companies; 75 percent of these firms are formally state-owned,
and many more have indirect state-ownership and control through holding groups and pyramid
schemes. Several “privately-owned” firms on this list are also controlled by the Chinese Party-state
without any state-ownership.5 Still, the point stands; concentrated state ownership and political control
do not stand in the way of business expansion, global reach, and capital market growth for Chinese
firms.
Was there a reliable and effective legal system in place, the picture above would not have been
so puzzling. Such a legal system could presumably overcome the multitude of structural predicaments
that characterize public firm ownership in China, reduce the cost of doing business and raising capital,
and thereby support and explain growth. Having such a system in operation would conform to many
prevailing views in both law and development and comparative corporate governance. The rise of the
public firm in China and the growth of its capital markets, however, had little to do with the
surrounding legal framework.
When firms emerged in China in the mid-1980s, they did so with a shattered bureaucracy, an
annihilated legal system, and a devastated isolated economy as their backdrop. They operated and
issued securities through unregulated, informal markets that were not initiated by bottom-up private
ordering pressures either. Later, when these firms were corporatized and issued their shares to the
public, and laws and corporate governance institutions borrowed from corporate capitalism were
promoted, the process was guided by political necessities rather than by economies of scale and
demands of technological advancements. China’s political economy had a determinant role on the
Second only to the United States, whose market cap represents 36.3 percent of the global market capitalization. This is
based on data compiled by BLOOMBERG and presented by BUSINESS INSIDER and BESPOKE. See Kim Iskyan, China’s Stock
Markets Have Soared by 1,479% since 2003, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/worldstock-market-capitalizations-2016-11; Which Countries Control the Global Stock Market?, BESPOKE (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.bespokepremium.com/think-big-blog/which-countries-control-the-global-stock-market/.
5 See generally Curtis Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665
(2014). Haier Group, Huawei, and even Alibaba and Tencent are among the Fortune Global 500 firms that are thought to
have strong ties with the Party-state.
4
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design of corporate ownership and the consequent functions of the market. It also dictated how legal
institutions will function.
The outcome of this process was an enabling, outwardly convergent, yet largely ineffective
corporate governance system that facilitates opportunism by corporate controllers, corruption, and a
capital market that is beholden to the Party-state. Indeed, for corporate governance advocates, China
stands as one of the most challenging environments in terms of group concentration, managerial selfdealing, asset tunneling, and related-party transactions tied to corporate corruption. Yet, the allure of
Chinese firms to domestic and outside investors is unquestionable.
The implications of this are quite striking. China fostered the growth of successful and globally
competitive firms, and its capital markets advanced to take a spot among the world’s most meaningful
markets, despite weakly functioning “good” corporate governance institutions and strong “bad” ones.
To be sure, the remnants of developmental state attributes, mainly the support and protection
some firms receive from the Party-state, can explain part of the success story.6 There are also many
ways to dispute and even to dismiss China’s capital market growth.7 While there is no one measure
for “economic success,” I take the above growth picture as my starting point. I do not presume to
offer an economic explanation for China’s capital market development or a path for what would be
normatively desirable distant developments. Rather, my goal is more modest. I offer a theoretical
account of China’s capital market growth conundrum. Through an expository analysis of the rise of
the public firm and the evolution of capital markets, I aim to expose the conundrum and postulate an
explanation. This explanation, I propose, lies in China’s political economy configurations and the
shifts within this system.
Changes in the political equilibrium of economic decision making within the Party-state
organization affected the interests of individuals, policy makers, and organs within the system, pushing
them to design and employ idiosyncratic governance mechanisms that promote growth. The result is
public firms and a capital market that continue to grow and prosper, even though they are governed
in unusual ways and in pursuit of unconventional goals. China’s political economy is therefore
responsible for many of the market’s infirmities, but also holds the key to its unprecedented success.

Mainly corporatized SOEs benefit from this. Common examples include access to credit on better terms from stateowned banks regardless of underlying conditions, protectionist licensing treatment, rescue-type intervention in share trade,
and lax competition arrangements.
7 Common criticisms are concerned with questions of the reliability of growth indicating data and posit that the data is
based on value inflation or outright misleading information. Others argue that existing growth indications do not rise to
their full potential that could have been achieved given a better legal framework. See the works of Franklin Allen in this
space. See, e.g., Franklin Allen et al., Dissecting the Long-Term Performance of the Chinese Stock Market (Mar. 13, 2018),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880021; Franklin Allen et al., Explaining the
Disconnection between China’s Economic Growth and Stock Market Performance (Jan. 31, 2015) (paper presented at
the China
International
Conference
in
Finance,
July
9-12
2015,
Shenzhen),
available
at
http://www.cicfconf.org/sites/default/files/paper_736.pdf
6
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Chapter 1 presents the underlying conundrum surrounding China’s capital market growth. It
then tracks the historic background upon which the large public firm emerged in China and points to
the use of alternative, largely experimental transitional mechanisms that governed the budding market.
Chapter 2 discusses the subsequent turn toward law and presents the formal institutional
setting within which China’s listed firms are currently embedded. The chapter reviews institutions and
mechanisms, both internal and external to the firm, that are commonly associated with “good
corporate governance” regimes and examines their function in China. It shows how political economy,
including the continued grip of state capitalism, created structural and perhaps even conscious
predicaments that undermine the function of traditional governance.
Chapter 3 offers an alternative resolution for China’s law and capital market development
conundrum, found within China’s political organization and governance. It shows how political
governance, in various forms that evolved throughout China’s economic transition, has monitored,
incentivized, and held accountable corporate control parties. Finally, it points to recent developments
that expand and legalize the use of political governance in the corporate context. I refer to these
developments as the “politicization of corporate governance,” and consider their implications for
firms, investors, and the role of the legal system in China.
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CHAPTER 1: CHINA’S LAW AND DEVELOPMENT CONUNDRUM—A CAPITAL MARKET
PERSPECTIVE
“It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is … national interest”8
Winston Churchill, BBC radio broadcast, 1 October 1939

Four decades of economic development in China are surrounded by a great puzzle: China was,
and still is, able to achieve economic growth while not adhering to conventional views on economic
develpment. 9 Throughout its economic transition, China strategically resisted policy measures that for
decades were considered essential for economic growth, including rapid liberalization of monetary
policy and trade, ownership privatization, a Western-style rule of law, and multi-party participatory
governance.10 These were strongly advocated by international policy organizations and reformers as
the necessary policies for all growth-oriented economies.
China’s growth trajectory also does not follow the widely accepted views about the role of
legal institutions in economic development. These views attribute much of the economic growth
prospect of any given system to the credibility and quality of its legal institutions.11 China’s economic
success, however, occurred in the absence of many of the qualities commonly attributed to a well
functioning legal system. This reality, which I call China’s law and development conundrum, goes
against fundamental economic and legal thought. Indeed, this conundrum spreads along a spectrum
Winston Churchill, BBC Radio Broadcast (Oct. 1, 1939). Regarding the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s expected choice
between the Allies and Axis, Churchill stated, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a
mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Id.
9 China’s economic growth is hotly debated among economists. See, e.g., Thomas G. Rawski, Can China Sustain Rapid
Economic Growth Despite Flawed Institutions?, in IN SEARCH OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT MODEL – BEYOND THE BEIJING
CONSENSUS 86-108 (Philip Hsu et al. ed., 2011) (and the references therein).
10 Village elections as well as the rhetorical propaganda of “multi-party cooperation” and “consultative democracy,”
supposedly achieved through the presence of the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and its
advisory legislative role, isn’t exactly multi-party democracy—two thirds of its members are representatives of the Chinese
Communist Party.
11 See, e.g., D. C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); Ronald Coase,
The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998). North’s seminal work refers to institutions as both formal and
informal frameworks that shape human interaction. Similarly, Coase makes clear that the working of an economic system
and its productivity depend on transaction costs that “depend on the institutions of a country: its legal system, its political
system, its social system, its educational system, its culture, and so on … a complex interrelated structure.” Nevertheless,
their approach is mostly understood to address formal state-created institutions as the key determinants for economic
growth, particularly those of property rights and contract enforcement.
See, e.g., Donald Clarke, Economic Development and the Right Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 90 (2003)
(interpreting North’s work and summarizing that “Productive capitalism needs formal adjudication, judiciary enforced
contracts and inviolable property rights.”). See also DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION,
INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 184 (2007) (labeling the institutional approach as ‘property rights
reductionism’— one that views the property rights protection as the end-all of development policy).
8
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of dimensions, leaving academics, practitioners, and foreign policy makers puzzled. Within this broad
spectrum, the success of Chinese publicly-listed firms and the domestic capital markets within which
they operate is particularly striking and provides an excellent focal-point through which China’s law
and development conundrum is examined here.12
Capital markets and the firms that populate them are eminent components in any growthoriented economy. Firms are the primary vehicle through which large scale production and commerce
take place. Their publicly listed form enables an aggregation of wealth of “innumerable individuals
under the same central control.”13 Capital markets, in turn, facilitate financing beyond relational-based
exchange, making capital accessible and less costly for firms. They enable large scale share-trade
between unfamiliar parties by facilitating information flow from firms to investors and back to
decision makers within firms. This informational function is expected to ensure the allocation of
capital to the most deserving firms (commonly referred to as efficient allocation of capital), thereby
aiding their further growth. Both the public firm and capital markets are considered major steps in
financial development and in economic development overall: the deeper the capital market is, the
greater the prospect for further economic growth is assumed to be.14
It is argued that in order for the capital market to become larger and deeper, and to ensure
efficient allocation of capital, it ought to be supported by legal institutions. This conventional wisdom
claims to have identified the particular prescription that is best suited for capital market development,
and by extension for economic growth. 15 While many controversies exist on various aspects within
this paradigm,16 the following propositions constitute the common understanding about corporate
governance and capital market development today:

Milhaupt and Pistor took an illuminating approach to the relationship between law and economic development through
the corporate governance lens. The authors offered an analysis of several country-based case studies that question many
of the conventional law and development theories. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM
(2008).
13 ADOLF A. BERLE & C. GARDINER, MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 129 (rev. ed. 1967).
14 Note that this does not mean that capital markets are crucial for economic growth; the evidence for that is far from
conclusive. Yet scholars are largely in agreement that growth can be expanded when capital market activity increases. For
the claim that higher levels of financial development are positively associated with economic development, see Robert G.
King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q. J. ECON. 717 (1993). Specifically regarding the
stock market, see Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 1690, 1999).
15 Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131-1150 (1997) (connecting legal origin
with the availability of external finance and the size of the capital market); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (identifying investor protection indicators across countries and making connections between the
ownership structure of public firms and these indicators); Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origin, 46
J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 302 (2008) (providing a literature review of related studies).
16 For general doubts as to the ability to produce all-inclusive indices, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive
Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008). For critics on specific elements within the Law and
Finance approach, see infra note 21.
12

6

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH
-

T.G.O

State ownership and heavy statist or political intervention impede market development,17 while
privatization works better;18
Dispersed ownership is more conductive to capital market development than concentrated
ownership;19 and finally,
Law matters: legal institutions, particularly those associated with investor protections,20 are
needed to attract external finance and are thus crucial for capital market development.21

Strikingly, China misses the mark on all three points. The development process of China’s
public market presents a different story altogether and leaves its observers puzzled. The story suggests
that at least under some circumstances, firms can develop and prosper while being subjected to state
ownership and politicized control. It indicates that concentrated ownership can be associated with
capital market growth. It also reflects that external financing might not be contingent on highly
functioning legal institutions, and that public firms can thrive even under a legal system that enables
profusion of related-party transactions and outright abuse of public shareholders. Capital markets, it
Friedrich Hayek is known for developing a theory according to which legal systems with traditions that constrain
government intervention (common law) are more compatible with a market economy than legal systems in which
government power was more freely asserted (civil law). See Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). The argument is supported by various studies noted in La Porta et al., The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origin, supra note 15.
18 MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRIVATIZING RUSSIA (1997) (arguing that in order to achieve economic growth, firms should
be de-politicized and the state should be distanced from firm ownership through privatization). This was indeed the
approach promoted by international policy organizations and applied via the privatization waves of the late 1980s and
early 1990s across Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America.
19 La Porta et al, supra note 15. See also Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999)
(inferring the same). But see Jeremy Edwards & Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation, 5 GER.
ECON. REV., 143 (2004).
20 This entire line of argument based on empirical reasoning has come to be known as the “Law and Finance” approach.
See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON., 430 (2008). Another thread of this
literature is the legal origin theory, grounded in the same articles by La Porta et. al, supra note 15, which posits that the
laws of common law countries are more protective of outside investors than those of (particularly French-)civil law
countries, and thus are more conductive to financial development. The original studies did not consider emerging markets
or transitional economies, but subsequent research addressed this in support. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, et al., The New
Comparative Economics, 31 J. COM. ECON. 595 (2003).
21 Critiques of the Law and Finance approach and disagreements about the specific desirable elements are not lacking, but
they all seem to hold that legal institutions and the availability of external finance are correlated. For questions as to the
applied coding, see Holger Spamann, Law and Finance Revisited (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No.
12, 2008) (re-coding the original data on shareholder and creditors rights based on different legal analysis and questioning
LLSV’s results). For conflicting evidence from a broader historical view, see Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great
Reversal: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON 5 (2003) (suggesting that by historic
accounts, LLSV’s cross-country conclusions on the strength of the US stock markets versus weakness of continental
European markets are misinformed). See also MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 12, at 23-25 (positing how changing the
period of time selected for the examined growth in different countries—common law and civil law countries—provides a
different outcome). For claims as to the inability of menu legal institutions to achieve intended results in practice without
appropriate adaptation to local conditions, see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003);
Bernard Black et al., Methods for Multicountry Studies of Corporate Governance: Evidence from the BRIKT Countries, 183 J.
ECONOMETRICS 230 (2014) (empirically questioning the predictive power of “common elements” and offering countryspecific governance indices). While not necessarily in critique of the Law and Finance approach, there is also controversy
on the implied causality of legal establishment and market development. Most notably, see John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed
Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange
as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997) (stating that law tends to follow rather than precede economic change).
17
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seems, can expand despite, and perhaps due to, “bad” corporate governance. Finally, and with no
contradiction, the story does support the general view that law matters, but for a completely different
reason. When legal institutions of corporate governance took form in China, they did not operate to
secure the rights of public investors in firms, but rather to implement the agenda of the polity and
consolidate its power. Thus, the importance of law to capital market development increased over time,
but its instrumental nature remained.

Classification of China’s Development Trajectory

To put China’s development trajectory into context, it is valuable to first identify its stages. A
common classification follows the stated shifts in economic policy, which are reflected in the
pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congresses. These can be divided into three
primary stages:
The first and early stage of economic transition, known as “Growing Out of the Plan,”22 1978–
1989, started in December 1978 with the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP,
which announced a “Reform and Opening” economic-policy.23 The focus of this early economic
transition stage was on experimenting with various methods to increase productivity in the state sector
and attracting foreign direct investments to the budding market. During the second stage of economic
transition, known as the “Modern Reform Era,” 1992–2007, the Party proclaimed the establishment
of a “Socialist Market Economy.” These years which formally started with the 14th Congress of the
CCP, 24 saw a robust enactment of economic laws and central-state institutional establishment. Finally,
the third and current stage of economic transition is known as the “Mixed Ownership Economy”
stage. The term was coined by the 17th Congress of the CCP in 2007,25 and explicitly announced as

Political economist Barry Naughton coined the term to represent the period in which China gradually stepped out of
the planned economy avoiding a grand political struggle. See BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE
ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1993 (1995).
23 See Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao (中国共产党第十一届
中央委员会第三次全体会议公报) [Communique] (adopted and promulgated by the 3rd Plenary Session of the
Eleventh
Cong.
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
Dec.
22,
1978,
available
at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html.
24 The Congress was held in October 1992; the economic plenum was held a year later. See Decision on Issues Concerning
the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy [hereinafter 14th Party Congress Decisions], in Zhongguo gongchandang
di shisi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao (中国共产党第十四届中央委员会第三次全体会议
公报) [Communique] (promulgated by the 3rd Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Cong. of the Communist Party of China,
Nov. 14, 1993), available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65395/4441750.html.
25 Hujintao zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao (胡锦涛在中国共产党第十
七次全国代表大会上的报告) [Report to the 17th Party Congress], (delivered by President Hu Jintao, Oct. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Report to the 17th Party Congress], available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/67507/6429847.html.
22
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the current “stage” of China’s economic transition during the 18th Congress of the CCP in 2013. 26
During this current stage, the Party plans to let markets play a more “decisive role” in the economy,
and specifically to encourage the financial system and capital market activity while at the same time
ensuring economic stabilization.27
Finally, a word of caution lest anyone be misled by this classification of transition stages: China
is often referred to as a transitional economy but the fact that its economic trajectory went through
various stages of transition does not make it one. A “transitional economy” implies a process toward
an end goal, most commonly toward ownership privatization and a liberal market economy. Some
economists have perhaps optimistically viewed China’s development trajectory to represent “gradual
privatization,” as if an end result of complete privatization is inevitable.28 Most expert observers of
China, however, agree that full privatization is not the end goal of the Chinese Party-state under any
CCP-led regime.29 Hence, while over several decades there has been some reduction in the state’s
direct equity holdings in PRC firms, coupled with varying spurts of growth in small to medium
enterprises often called “private,” these reductions in formal equity shares do not amount to even a
gradual reduction in control over the Party-state-operated assets. Accordingly, the term “transition”
here refers only to the temporal aspect of the institutions discussed, without assuming any final results.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF FIRMS AND THE CAPITAL MARKET
To uncover China’s law and capital market development conundrum, I provide an historical
account of the emergence of firms and capital markets. This account focuses on two key elements: 1)
the rise of the large (public) firm; and 2) the creation of capital markets in their narrow sense. The
review reflects how during the first and second stages of economic transition, China did not conform
with the common development assumptions mentioned above. China’s public firms emerged and
were able to expand with highly concentrated state ownership, and its capital markets evolved while
relying mainly on transitional, often informal, experimental mechanisms. Only halfway into the
development of firms and capital markets did a policy-guided embrace of corporate governance
institutions seen in other successful economies begin. But even then, the introduction of these
institutions was directed by political economy necessities—mainly, the concerns for Party-state

Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao (中国共产党第十八届中
央委员会第三次全体会议公报) [Communique] (adopted and promulgated by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th
Central Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Communique 2013], available at
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/15/content_31203056.htm (partial English translation).
27 Id.
28 Gérard Roland, Political Economy Issues of Ownership Transformation in Eastern Europe, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 31, 47-49 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995).
29 The term “Party-state” refers to a one-party system in which one political party directs both the political process and
the administrative governance of the state.
26
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legitimacy and the need to reconsolidate economic power. Private economic activity and capital market
efficiency were of lesser importance, consequently rendering the newly established laws and
institutions powerless and irrelevant.

A. The Rise of the Large (Public) Firm
One of the first instigators for the rise of public firms in China was the economic autonomy
that the central Party-state gradually granted to local level governments in order to advance economic
growth. Limited discretion to make decisions concerning economic policy has resulted in various local
economic initiatives. One such initiative was a party-sanctioned local experiment in the state sector
with various forms of organizational ownership. It started in the mid-1980s at local-provincial levels
and later expanded to be known as the national SOE (State-owned Enterprise) corporatization scheme.
These experiments supplanted the nascent market forces; they were meant to incentivize economic
activity in SOEs and to induce firms and their managers to adapt efficient measures to increase
productivity. The corporatization experiment also took the place of the abrupt privatization approach
that was common in other transitional economies.30 It introduced organizational ownership under
heightened control and an illiberal economic system.
As productivity increased and firms expanded, so did opportunities for abuse. Local economic
power accumulated and introduced shifts in the delicate political equilibrium. Local experiments with
enterprise reform were replaced by efforts of the central-state to reorganize and consolidate power
over firms, including by the use of legal reforms and institutions. The rise of the public firm in China
was thus strongly directed by political-economy. The result was Party-state control over a great
number of China’s most significant listed firms, one of the main attributes of China’s state-capitalism
today.31 The following provides an overview of how the public firm emerged, business groups were
created, and the Chinese Party-state became a dominant, often controlling, corporate stockholder.

Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000)
(discussing mass privatization of large firms in Russia and its dire consequences).
31 Commentators have taken different views as to China’s Party-state involvement in the economy. Some have argued
against the characterization of the Chinese economy as “state-capitalism.” See, e.g., NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER
MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS IN CHINA (2014) (considering the rapidly growing private business sector as a major
driver of economic growth and employment in China today). Others, such as Lin and Milhaupt as well as contributors in
Milhaupt and Liebman’s edited volume, use the terms more freely. See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis Milhaupt, We Are the (National)
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013); REGULATING THE VISIBLE
HAND?, (Curtis Milhaupt and Benjamin Liebman eds., 2016). I use the term to describe a system in which the Chinese
Party-state directly or indirectly functions as the controlling shareholder of most significant PRC industrial groups and
their domestic and globally-listed companies, as well as of the commercial and policy banks and financial firms, and at the
same time stands behind the market’s regulation and enforcement institutions.
30
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1. Economic Decentralization and SOEs
Under Mao Zedong’s command economic system (1949–1976), state-owned enterprises and
by urban and rural collective enterprises carried out most economic activity in China.32 The basic unit
for economic and social life, in both the collectives and state-owned enterprises, was the danwei—the
working unit—which was a political as well as an administrative institution. Bound to the danwei for
life, workers relied on it to provide their entire social welfare needs, including everything from housing
and food to entertainment. The danwei exercised economic, social, administrative, and political control
on behalf of the party and state, extending the Party-state’s presence and control to China’s grassroots.
Above the working units, plant-level enterprises were organized into sectoral or geographical
divisions, which were in turn assigned to various industrial bureaus.33 Under administrative control
and central planning, economic resource allocation was executed by fiats that were driven by political
and social needs rather than by supply and demand. The danwei itself had no economic independence;
instead, it was assigned production quotas and was funded through the state budget to reach the
quotas. Demand for the products was guaranteed through fixed outlets, which were transferred by
command to the other danwei units within a given state-owned or collective enterprise. All “profits”
were remitted to the state, and there was therefore no need for a modern taxation system.34 Under this
economic and social reality, production units had no need for external capital. They had no incentive
to seek new business opportunities, expand their production capacity beyond orders, or operate
efficiently.
Starting in the early 1980s and continuing throughout China’s long process of economic
transition, reforms took place on a somewhat eclectic, trial-and-error basis of experimentation,35 which
was endorsed by the central Party-state. 36 Most economic policies were focused on state-owned
enterprises and only gradually opened-up to the idea of private forms of ownership.37 The primary
Under Mao, limited private economic activity was allowed from time to time to the peasantry. Private agriculture activity
made up a very small portion of rural labor input. Andrew C. Mertha, From “Rustless Screws” to “Nail Houses”: The
Evolution of Property Rights in China (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
33 Theodore Groves et al., China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market, 103 J. POL. ECON. 873, 876 (1995).
34 STOYAN TENEV ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE
INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 10-11 (2002).
35 Sebastian Heilmann refers to “experimentation under hierarchy” as a “process of policy generation that legitimizes local
initiative while maintaining ultimate hierarchical control.” Sebastian Heilmann, Experience First, Laws Later: Experimentation
and Breakthroughs in the Restructuring of China’s State Sector, in GOING PRIVATE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING AND SYSTEM REFORM 95-118 (Jean Chun Oi ed., 2011); Sebastian Heilmann, Experimentation under
Hierarchy: Policy Experiments in the Reorganization of China’s State Sector, 1978-2008 (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard U., Faculty
Working Paper No. 172, 2008).
36 Heilmann, Experimentation under Hierarchy, supra note 35. See also YUEN YUEN ANG, HOW CHINA ESCAPED THE POVERTY
TRAP (2016) (suggesting that the empowerment of local agents to experiment with innovative policy solutions was a major
component in China’s ability to “escape the poverty trap” despite weak legal institutions).
37 With the exception of rural (mostly land related) reforms. Economic activity in rural areas and specifically in agricultural
land had gone through different reforms that reflect different property rights arrangements. JANOS KORNAI, THE
SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 74-79 (1992); TENEV ET AL., supra note 34, at 11.
32
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goal of the experiments was to encourage more productive activity in state-owned enterprises. One of
the first examples is the introduction of “shares” into enterprises. Although the term “corporatization”
formally refers to the ownership organizational reform taken in SOEs in the 1990s, the process had
started much earlier with experiments within collective enterprises in the countrysides, which later
spilled over into state-owned enterprises. 38 Shares were issued and given primarily to enterprise
employees. In 1986, the State Council released regulations permitting local governments to select a
few large and medium-sized SOEs in their localities as formal pilots for shareholding experiments,
thereby acknowledging share ownership assignment as a formal experiment and applying it more
broadly.39 However, the issued shares provided a fixed and guaranteed dividend cash payment much
like a bank deposit and therefore did not create incentives to increase production.
Other ways to incentivize local governments to increase productivity during the early
transition phase were dual-track pricing and fiscal contracting. These schemes permitted state
enterprises to sell excess products at newly-emerging market prices, remit part of the profits to the
local government, and retain the rest. In the early 1980s, local governments were delegated such rights
over a great number of state assets. It is estimated that already by 1985 state-owned enterprises
controlled by the central government accounted for only twenty percent of total industrial output of
all enterprises at or above the township level. By 1994, state assets controlled by the central
government were only thirty-five percent of all state assets.40 In this environment, local governments
have become largely dependent on their own generated revenues and less reliant on centrally allocated
resources, thus creating dependence on local enterprises for revenue. This process has had meaningful
implications for China’s political structure and is one of the main catalysts for China’s “Fragmented
Authoritarianism” today. 41 As described by Lieberthal, the “decentralization of budgetary authority
enabled many locales and bureaucratic units to acquire funds outside of those allocated through the

The first local experiments with share issuance happened in the countryside before there was a formal acknowledgment
of broad policy experimentation. For a detailed chronology of local initiatives and experiments with stock issuance and
trading platforms, see CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J. T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS
21-22 (2006) (mentioning Provisional Management Measures that were released locally by the Shanghai Branch of the
People’s Bank of China in July 1984 as the first formal rules promulgated by a local government body to address the
issuance of shares). The rules, known as the “Eight Articles” (Batiao) limited the issuance of shares to newly established
“collective enterprises,” excluding SOEs from the initial experiments. Yet, shares of collective enterprises could be held
by SOEs or other collectives, as well as by specific types of individuals, excluding party officials. Peasants were permitted
to invest in shares, and employees could (and were often encouraged to) purchase shares of the enterprise they worked at.
As Walter and Howie state, this was done in an effort to protect SOEs and party officials from the new, politically charged,
capitalist initiative.
39 See id. (mentioning approval of share issuance to Liaoning Fushun No. 1 Brick Factory in January 1980 as the pioneering
share issuance, followed by the issue of shares of Chengdu Shudu Office Building Co. Ltd. the same year, Shenzhen Baoan
County United Investment Co. Ltd. share issuance in 1983, and Beijing Tianqiao Department Store Co. Ltd. share issuance
in 1984).
40 Shuhe Li & Peng Lian, Decentralization and Coordination: China’s Credible Commitment to Preserve the Market under
Authoritarianism, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 161, 176-178 (1999).
41 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: the ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism Model’ and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS,
AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1991).
38

12

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

central budget, which they could use to pursue their own policy preferences.”42 This was a shock to
the political-economic equilibrium, creating new competition between localities and power shifts from
the center.43
Beyond its implications on the allocation of administrative and economic decision-making
authority within the Party-state system, economic decentralization also had direct implications on the
organizational ownership of state assets. It shaped how firms were structured, business groups
emerged, and how the capital market evolved more broadly. Salient among these, economic
decentralization directly informed the ways industrial enterprises were managed.
Local governments started to create various schemes with the goal to increase production in
the SOEs under their administrative management. Within each local government’s administrative
boundaries, officials were assigned to manage the state assets organized in SOEs. These appointed
managers engaged in “Management Contract Responsibility” arrangements with their local
governments. Many of these new arrangements involved performance targets, compensation plans,
and control rights,44 including, for example,45 1) contract-based arrangements between SOEs and their
supervising government agency in which SOEs bargained for profit remittance targets, allowing the
SOE to keep the surplus (in many cases, profits above target were distributed to workers and
managers); 2) giving greater control to SOE managers over sales, pricing, production, and finally even
on investments and labor decisions, in return for achieving profit remittance targets; and 3) when the
central government introduced a share issuance system, managers and other senior employees received
shares in their SOEs as an additional incentive to increase firm profitability.
Such arrangements allowed the managers to have growing discretion over the use of the
enterprise’s generated profits. The goal was to incentivize managers to perform better. Local
government officials who were assigned to manage the SOEs were then able to use the retained profits
and their broadened managerial discretion to expand the assets under their management.
To further their authority, many opted to create SOE subsidiaries such as collective enterprises
and joint ventures. To these affiliated businesses, they often provided local government sponsorship
and personal patronage. This new form of asset diversification helped local government officials to
gain more autonomy from supervising central government agencies. Consequently, local government
officials emerged as dominant business players and powerful decisionmakers in their jurisdictions.
The process of economic decentralization and these local experiments did not follow the
globally advocated strategies for stimulating market development. They also functionally substituted
Id. at 8.
Susan Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL
INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG ERA 101, 111 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004).
44 See Donald C. Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION 375, 415-416 (Thomas Rawski & Loren Brandt eds., 2008). See generally Li & Lian, supra note 40, at 176.
45 Groves et al., supra note 33.
42
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for traditional corporate institutions and formed the baseline for the rise of the Chinese public firm.46
Another result, however, was the accumulation of local powers, which had several important negative
effects.
First, strong local protectionism arose, and it guided economic and administrative decision
making, including with respect to firms. Known aspects of economic protectionism are the approval
of risky investment schemes often without solid feasibility checks and the influence of local
government officials on the supply of bank loans to SOEs.47 Another notable effect was on legal
enforcement, which was tainted by selective enforcement in favor of local parties.48 Protectionism also
led to informal internal trade barriers that different provinces created against each other and which
influenced the operation of firms by limiting cross-provincial business cooperation and curbing
competition.
Second, such economic decentralization created the potential for conflicts of interest at
various levels, between the administrative role of individual officials and their role as SOE managers,
as well as between the central administration and the localities.49 In addition, multiple overlapping
government agencies had a say in monitoring various aspects of the operations of SOEs, including
labor, production, and resource allocation. This led to burdensome multilevel bureaucratic
interference with SOE management by various state agencies and Party agents with conflicting
interests.50 These lines of conflict created the concern that local officials (and SOE managers among
them) would become less attuned to central government goals, and it made coordination between
central and local government organs more challenging.
The central government was not blind to these concerns and tried to curb the developing ties
between local administrative authority and economic power.51 A separation between the government
role and the commercial activities of SOEs was announced.52 Under this approach, government and
See Clarke et al., supra note 44, at 415-416 (discussing managerial incentives as a functional substitution for corporate
governance institutions).
47 TENEV ET AL., supra note 34, at 20-21 (positing that the high level of nonperforming loans in the banking system creates
a gap in incentives nowadays too).
48 This influenced the wide spectrum of legal enforcement, including debt collections, bankruptcy, prosecution, and
adjudication. Protectionism also tainted other administrative processes, such as business licensing, allocation of labor,
credit financing, taxation, and profit retention privileges. Protectionism in the People’s Court system emanated from other
related factors; economic decentralization and local self-funding also meant that local governments were the ones to fund
the operation of the judicial system in their locales. See Randy Peerenboom, The Judiciary: In Search of Independence, Authority
and Competence, in CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 280, 311(Randy Peerenboom ed., 2002).
49 Jean Oi, The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy,144 CHINA Q, 1132, 1144-1145 (1995).
50 Donald Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 4 CHINA ECON. REV. 494, 497-498 (2003).
51 See Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jingji tizhi gaige de jueding (中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定) [Decision on
Reforming the Economic Structure] (promulgated by the Central Comm. of the Communist Party of China, 3rd Plenary
Session of the Twelfth Central Committee, Oct. 20, 1984), art. 6 [hereinafter 1984 CCP Decision on Reforming the
Economic Structure], available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64565/65378/4429522.html (showing
noticeable beginnings of this shift).
52 Howard Chao & Xiaoping Yang, Private Enterprise in China: The Developing Law of Collective Enterprises, 19 INT’L L. 1215,
1220 (1986) (citing several decisions that instructed party and government officials to resign either from their company
46
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party officials were not allowed, at least not formally, to manage enterprises directly while also serving
in other public posts. (This is not to be equated with the Anglo-American “separation between
ownership and control,” which was implemented later through corporatization.)
Over time, however, these steps to separate government from enterprises proved ineffective.53
The separation seemed artificial and only added to existing operational difficulties. With little or no
business or managerial knowledge, management appointees, now former government and military
officials (members of the nomenklatura), were still conduits of the government unit that appointed
them. Moreover, the appointing units continued to supervise the managers, a pattern that led to local
corruption and capture. Unfamiliar with the new business reality, the supervising state agencies were
caught unprepared, lacking the capacity to monitor their appointed agents.54 The concern for conflicts
of interest materialized. New economic opportunities along with broader managerial freedom brought
wealth extraction and asset stripping in SOEs. Managers freely partook in value and asset transfers
and were not held accountable for losses.55
By late 1980s, the relative inefficiencies of SOEs became a point of growing concern, especially
in light of increasing competition from an emerging private sector (still mainly rural) and the limited
penetration of foreign businesses.56 By the mid-1990s, forty-one percent of China’s SOEs suffered
losses.57 A new social layer of crony-capitalists began to emerge.58 The former state officials and party
members in their private capacity started to form a powerful interest group, whose members’ personal
interests gradually became directly invested in China’s firms and have direct power over economic
policy decisions. This process soon became the source of many of China’s current corporate
governance and capital market challenges.

posts or from their public one). This is not the situation nowadays, as senior executives in China’s biggest SOEs often
simultaneously hold important positions in the government and the party.
53 See generally, 43Michael Irl Nikkel, Chinese Characteristics in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company
Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 518-520 (1995).
54 Xue Liang Ding, The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firms, 43 CHINA J. 1 (2000) (describing a “bleeding of the state
sector” into the private hands of manager-appointees and officials assigned to supervise them).
55 Dominic Ziegler, The Honeycomb of Corruption—A Little Reform in the State Sector Has Proved A Dangerous Thing, ECONOMIST,
Vol. 355, Apr. 8, 2000, pp. CS8-CS10, available at https://www.economist.com/node/299621 (“reforms that have brought
great complexity to the state sector's relations … ‘managers of Chinese state firms essentially have ended up capturing a
sizeable portion of the widely scattered public property’”).
56 Gary Jefferson, Are China's Rural Enterprises Outperforming State-Owned Enterprises? (World Bank China Series, Research
Paper No. CH-RPS 24, 1993) (focusing on the rapid growth of Town-Village Enterprises as the critical element in China’s
economic transition success).
57 China Plans New Bankruptcy Law, WALL STREET J., Dec 30, 1994, at A4.
58 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?, 211 CHINA Q. 624 (2012).
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2. National Level Schemes
Asset stripping from SOEs, corruption, and capture were not rampant only within local
governments but rather were carried out at all levels. Yet economic decentralization and the resulting
accumulation of local powers were a main driving force behind the national level efforts that came
next. The corporate form as an organizational ownership structure of SOEs was introduced and
utilized as part of the central Party-state effort for national restoration to achieve both domestic
consolidation and international competitiveness.
Facing the institutional challenges discussed above, central government agencies started to
develop schemes for structural reform. The State Commission for the Reform of the Economic
System (CRES), a national state agency under the direct authority of the State Council that was created
to handle economic reform and granted the authority to design and issue relevant policies, undertook
one of the best-known initiatives. The CRES, without any prior move by the national legislature or
even the Party, introduced a national legal reform of business enterprises.59 The two policy documents,
known as the 1992 Normative Opinions, defined different legal forms of organization for equity sharebased enterprises. The 1992 Normative Opinions also prescribed normative business standards in
such companies, introducing for the first-time modern principles of corporate organization.60 Despite
being issued by an administrative state body rather than by a national legislator (the NPC or the State
Council), the 1992 Normative Opinions are viewed as the first de-facto modern national business
organization law.61
A few months later, the central Party-state picked up these agency-led efforts through two
important enterprise organizational plans: i) the “modern enterprise system;” and ii) accelerating
business groups.62 These were meant to rebuild the troubled state sector while reconsolidating control
over SOES.

Youxian Zeren Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Normative Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability Companies] (promulgated
by the State Comm’n for Restructuring the Economic Systems, May 15, 1992), available here
http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=5740 [hereinafter Normative Opinion on LLCs 1]; Gufen Youxian
Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Normative Opinions on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares] (promulgated by the State
Commission
for
Restructuring
the
Economic
Systems,
May
15,
1992),
available
here
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=5738&lib=law [hereinafter Normative Opinion on CLSs] [hereinafter together
1992 Normative Opinions].
60 For example, enterprise legal personhood, shareholders’ limited liability, share ownership, transferability of shares, and
formal separation between management and ownership. See Normative Opinion on LLCs 2, supra note 59, arts. 1, 22, 28,
30, 39, 41-42.
61 Not having a formal status of law and being the “opinions” of an administrative commission, the status of these opinions
was subject to debate. In retrospect, the State Council confirmed their effect as a ministry-level regulation. See Nicholas C.
Howson, China’s Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L., 127, 137
(1997).
62 A parallel reform with much the same political consolidation purpose was the Tax Reform of 1994, which included
methods to redefine the fiscal relationship between the central and local government and increase the center’s fiscal control.
S. B. Herschler, The 1994 Tax Reforms: The Center Strikes Back, 6 CHINA ECON. REV. 239 (1995).
59
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i. The “Modern Enterprise System” — Corporatization and Share-Ownership
The Decisions of the 14th Party Congress announced a shift toward a “modern enterprise
system.” 63 This policy formally initiated a national process for SOE corporatization, in which a
modern corporate form was adopted, although still on a probationary basis. By adopting the features
of the modern corporation as the organizational form that had proven successful worldwide, it was
hoped that productivity would increase and that efficiency would start to guide the management of
state-owned enterprises. 64 Interestingly, however, several elements from the 1992 Normative
Opinions, including standards for shareholder protections,65 were not embraced by the CCP decision
and were withdrawn in the enactment of the subsequent, and first, PRC Company law.66
Adopting the contours of a modern corporation in law reflected a formal acknowledgment of
several corporate attributes, such as a separate legal personality, limited liability, transferability of rights,
and separation of ownership from management, which was referred to as “scientific management.” 67
Furthermore, it meant a (re)conceptualization of property rights ideas and specifically ownership
interests through shares, even if this was still exercised mainly by the state on behalf of “all the
people.”68 Indeed, as part of the corporatization initiative, share ownership rights in enterprises were
formally recognized. The significance of this should not go unnoticed and is especially striking given
that China’s first Property Law was enacted only in 2007. 69 Ownership of financial assets and
particularly the economic rights attached to it were still openly frowned upon at that time.70 This had
a simple ideological basis, as earnings from capital assets ran counter to the basic Marxist view of
labor-based income. Thus, a share system that was taken beyond local experimentations and
acknowledged in a formal national law had to be motivated by a strong national purpose. It is indeed
well established among China commentators that the corporatization scheme was designed to attract

See 14th Party Congress Decisions, supra note 24.
Donald Clarke, How China’s Effort to Bring Private-Sector Standards into the Public Sector Backfired, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE
HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 35 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J.
Milhaupt eds., 2015).
65 Howson, supra note 61 (comparing the 1992 Opinions and related documents with the 1993 Company Law).
66 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1994) [hereinafter “1993 Company
Law”]. The Company Law was later revised. See infra note 147.
67 Id. arts. 3-7.
68 Although all assets were possessed by the state in the traditional state-owned enterprises system, the corporatization
process and share-ownership can be viewed as distinguishing between administrative possession and the recognition of
the state (and state bodies) as a property share owner.
69 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquanfa [Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007). On the controversies surrounding the enactment process, see
Songyan Sui, New Property Law Shakes Up China, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2007, 1:10 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/6429977.stm.
70 Only in 2002, following Jiang Zemin’s 2001 speech and the official proclamations of the 16th Communist Party
Congress, were party members officially welcome to pursue investment-sourced income.
63
64
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public finance to recover the failing state sector. 71 However, given the shifts in China’s politicaleconomic equilibrium, it was also an act of consolidating control over business organization.
In the process of corporatization, SOEs as industrial-ministerial or provincial-line state
agencies were converted from their former organization into one of the corporate forms recognized
under the newly enacted Company Law. The law distinguished between three main corporate forms
of organization: (1) a Limited Liability Company (LLC) (youxian zeren gongsi) intended for a small and
more closely held group of investors, similar to the close corporation form in the United States; (2) a
Joint Stock Limited Company, also known as a “company limited by shares” (CLS) (gufen youxian gongsi),
which may be a listed company or an unlisted company, although the assumption was that a company
will be established with the intention to list in the future; and (3) a Wholly State-Owned Limited
Liability Company (guoyou duzi gongsi), a special type of LLC wholly owned by a state body. 72
As part of their reorganization, the corporatized SOEs had to shed their social welfare
functions and maintain only their productive assets and human capital. 73 These newly created legal
entities were then either grouped under (1) central and local-level state bodies (e.g., central, provincial,
and municipal government organs with jurisdiction over a particular industrial sector or region), which
were now reorganized as holding companies with subsidiary “legal person” holdings; or (2) organized
with other existing PRC enterprises (such as collectives and other companies that were also controlled
by non-central government bodies) and given a “legal person” status.74
The controlling shares of these corporations were issued to the industrial ministry or to other
national and local government units from which the corporation was created. The structural outcome
of this corporate organization process was the consolidation of the productive assets and human
capital of traditional state-owned enterprises and their vesting in several now-corporatized SOEs in
which the central or the local government now had shares.
It was assumed that the new corporate shareholding capacity of the state would eliminate
conflicts between the various state agencies involved in the firms’ operations since they would have
one vehicle, the shareholder vote, to promote their goals.75 In addition, the corporate form was not
only thought to be better suited for efficient management but was also essential in order to make
external equity financing possible.
To establish this conclusion, scholars present the percentage of listed firms originated from SOEs. For example, Clarke
brings sources to show how at the end of 2000, of the 1,088 listed companies on both exchanges, over 900 were originally
traditional state-owned enterprises. At the end of 2001, out of 1,160 listed companies, approximately 1,103 were originally
traditional state-owned enterprises. Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 125, 131 (2006).
72 For the LLC form, see 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, arts. 3, 9, 19, 20. For the CLS form, see id. arts. 3, 73, 74. For
the wholly state-owned LLC form, see id. arts. 3, 64.
73 The social welfare functions were transferred to “social affairs units” (shiye danwei) under relevant ministries. See DALI L.
YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
(2004).
74 Harry G. Broadman, The Business(es) of the Chinese State, 24 WORLD ECON. 849, 860-863 (2001). For an extensive analysis
of Chinese listed firms group formation, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31.
75 For a critique, see Clarke, supra note 50, at 497-500 (noting how the same state entity can still seek multiple, sometime
conflicting goals and how the state still in practice kept exercising its control not only through its shareholding capacity).
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While formally initiated at the national-level by the new Company Law of 1993, the
corporatization scheme was implemented gradually and by experimentation first. By the mid-1990s,
the State Council selected 100 large and medium size SOEs for a pilot program. The SOEs that were
corporatized as CLSs could now raise equity investments from domestic and foreign investors and
assign them shares in return. From this point onward, while companies with dominant state ownership
were still colloquially called SOEs, it is more accurate to refer to them as state-controlled companies.
A survey of 2,343 pilot enterprises conducted by the State Statistical Bureau in 1997 revealed
that 85 percent of the enterprises had corporatized into one of the legal corporate forms. Among
these, 39 percent adopted the wholly state-owned form, 23 percent adopted the LLC form, and
another 23 percent adopted the CLS form.76 By the end of 2000, over 80 percent of all state-owned
enterprises surveyed were transformed into corporations, and over 1,200 large enterprises were
restructured specifically as CLSs.77
While the restructuring effort was carried out successfully and the corporatized firms quickly
attracted outside financing (see below), in practice, however, the contribution of this process to
management quality, accountability, and efficiency was limited. One of the main reasons was the
cognizant design of the share structure in the corporatized SOEs.
Strategically refraining from privatization, the newly corporatized SOEs that turned to equity
financing were required to maintain a third of their shares as state shares. These shares were classified
as common but untradeable shares and could be owned only by state entities. Another third of the
newly issued shares were reserved for legal persons. These were also common but untradeable shares
and were only transferable to other legal persons with appropriate approvals that included price
determination.78 During that time, China’s economic laws determined that legal persons were domestic
organizations with formal legal personality, which meant that the definition in practice excluded
individuals.79 Moreover, since purely private businesses were at that time few in number, legal persons
de-facto meant enterprises that were state-owned or state affiliated. This diversification of different
types of common shares practically meant that about two-thirds of a listed company’s shares were
directly and indirectly held by organs of the state. It also meant that only about a third of the company’s
shares—the public float—were transferable.80 This system isolated state shares from market forces
and had implications on the valuation of listed companies. Most important, the potential disciplinary
role of the capital markets on the insiders of the firms was curtailed from the start.
He Jun, An Empirical Study on the Governance Structure of Listed Companies [Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Jieguo de Shizheng Fenxi.
(Jingji Yanjiu)], 5 ECON. RESEARCH. J (1998).
77 TENEV ET AL., supra note 34. Unfortunately, the source does not mention the total number of firms surveyed and
therefore the percentage of CLS corporatization in SEOs is unclear.
78 Wenxuan Hou & Edward Lee, Split Share Structure Reform, Corporate Governance, and the Foreign Share Discount Puzzle in
China, 20 EUR. J. FIN. 703, 709 (2014).
79 The Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 4th session of the fifth National People’s
Congress, December 13, 1981, effective July 1, 1982, was enacted to govern agreements between domestic “legal persons.”
Those at that time were legal entities restricted to the state sector, SOEs and/or collectives. The law was amended in 1993
to include all domestic registered and licensed business entities (still, not individuals).
80 Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspective, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190 (2015).
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The share composition started to change after the split-share structure reform was announced
in 2005. 81 State-owned shares and legal-persons’ shares were, in principle, gradually subjected to
market discipline. Today, legal person shares are held by entities such as industrial enterprises (mostly
SOEs), holding companies, non-bank financial institutions, and research institutions. These legal
person shares are largely still indirectly controlled by the state.
Yet, even today, making state and legal person shares tradable does not mean these shares are
suddenly being traded. State ownership in significant cases is retained. Either state bodies do not trade
their shares in practice82 or they trade their shares through a private placement to another state-owned
or affiliated enterprise. Alternatively, in many instances and often following policy directives, state
ownership is reduced but control is maintained through mergers and acquisitions, diversification to
subsidiaries and holding groups, and group formation. While these methods are globally-common
business strategies,83 they resulted in the entrenchment of voting control at the hands of the state and
its affiliates while reducing equity ownership and accountability for losses.84
ii. Business Group Formation
Another key effort that the central Party-state took to reconsolidate control over SOEs was
the acceleration of business group formation. As early as 1987, the CRES encouraged SOEs to
organize as “business groups” (qiye jituan).85 In its Opinions for the Establishment and Encouragement
of Business Groups [The Business Groups Opinions],86 the enterprise group was defined as a multilevel organizational structure, with various circles of enterprises tied together by a charter and by
shared organizational features, yet each with corresponding autonomy.87 This organizational structure

A self-assessment study conducted by the CSRC and China’s State Economic and Trade Commission before the sharestructure reform was launched found that seventy-seven percent of China’s controlling shareholders in a study that
included 1,175 listed firms could be considered state entities, while in about a third of the companies a single-state
shareholders held more than half of the shares. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 148 n. 58.
82 Id.
83 Another business strategy to raise capital is to leverage the firm. Debt capital does not require the state to give up control
nor dilute its ownership interests and has become an acute problem especially for local-level SOEs. Kun Su, The Inner
Structure of Pyramid and Capital Structure: Evidence from China, 9 ECON.: THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-J., 1 (2015)
(finding that multiple layers of pyramid structure increase a “leverage effect” and the motivation of the ultimate owner to
expand debt financing).
84 See discussion infra Chapter 2.
85 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714.
86 The Opinions on the Establishment and Development of Business Groups, issued by the State Commission on
Restructuring the Economy and the State Economic Commission, recognized Business Groups as a “multi-level
organizational structure” with separate legal personality. See Guanyu Zujian he Fazhan Qiye Jituan de Jidian Yijian (关于
组 建 和 发 展 企 业 集 团 的 几 点 意 见 ) [Opinions on the Establishment and Development of Business Groups]
(promulgated by the Nat’l Econ. Sys. Reform Comm’n & the Nat’l Econ. Comm’n, Dec. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Business
Groups Opinions], available at http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg21829/31802.shtml.
87 Id.
81
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expanded in the following years until it turned into a national goal.88 The creation of national business
groups eventually applied systematically along former ministerial or sectorial line bureaus.89
During corporatization and the introduction of a share system, group companies were also the
corporatized SOEs that issued shares and raised equity capital from the public—the business group’s
publicly listed firm. These, in many cases, became China’s national champions. Other enterprises
under the same core company within the group provide related services to support the main
corporatized listed firm, such as research and development or education subsidiaries, the group’s
finance company, and other service entities (subsidiaries or affiliated firms) that expand the group’s
network through contractual arrangements.90
Today, the picture that has emerged is one of an intricate layered network of dozens of related
companies within business groups in specific industrial sectors. Enterprise groups must register as
such,91 a status that grants their various entities opportunities for preferential taxes, stock listing, and
government contracts.92 Entities within the group are tied to a parent “core” company, above which
the state presides. The core company functions as the holding company in the group. The main
production enterprise within the group is the “group company”—the unit to which most of the state
assets as well as economic and production activities were funneled through the corporatization process.
The policy of accelerating business group formation was meant to encourage competition,
prevent monopoly, promote technological progress, and improve economic efficiency through,
among other ways, economies of scale.93 In many key industries, however, and especially after state
assets were restructured under the national State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) and its local branches—which hold controlling or full ownership interests at
the core parent company—group formation actually led to monopolistic and oligopolistic group
power. 94 Since the reorganization of state assets in groups meant carving corporations out of
industrial-sector ministries and agencies, groups from inception were de facto confined to certain
geographical areas or to a certain step in the production chain within a given industry.95 Thus, while
Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714.
Brødsgaard, supra note 58, at 627-628.
90 For the various entity components of the national business groups in China, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 717721.
91 The Business Group Opinions were further developed with the issuance of Qiye Jituan Dengji Guanli Zhanxing Guiding
88
89

(企业集团登记管理暂行规定) [Provisional Rules on Business Group Registration] (promulgated by the St. Council,
Sept. 1, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 1997). For a comprehensive review on their function today, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note
31, at 712-720.
92 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714.
93 Business Groups Opinions, supra note 86, art. 5. See also Brødsgaard, supra note 58, at 627-628; Lin & Milhaupt, supra
note 31, at 714.
94 For example, in energy, petroleum, telecommunications, and chemicals industries. Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 5, at
690-691, n.129.
95 This is the case particularly for central-state held groups in strategic industries. One of the examples most commonly
referred to in the literature, is the asset reorganization and corporatization of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. See id. at
692.
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they were theoretically competing with parallel groups, they in fact accumulated market dominance in
their designated roles.
While the group structure may have limited the development of domestic competition, it
contributed to China’s competitive abilities in the global market. As noted by Lin and Milhaupt, the
government encouraged business group formation to foster the growth of national champions as
engines of development. 96 Finally, the national endorsement of business group formation had an
additional important goal, to aid the Party-state in “streamline[ing] control over the economy.”97 In
theory, by reducing information and coordination costs, national-level vertically integrated groups are
able to transmit and implement economic policy more easily, serving and amplifying central-level
control.98
Notwithstanding these aspirations, policy makers acknowledged several concerns from the
very beginning of this strategy in the late 1980s. The Business Groups Opinions cautioned against
potential conflicting interests not only between various levels of group member companies but also
between different levels of the state. The Business Groups Opinions emphasized that groups should
not operate in ways that would damage national interests.99 However, concerns have materialized at
both levels: the group system furthered local-level networks, and it concentrated economic and
administrative power in the hands of a few national champions and their leaders. At least from a
domestic perspective, it seems that the endorsement of business group formation backfired.

Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 699 (“One highly distinctive characteristic of state capitalism in China is the central
role of about 100 large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (guoyou qiye) controlled by organs of the national government in
critical industries … These globally significant SOEs are China’s national champions.”). See id. at 714, n. 51 (noting that
the creation of national champions was explicitly recognized as a goal of the central government in 1996 in the Outline
Report on the Ninth Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development and the Perspective and Goals of
2010. See Guanyu Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan “Jiu Wu” Jihua He 2010 Nian Yuanjing Mubiao Gangyao Ji Guanyu
“Gang Yao” Baogao De Jueyi (关于国民经济和 社会发展“九五”计划和 2010 年远景目标纲要及关于《纲要》报
告的决议) [Outline Report on the Ninth Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development and the
Perspective and Goals of 2010) (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996). See also Lin & Milhaupt, supra
note 31, at 712 (noting that the encouragement of business group formation is a common strategy in many other countries,
and is often used to fill institutional voids, and reduce transaction costs of administrating economic policy).
97 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 714.
98 There are, however, several articles that suggest the opposite view. See Joseph P. H. Fan et al., Institutions and Organizational
Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1217 (2013) (arguing that local government
organizational pyramids are designed to minimize political costs of state interference, further suggesting that this was
implemented by local governments in an effort to assign them more credibility to nonintervention vis a vis investors); Kun
Su et al., Pyramidal Structure, Risk‐Taking and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Local SOEs, 26 ECON. TRANSITION 401 (2018)
(viewing business group formation as a form of decentralization that was aimed to reduce political influence on firms by
increasing intervention cost along the layers of the pyramid); Min Zhang et al., Pyramidal Structure, Political Intervention and
Firms' Tax Burden: Evidence from China's Local SOEs, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 15 (2016) (looking at the influence of state-pyramids
on corporate tax burden, finding that state-pyramidal layers are significantly and negatively associated with effective tax
rates, which the authors argue indicates that group pyramids formed to protect local state-owned enterprises from political
intervention). It should be noted that Lin and Milhaupt focused on national level groups under SASAC, thus the views on
the use of business groupism might not be in contradiction. Either way, scholars would probably agree that at the local
level, the endorsement of business groups had increased decentralization and added to conflicting interests.
99 Business Groups Opinions, supra note 86, art. 13.
96
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During the first few years of the scheme, the national-level endorsement of business groups
boosted empire-building by the localities and widened the divide between central-level and local-level
economic power. Local governments had used the opportunity to create pyramid-layered business
groups that dissociated them from central government control. 100 This form of economic
disentanglement from central control through local-group organization is an aspect of the shifts in
China’s political economy that carries implications today.101 Also, with respect to national-level groups,
since many of the most important national champion groups were converted from previous industrial
ministries, there was a strong political pressure to maintain their rank within the bureaucratic
hierarchy.102 As a result, these business groups and the general managers of many of their corporatized
SOEs still enjoy a status equivalent to that of a minister or vice minister in the state’s hierarchical
bureaucracy. This makes supervision over them by state administrative bodies charged with tensions
and battles over authority.
In sum, the policy endorsement of business group formation has been a significant contributor
to China’s rising economic power, particularly in the international front. However, it has also amplified
the conflicts of interest between the various authorities of the state, both horizontally and vertically.
Furthermore, business group formation also intensified conflicts at the group level itself. Having to
consider group-level implications, the core company and its controlling state-owner became further
alienated from the shareholders’ interests in each firm within the group.103

B. The Formation of Capital Markets (in their narrow sense)
Capital market institutions operate to reduce the costs of raising external finance. This is
achieved primarily by facilitating transactions in a large number of securities simultaneously, making
information easily available to potential and existing investors, and reducing the costs of monitoring.
Importantly, capital markets promote efficiency by allocating capital to the most deserving firms.
Capital markets in China, however, evolved primarily to serve other functions. The following review
examines how capital markets, in their technical, narrow sense, formed in China, focusing on the
primary mechanisms through which stocks were issued and traded and the institutions that were
created to govern them.

See sources in supra note 98 (positing that this was also a form for the local governments to attract investors by
committing through the pyramid structure to less government interference).
101 In previous work, I suggested how such economic disentanglement from the central Party-state may eventually
empower public investors through a budding form of a market for corporate control. See Tamar Groswald Ozery, Minority
Public Shareholders in China's Concentrated Capital Markets—A New Paradigm, 30 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 45-48 (2016).
102 Brødsgaard, supra note 58, at 612.
103 See discussion infra Chapter 2.
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Like the creation of corporations, capital market activity in China was initiated informally on
an experimental basis, which was later broadened by provisional national schemes before finally being
formalized. Also similar to the making of the corporate form, the justification for establishing formal
nation-wide capital markets lay primarily in their function as a financing tool for SOEs.104 While the
stock markets were formally active since 1990, in the second half of that decade, the state started to
support the system of public share issuance explicitly when searching for alternatives to bank lending.
Commentators attribute this to the pressing need to rescue the troubled state sector, which became
deeply indebted at that time.105 This shaped stock market development ever since as a platform to
finance the restructuring of SOEs, rather than as a marketplace that promotes efficient allocation of
capital. The implications extend to the present, as clearly seen through frequent Party-state measures
in keeping stock prices up in order to sustain the value of corporatized SOEs. As with the emergence
of the public firm, the levers of the capital markets have been moved by shifts in power dynamics as
central Party-state institutions made efforts to regain full control over the emerging market.

1. Share-Offering Platforms
The first share offerings in Chinese entities after the initiation of market reform were tested
offshore on the Hong Kong exchange or conducted informally by local institutions. This occurred
during the second half of the 1980s. The initiators were local financial institutions, mainly local bank
branches, special economic zones, securities companies, and local OTC trading centers.106 The State
Council approved the establishment of formal securities exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen on June
2, 1990. The new Shanghai Stock Exchange opened on December 19, 1990 and was followed by the
opening of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in July 1991. Even after the two stock exchanges began to
operate, informal local trading continued in major cities.107 The management of the two formal stock
exchanges remained in the hands of their respective local governments through “municipal securities
commissions” in cooperation with the local branches of the People’s Bank of China. Each stock
exchange was therefore effectively an administrative unit, integrated into the operation of its local
government. Local officials from the various municipal bureaus were involved in all aspects of the
stock exchange’s operations—from the selection of which enterprises would be corporatized, through
the approval of share issuance, to the listing process itself.108 Moreover, given the absence of unified
guidance on how to operate the exchanges, the stock exchanges largely operated on a trial-and-error
basis. This practice, naturally, allowed much room for local discretion and protectionism.

STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA'S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 20-25 (2003).
Clarke, supra note 3, at 151-152.
106 For a detailed account on local experimentation with share offerings, see WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 38.
107 Id. at 27.
108 Id. at 29-30.
104
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In 1992–1993, along with the enactment of a law for corporations, the central Party-state
started to centralize its control over the two stock exchanges. These efforts included consolidating the
regulatory and supervisory authority over the operation or the exchanges, as well as gaining control
over the issuance process itself. This latter effort was intended through the design of a quota system,
addressed below. The main motive, as described by Walter and Howie, was the fear from losing
control over the development process to local officials, who promoted issuances in selected
corporations and consequently accumulated substantial economic and administrative power through
the emerging capital markets. The authors describe a “share fever” in both exchanges and a specific
incident of over-subscription in Shenzhen, which created great disappointment among potential
investors and provoked public riots against local protectionism. This led to the establishment of two
national securities market regulators, the State Council Securities Commission and China’s Securities
Supervision and Management Committee.109 The State Council subsequently issued a provisional “law”
on securities, which set temporary mechanisms for share listing. 110 This temporary yet important
document set the procedures for share issuance, trading, and disclosure by CLSs, prohibited insider
trading practices, and established civil and criminal liability for securities violations for the first time.
Honing their new national authority, the security regulators issued a complementary set of temporary
rules, 111 which prohibited securities fraud and specifically addressed insider trading and other
misconduct in the budding stock markets.112
The efforts to consolidate authority over the securities market culminated with the adoption
of a national law for securities.113 Substantively, the 1998 Securities Law only supplemented the prior
1993 Provisional Regulations on Share Issuance. Organizationally, however, it was extremely
meaningful as it centralized the regulatory authority and control over the stock exchanges and over
the development of the securities markets more broadly, under the authority of one ministry-level

Both institutions were founded in October 1992 and consolidated under China Securities and Regulatory Commission
(the CSRC) following the enactment of the Securities Law in 1998. See infra note 113.
110 Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulation on the Administration of Issuance and Trading
of Stocks] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 22, 1993) [hereinafter The Provisional Regulations on Share Issuance].
111 Interim Procedures on the Management of Stock Exchanges (promulgated by the Securities Comm’n of the St. Council,
July
7,
1993),
art.
4,
available
at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100050789.shtml (“Stock exchanges are
subject to the management of the local people's governments and the supervision and control by the China Securities
Supervision and Control Committee” [a body under the Securities Commission of the State Council (SCSC) which
preceded the CSRC.]); Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Banfa (禁止证券欺诈行为暂行办法) [Provisional Measures
for the Prohibition of Securities Fraud] (approved by the St. Council, Aug. 15, 1993, promulgated by the SCSC, Sept. 2,
1993)
[hereinafter
The
1993
CSRC
Provisional
Measures
Against
Fraud],
available
at
http://baike.baidu.com/view/434690.htm.
112 HUI HUANG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: INSIDER TRADING LAW IN CHINA (2006).
113 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengchuan Fa [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the 6th Meeting of the Standing Comm. of the 9th Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, amended Oct. 27, 2005, and Aug.
31, 2014, effective Aug. 31, 2014), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=233280&lib=law [hereinafter 1998
Securities Law].
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state agency—the China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 114 The CSRC has been
exclusively responsible for China’s securities regulation ever since.

2. The Quota System
Another important effort to reconsolidate central state control over the stock market took the
form of a quota system, which was officially in place from 1993 until 2000. This effort backfired,
however, and only amplified regional powers.
The quota system was a national effort to administer the process of share issuance and control
its scope. It was intended to ensure that the newly available external finance would be funneled to
selected state-owned companies, while controlling supply and thereby keeping prices of newly offered
shares high. 115 Technically, this administrative governance mechanism was based on a defined
preapproved national pool of shares to be issued. The size of the national pool was determined
annually by the central government through the People’s Bank of China. Provincial governments (in
the case of local firms) or central ministries (in the case of firms owned by a central ministry) then
negotiated with their respective branch of the securities regulator on their allocated quota. Similarly,
they bargained about which firm they would eventually recommend to the center for share issuance.
After reaching an agreement, a request was submitted to the central securities regulator, which decided
how to allocate the national pool between the regions and ministries. The central authority also
decided which of the recommended companies would then enter a formal review process toward their
initial public offerings. Each such company had to go through an individual approval process, during
which information about the company was considered as well as its rule-obedience record.116 In their
account of the quota system, Pistor and Xu point out that the central authority approved the firms
recommended to it in most cases. This, they suggest, indicates that from the outset, the real power
was in the hands of the local governments and the ministries in selecting the firms to begin with.117
As a side note, while the term quota system refers only to the mechanism for the selection of
IPO issuers, the pricing of IPOs also went through similar transitional administrative governance
methods. Initially, the relevant government level directly determined the price for an IPO issuance.
Toward 1995, pricing started to be based on consultation and bidding between the issuing company,

(Robin) Hui Huang, The Regulation of Insider Trading in China: A Critical Review and Proposals for Reform, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP.
L. 281, 284 (2005).
115 See generally Donald Clarke, The Role of Non-Legal Institutions in Chinese Corporate Governance, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2009).
116 For a detailed account, see Katherina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from
China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184 (2005).
117 Id. at 197-198.
114
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its underwriters, and the relevant local authority. It was only toward 2005 that the price for IPO
issuance started to rely on open market inquiry and evaluation.118
As for quality control, in the absence of market price mechanisms to evaluate companies, the
quota system was also intended to provide quality-guided administrative selection. This was designed
by including incentives at both regional and company levels that were supposed to ensure an effective
evaluation of companies prior to their selection. Regions whose selected companies performed well
after their shares were issued were awarded larger future quotas. Companies that performed badly
were subject to potential delisting, which could reduce the region’s future quota. The purpose was to
incentivize firms and local government officials to pass their recommendations to the center based on
collected and verified information, and thereby to identify “more [rather] than less viable firms” as the
potential issuers.119
Commentators note several positive results of this administrative system, concluding that it
was an important transitional mechanism that facilitated share-issuances in the absence of advanced
capital market mechanisms. The quota system induced some level of information exchange and
disclosure in the newly emerging capital market, a valuable factor in the absence of mandatory
information disclosure standards and enforcement. Intense bargaining between the center and local
governments encouraged interregional competition. Furthermore, it also introduced capital market
growth measures as a basis for administrative decision making for future quotas, which presumably
incentivized local officials to keep a watchful eye on firms in their region.
At the same time, however, the implementation of the selection process within the quota
system quickly became crooked. Increasingly motivated by personal considerations and selection
biases, the system intensified local protectionism. The incentives and accountability methods
described above backfired. Since local officials personally benefited from the image of betterperforming companies, they had little incentive to press for reliable disclosure. Instead, they were
prone to turn a blind eye to inaccurate reports or even actively assist firms in committing fraud. 120
Moreover, the system did not address matters of information disclosure in the post-IPO stage. It
became clear that this transitional mechanism should end and be replaced by a formal approval process
for IPOs with more transparent, impartial listing standards and disclosure rules for secondary trade.
In that sense, the enactment of the 1998 Securities Law was the beginning of a turn from a rather
arbitrary administrative system of share issuances to a more centralized and formal governance. In

On the various transitional methods for IPO price determination, see Chen Su & Jing Yu, Market-Oriented Reform of
China’s IPO System and Information Disclosure Regulation, in THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET VOLUME I: A RETROSPECT AND
ANALYSIS FROM 2002 39 (Cheng Siwei & Ziran Li eds., 2014).
119 Pistor & Xu, supra note 116.
120 Id. at 199-200.
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2001, the CSRC issued new measures for the administration of IPOs, which formally ended the quota
system.121

*

*

*

This review reveals the process through which public firms emerged in China, including the use
of transitional mechanisms that had a meaningful influence on how capital markets sprouted. Absent
any other institutional framework, public firms developed through a process of local experimentation
followed by national administered expansion that was guided by political necessities. Political economy,
then, rather than economies of scale or technological progress, motivated the creation of the public
corporation. Then, when formal national schemes kicked in, they were likewise designed primarily
with political functions— the need to reconsolidate economic and administrative control by the
central Party-state and to finance China’s struggling state sector. The rise of the public firm and the
formation of capital markets therefore reflect the limited yet marginally increasing role of law in the
early stages of China’s capital market development and the presence of political determinants.

Measures for the Administration of New Share Issuance by Listed Companies (promulgated by the China Sec.
Regulatory Comm’n, Feb. 25, 2001), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/mftaotlcins697/ (partial
English translation). Note, however, that the actual implementation of the Quota System persisted until 2003.
121

28

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

CHAPTER 2: CHINESE LISTED FIRMS AND THE PUBLIC SHAREHOLDER “CLASS”—A
STRUCTURED PREDICAMENT
A “political farce under the pretext of law”?122
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, July 2016

Political economy was a major driving force at the dawn of the public corporation in China,
as shown in Chapter 1. Transitional, informal, and often locally-initiated government experiments –
rather than the law – directed firms and capital market activity.
Yet the limited role for legal institutions at this stage might also be explained as reflecting the
early stage of market development. Many countries walked a similar path, in which they were able to
initiate a capital market where firms raised capital from investors even in the absence of a supporting
legal system by using functional substitutions. Entrepreneurs and investors in emerging markets seem
to be less deterred than expected by low-quality legal institutions. 123 Even in the most advanced
markets, some scholars argue, the law followed rather than led capital market development, which was
instead instigated by bottom-up resourcefulness.124
Comparative experience from transitional economies also reflects that during early stages of
economic transition, the state may be particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking behavior. Unregulated
areas and nascent financial markets enable state capture more freely, allowing more opportunities for
officials and their affiliates to capture the state for private benefit. 125 Alternative substitutions,
especially informal ones, are often ambiguous and arbitrary and thus cannot fully avoid the infirmities
that are created during the early stages of transition. Indeed, the trajectories of developing and
Hannah Beech, China Slams the South China Sea Decision as a ‘Political Farce, TIME (July 13, 2016),
http://time.com/4404084/reaction-south-china-sea-ruling/ (quoting China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in response to
the final award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the South China Sea case).
122

For the tribunal’s award, see Tribunal Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, South China Sea (Phil. v. Chin.), P.C.A.
Case No. 2013-19, 19-28 (Jul. 12, 2016). See also Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case View,
https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7, accessed June 11, 2017.
123 Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 282-290 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). See also
Mariana Pargendler et al., In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 569 (2013).
124 See Coffee, supra note 21 (arguing for private ordering by entrepreneurs and the stock exchanges in the United States
prior to regulatory action); Mahoney, supra note 21 (for preempting private regulatory action by the NYSE); Yoshiro Miwa
& Mark J. Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in Transitional Japan, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 273 (2002) (Firms in early twentieth century Japan created corporate governance arrangements by private
ordering—they hired prominent industrialists to their board. This functioned as a quality signal to the market in the absence
of legal arrangements.).
125 Black et al., supra note 30; Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property
Rights: The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Paper No. 11772,
2005).
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transitional economies have caused many observers to believe that local substitutions can only go so
far.126 The status of the financial system is often treated as a proxy for such a turning point. Robust
capital markets, particularly, are said to require high-quality, reliable, and perhaps internationally
familiar investor protection mechanisms and disclosure standards that only developed legal
institutions seem to provide.
Conceptually, this is also the point where development scholars meet corporate governance
convergence proponents. In the corporate and capital market literature, globalization is said to push
firms and markets into a competitive Darwinist mode, in which they either adjust or perish.127 The
pressures of international competitive capital and product markets are thought to cause firms and
markets to adapt their governance in pursuit of the most efficient corporate rules and structures.
Absent such adaptation, suboptimal firms and markets will fall behind. In a competitive global market,
therefore, convergence is viewed as an inevitable step for any growth-oriented economy.128 In the
process of adaptation, corporate laws, practices, and structures will become more congruent,
ultimately converging into one optimal model—mainly, that of Anglo-American (really American)
corporate capitalism.129
This convergence discourse now distinguishes between formal convergence and functional
convergence.130 The dominant view predicts that functional convergence will occur first behind a
formal curtain that persistently holds back legal change. 131 A process of bottom-up pressures breeding
functional convergence will at a certain point bring a more formal reform. 132
Both the development approaches and corporate governance theories thus hold that even
where functional substitutions provided enough assurances for market economic activity to sprout,
more conventional institutions of corporate governance should, and will, take their place at a certain
See generally Ricardo Hausmann et. al, Growth Accelerations, 10 J. ECON. GROWTH 303 (2005). See also Kevin Davis &
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L., 895, n. 162
(2008) (citing Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92
VA. L. REV. 1517, 1554-65 (2006) and the references therein).
127 Coffee, supra note 21.
128 The opposing view of consistent divergence is identified with path dependence theories. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk &
Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (proposing a theory
of path-dependence that explains persistent divergence in corporate systems); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms,
84 VA. L. REV., 1145 (1998) (suggesting that convergence, even when efficient, will be limited due to internal political
economy).
129 Representative for this view are Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that around the world corporate systems are
converging toward a single, shareholder-oriented model).
130 In my view, in this discourse, formal convergence has conceptually aligned with transplant strategy and no longer
represents a slow gradual process of adaptation in (formal) laws. The perception of convergence as a gradual adaptation
process is represented in the idea of functional convergence alone.
131 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001) (formal
variations and persistence will remain but will be overshadowed by functional convergence). Bebchuk and Roe elaborate
potential reasons for this, such as path dependency, sunk costs and political rejection. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 128.
132 John Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L.
REV. 641 (1999); Coffee, supra note 21.
126
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point in the development process. Accordingly, the prevailing view regarding China too was, and still
is, skeptical as to the country’s ability to sustain capital market growth without developing the
institutions that are identified with corporate capitalism. 133 Some evidence on the passing efficacy of
local-managerial incentive schemes as functional substitutes supports this view.134
At first glance, China’s capital market development during the second stage of transition (the
Modern Reform Era, 1992–2007) seems to follow this understanding. During the late years of this
stage, corporate governance took a more structured, investor-oriented turn through regulatory action
by central state authorities. China’s policy makers have formally embraced many of the institutions
traditionally identified with corporate capitalism. This turn was not abrupt, but rather evolutionary.
The growing market and the various political needs and motivations co-evolved along with the rising
legal system, which together determined how firms and the capital market would develop.

I. A TURN TOWARD LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS—CONVERGENCE WITH CORPORATE
CAPITALISM
As seen earlier, the opportunities and interests of a new variety of economic actors within the
Party-state system started shifting when market economic activity was enabled. This echoed back into
the system, as policy-makers—troubled by the shifts in internal political-economy—turned to legal
construction to achieve a reconsolidation of power. By the early 2000s, an increasing body of nationallevel economic laws and regulations gradually replaced the probationary mechanisms used earlier.135
Central-state agencies and institutions were created and given regulatory and supervision authority
over various aspects of the financial market.136 This shift in the use of the legal system to govern firms
and the capital markets exemplifies a more general proclaimed turn toward law during the 15th Central

See generally IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003).
With respect to China specifically, see ASIFMA, CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS: NAVIGATING THE ROAD AHEAD (2017),
available at https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/china-capital-markets-final-english-version.pdf;
Minxin Pei, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY (2006); Yingi Qian, How
Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 297 (Dani Rodrik
ed., 2003); Thomas G. Rawski, Will Investment Behavior Constrain China’s Growth?, 13 CHINA ECON. REV. 370 (2002).
134 Existing evidence suggests that local managerial incentives functioned relatively well during early stages, when they had
a positive effect on profitability, total factor productivity, and return on equity. However, with increasing liberalization
during the 1990s, managerial incentives seem to have lost their functional contribution to efficiency. See Clarke et al., supra
note 44, at 416.
135 It should be noted, however, that an “experimentation first” strategy is still the approach used to introduce new
economic measures into the market.
136 A few examples include the CSRC (founded 1998), SASAC (founded 2003), China’s Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC, founded 2003), and the China National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, founded 2003).
133
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Party Congress, 137 in which the CCP declared a move toward a Chinese-type “rule of law.”138 This was
also when the Central Party Congress first used the term “corporate governance” as part of its
economic reform planning.139
In the following years, problems within the troubled state sector were accompanied by new
external and domestic pressures to adopt national corporate governance standards. In 2001, a wave
of worldwide corporate scandals did not skip China. A number of large Chinese corporations were
involved in accounting fraud and market manipulation, causing losses to many investors and also
reflecting badly on China’s state asset management system.140 As one commentator noted: “These
events provided the needed crash for legal change. Disappointed investors started to demonstrate in
front of the CSRC building.”141 Together with the effect of the Asian financial crisis and the global
competition that China started facing following its 2001 WTO accession, these events led to extensive
discussions about corporate governance and induced the formal embrace of many Western corporate
governance institutions into the market.142
The CSRC took a lead role in this turn. As part of the efforts at the time to consolidate
economic and administrative authority, the CSRC was given the administrative and political latitude

On the intensification of legal construction efforts during that time, see William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's
Post-Cultural Revolution Project of Legal Construction, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193 (1999). See generally Perry Keller, Sources of
Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (1994).
138 See Report to the 15th Party Congress (delivered by President Jiang Zemin, Sept. 12, 1997), Ch. VI (Reforming the
Political Structure and Strengthening Democracy and the Legal System) [hereinafter Report to the 15 th Party Congress],
available at http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/308S/Readings/jzm15CCP.htm (“Govern[ing] the country
according to law and making it a socialist country ruled by law.”).
139 See JANE FU, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 5 n.55 (2010) (referring to the
CPC’s Central Committee Resolution on Major Issues Regarding SOEs Reform and Development in the “Announcement of
the fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth CCP National Congress”).
140 See Y. L. DUAN, LUNDA GUDONG GUQUAN LANYONG JI SHILI [ABUSING MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER CONTROL:
THEORY AND PRACTICE] (2001) (summarizing various fraud cases, including the Yorkpoint Science & Technology stock
scheme, the fall of Daqing Lianyi, Dong Fang Electronics, PT Hong Guang, Monkey King A, Lantian shares, Yi'an
Technology, Yin Guangxia, and Zhengzhou Baiwen).
141 Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 451, 464 (2003).
142 This is not to say that the customary ideas and elements that are generally packaged within the “corporate governance”
discourse were not considered in China before corporate governance formally penetrated the political and legal
consciousness. To the contrary, some ideas, even some that are conventionally seen as “Anglo-American” in nature (such
as shareholder-centrism and fiduciary duties), were in fact considered even before the establishment of the 1993 Company
Law and long before their formal adoption in the 2005 Company Law. Interestingly, the penetration of these ideas, like
many market developments in China, also happened on experimental levels or by institutions that are not responsible for
primary law making. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name: Anglo-American Fiduciary
Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008) (describing how Anglo-American corporate fiduciary
duties were first introduced in China in the early 1990s to serve the limited number of PRC issuers accessing foreign capital
markets, first by an administrative letter to the Hong Kong Exchange, and later by special supplementing provisions that
were not included in the Company law itself). See also Nicholas C. Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts,
1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 EAST ASIA L. REV. 303 (2010) [hereinafter Howson,
Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts] (finding judicial implementation of doctrines resembling derivative suits, veilpiercing, and fiduciary duties by the Shanghai People’s Courts before explicit authority was granted to courts in these
matters, and even before such doctrines had a formal legal basis).
137
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to form national-level corporate governance schemes.143 One of its first steps in this direction was its
2001 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies. The Code was intended to improve the
“modern enterprise system,” standardize behavioral rules for directors, supervisors, and senior
managers, and clarify shareholders rights. The Code was largely based on the OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance. Among its provisions, it stipulated disclosure and voting standards for relatedparty transactions, specified duties that controlling shareholder owe to the company and other
shareholders, required the disclosure of controlling shareholders’ interests (including the ultimate
controller), and emphasized the independent operation of the company from its controlling
shareholders, including the introduction of a cumulative voting system for the election of directors
and an independent directors scheme.144 Still, like many other corporate governance codes around the
world, the Code presented guiding principles that were mostly broad and vague with no accountability
measures for violators. It described best practices from which firms were left to choose.145
The highest government organs—the NPC and the State Council—also issued several
proclamations and legal amendments, which clearly reflected the formal acceptance of a law and
finance-style approach to corporate governance.146 In 2005, the 1993 PRC Company Law was revised
See Nicholas C. Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” As Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation
Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37 SEATTLE U.L.
REV. 667 (2014). For discussion on public enforcement and regulatory action by the CSRC, see also infra pp. 94-97.
144 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n
and
the
State
Economic
and
Trade
Comm’n,
Jan.
7,
2001),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.html.
145 For example, the first chapter of the code outlines shareholders’ rights with neither explanations of these rights, nor of
what would be a fair treatment of these rights and how a violation would be handled. Another example is the requirement
of independent directors in listed companies. Article 49 requires companies to establish an independent director system
in accordance with other relevant rules. While article 52 does specify further that listed firms’ audit and compensation
committee should include a majority of independent directors, they are not granted any special voting powers. Id. arts. 49,
52.
146 For instance, a relevant State Council Opinion states:
143

The quality of listed companies must be upgraded. The quality of listed companies is the source of value
for securities market investment…We should improve the structure of corporate governance of listed
companies, and by following the requirements of the modern corporate system, form a check and
balance mechanism among the power organ, the decision-making organ, the supervisory organ and
corporate managers… We should regulate the acts of controlling shareholders and prosecute those
committing acts to damage the interests of listed companies or those of small and medium-sized
shareholders…
Guanyu Tuijin Zibenshichang Gaigekaifang he Wendingfazhan de Ruoganyijian (关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定
发展的若干意见) [Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of
Capital
Markets]
(promulgated
by
the
St.
Council,
Jan.
31,
2004),
available
at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/sootscoptroasgocm970/. See also Guanyuzuohao Guancheshishi Xiudinghou
de Gongsifahe Zhengquanfa Youguangongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好贯彻实施修订后的公司法和证券法有关工作
的通知) [State Council Notice on Good Implementation of the Revised Corporate and Securities Law] (promulgated by
the St. Council, Dec. 23, 2005), available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/ content_212077.htm (the
Opinion emphasizes to various levels of the government the need to implement the revised Company and Securities laws,
which established mechanisms for the protections of corporate constituents, in order to promote capital market
development). Moreover, Chapter IV of China’s 2008 White Paper on promotion of the “rule of law” deals specifically
with “Legal Systems Regulating the Order of Market Economy,” which points to the need for “safeguarding the lawful
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wholesale,147 evidencing a shareholder empowering approach through more robust governance rights.
Formally, the revised statutes created various mechanisms for the protection of shareholders’ rights
and interests, and strengthened other protections. These included enacting explicit fiduciary duties of
corporate directors, supervisory board members, and officers; requiring nomination of independent
directors in listed companies; enabling a derivative lawsuit for shareholders; and providing certain buyback guarantees for shareholders. 148 Perhaps most striking, the 2005 Company Law also adopted
something like fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders toward the company and other
shareholders.149 At the same time, the Securities Law and the PRC Criminal Law were revised as well,
and together the laws introduced much-needed recourse for injured shareholders as well as criminal
liability based on securities law claims.150 This framework provided the tailwind for the CSRC to take
a stronger approach to investor protection through several administrative regulations, which the
commission issued in the following years.151
These developments might be mistaken for convergence with Western corporate capitalism.
If the governance of Chinese firms and the functioning of the capital market indeed converged with
corporate capitalism’s prescribed recipes for investor protections and capital market growth, then
China’s capital market growth and the domestic and global success of its firms could be explained on
the basis of this belated convergence. This conclusion, based on facially similar investor-protecting
laws and institutions, would be a mistake. An examination of one regulatory action will illustrate how
seemingly convergent norms are divergent in both function and intent.

rights and interests of corporate investors and stakeholders.” Zhongguo de Fazhi Jianshe (中国的法治建设) [China’s
Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law] (promulgated by the Information Office of the St. Council, Feb.
28, 2008), available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7041733.htm.
147 The prior 1993 Company Law was revised at the 18th meeting of the 10th National People’s Congress of the People’s
Republic of China on October 27, 2005 and was last amended December 28, 2013. Gongsifa (公司法) [Company Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, rev’d Oct. 27, 2005, last amended Oct. 26,
2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter “the Company Law” or “2005 Company Law”], available at
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/aec0c211a78989e9bdfb.html?keyword=company%20law . The 1998 Securities Law
was amended at the same time. See supra note 113.
148 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 22, 122, 142, 147-150, 151, 152.
149 Id. arts. 20, 21.
150 Gonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzheng An (liu) (中华人民共和国刑法修正案（六）) [6th Amendments to
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., June 29,
2006) [hereinafter Amendments to the Criminal Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200801/02/content_1388005.htm. The amended provisions relevant here are amendments to articles 161, 162, 163, 169, 182
that set criminal liability in cases of (respectively) false reporting, and non-disclosure that leads to “serious damages to the
interests of shareholders or any other person”; concealing or disposing of company property “so that serious damages are
caused to the interests of the creditors or any other persons”; and the use of corporate position for personal gain, including
accepting bribes and commissions in various forms (separate standard and procedure for criminal liability was set for
public servants in state owned corporations); violation of fiduciary duties by directors, supervisors, or senior managers of
a listed company, or by a controlling shareholder or actual controller (as well as when the controller instigated other
corporate officers to such violation) that have caused “serious loss to the interests of the company”; and manipulation of
the securities or futures market.
151 For a partial list, see infra pp. 94-97. For a fuller account, see Howson, supra note 143, at 698, 701-707.
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Shareholder Empowering Regulatory Action

The 2005 Company Law defines the shareholders’ assembly as the company’s main authority
with an extensive list of powers.152 It goes beyond the mere protection of basic shareholder rights by
enabling direct shareholders’ governance participation through the shareholders’ meeting, with the
following powers:153 1) to determine the company’s operating guidelines and investment plans; 2) to
elect and replace directors and supervisors (except for the representatives of the employees) and to
decide their remuneration; 3) to approve reports of the board of directors; 4) to approve reports of
the supervisory board; 5) to approve annual ﬁnancial budget plans and accounts; 6) to approve plans
for proﬁt distribution and loss recovery; 7) to decide on changes to the registered capital; 8) to approve
the issuance of corporate bonds; 9) to adopt resolutions on a corporate merger, division, change in
the company’s form, dissolution or liquidation; 10) to amend the bylaws; and 11) to exercise other
powers provided for in the bylaws. For certain fundamental transactions, a supermajority shareholder
approval is required.154
A review of the law further shows that the powers conferred on the shareholders’ assembly
even go much beyond these enumerated authorities. A resolution by the shareholders’ general meeting
is also required in other situations that are mentioned throughout the law. A shareholders’ approval is
required, for example, to execute the limited circumstances in which the company can purchase its
own shares.155 Their approval is required for the company to guarantee the debt of a shareholder or
actual-controller. Other “important matters” might also require a decision by the shareholders (e.g.,
“to transfer or accept any significant assets”).156 Moreover, even a decision on the issuance of new
shares is not reserved to the board and can be decided by the general meeting.157
2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 37, 98, 99. This appeared even in the 1993 Company Law: article 37 for LLCs
and article 102 for CLSs. See 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, arts. 37, 102.
153 See 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 37(7)-(10). These rules also apply to listed companies. Id. art. 99. These
articles also enable written consent in lieu of convening an actual shareholders’ meeting, reducing the costs of shareholders’
participation.
154 The general rule for a shareholder resolution is majority vote. Id. art. 103. Yet, some business decisions require approval
by two-thirds of the voting rights of the shareholders present: bylaw amendments, changes in the registered capital of the
company, resolutions concerning merger, split-up, dissolution, or change of the company form; as well as a decision to
purchase or sell any important asset or to provide guarantees that exceed thirty percent of the company's total assets within
a year. Id. arts. 103, 121. Article 16, the only article in the law that addresses directly the concern about abusive related
party transactions, requires the approval of the majority of disinterested shareholders for guarantees given by the company to
its controlling shareholder. Id. art. 16.
155 Note the circumstances requiring the shareholders’ assembly approval were narrowed down in the recent amendment
by shifting approval in some of the circumstances to the board. Compare the 2005 Company Law before and after its 2018
amendment. Id. art. 142.
156 Id. art. 104. See also id. art. 124 (requiring a shareholders’ meeting in situations where the number of disinterested board
members are insufficient). Interestingly, the law even states the possible involvement of the shareholders’ meeting in the
hiring and dismissal of the company’s accounting firm. Id. art. 169. The shareholders’ meeting has the ability to demand
the presence of a director, supervisor, and senior manager at its meeting, and such office holders have a duty to answer
shareholders’ inquiries presented there. Id. art. 150.
157 Id. art. 133.
152
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Individual shareholders are given an expansive right to information and document
inspection,158 as well as individual standing rights to approach the People’s courts on procedural or
substantive grounds.159 Additionally, the 2005 PRC Company Law allows a group of shareholders with
a ten percent or more equity interest in the firm to request a special shareholders’ meeting and enables
shareholders holding at least three percent of the firm’s equity to submit shareholder proposals to the
board.160
It clearly appears as though China’s policy makers had opted for an empowering, shareholderoriented corporate governance. The prescribed rights reflect an invitation for hands-on engagement
in corporate decision making that seems far beyond the powers conferred on shareholders in other
systems, even those in U.S. and U.K. corporate laws—the origins of shareholder-primacy notions.161
Judged solely based on the provisions above, contemporary China offers one of the most robust
shareholder-empowering corporate statutes in the world.
In practice, however, this facially shareholder-empowering regulatory framework does little to
empower public shareholders or restrict the behavior of corporate control parties against them. The
formal participation rights granted under the Company Law apply generally to the “shareholder class”
and do not operate to improve the position of non-controlling (thus real public or minority) public
shareholders. While this arrangement may have worked in widely-held markets, in a concentrated
market, true commitment to outside investors should have carried mandatory provisions, 162
specifically tailored to minority public shareholders.163 The shareholder-empowering approach taken
Id. art. 97.
On procedural violation grounds, see id. art. 22. For alleged violation of a shareholder’s right for information, see id. art.
33. For a form of appraisal related to specific circumstances in which the company buys back the shareholder’s shares, see
id. art. 74. For derivative suits, see id. art. 151. For individual lawsuits against directors or managers, see id. art. 152. See also
id. art. 183 (requesting a dissolution in court).
160Id. arts. 101, 102.
161 For example, in the United States, under the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) all corporate powers are vested with the board of directors, and the corporation is managed under their broad
discretion, which has been expanded by the courts. According to the DGCL and the corporate laws of many other states,
directors are nominated by the existing board and shareholders only have the right to vote on such nominees at the annual
meeting. Generally, for shareholders to propose their own nominees they need to initiate an expensive proxy contest. In
addition, in staggered board firms, the ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause is limited. There are only
a handful of matters that require shareholders’ approval: amendments to the corporate charter (as opposed to bylaws,
which can be amended by the board of directors), and mergers, consolidation, or a sale of all or substantially all assets.
Shareholders may convene a special shareholders’ meeting only if the company’s bylaw permits them to do so, and a
shareholder proposal is generally nonbinding. See Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code tit. 8 § 101-398. See
generally Model Bus. Corp. Act (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2002).
162 For theoretical support for this approach, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets
Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393 (2003) (arguing that corporate laws must incorporate some form of minority protection as a
mandatory rule and examining various such forms in different jurisdictions).
163 For examples of mandatory approaches in comparatively concentrated markets, see infra notes 280, 335-336 (discussing
audit and compensation committees in Israel). On mandatory non-controlling shareholders board representation in Italy,
see infra note 296. On compelling institutional shareholders’ vote on certain matters in Israel, see infra notes 255, 279.
For general data on countries that adopted minority veto rights, see OECD, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50089215.pdf. More generally on the
use of disinterested shareholders’ consent as a regulatory device in a dispersed market (Australia), see Jennifer Hill, Visions
and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 69–71 (2009).
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in China serves in actuality only to further the Party-state as the controlling shareholder. The
controlling shareholder will continue to govern the firm absolutely in a myriad of ways. For example,
absent mandatory cumulative voting on board elections, the controlling shareholder will be the one
to nominate and elect the company’s directors, who in turn have singular power to appoint top
management. The controlling shareholder’s appointed board members will set the agenda for
shareholder meetings and thereby be able to hinder any shareholder proposals from a three percent
shareholder technically authorized under the Company Law. Similarly, since voting is not required and
the law does not call for recusal of a controlling shareholder(s) vote, the controlling shareholder alone
will usually satisfy any mandated supermajority requirement for the approval of certain transactions.164
This is especially likely since no quorum is required to convene a shareholders meeting, and only the
votes of those attending the meeting are counted.
In addition, the admittedly more “enabling” approach taken in the revised Company Law 165
enables the parties to contract around the default rules. This means that the 2005 amendment enables
the controlling shareholder to contract into an even more robust control. Given the almost
nonexistent bargaining power of minority shareholders, which is intensified by the pyramidal holding
structure prevalent for many PRC issuers, any “opt-in” governance arrangement that is favorable to
minority shareholders will not be adopted. Thus, as observed elsewhere, “an interventionist state,
concentrated ownership, and shareholder-friendly law may be mutually reinforcing, especially when
the state holds large blocks of stock in its own right.”166
Furthermore, lest anyone think that whatever minority shareholder governance rights are on
offer can or will be enforced (whether mandatory or contracted-into), other structural impediments—
grounded in China’s political economy—cast a large shadow of doubt as to the ability of public
shareholders to secure these rights.167
Finally, at a conceptual level, there is also divergence in the notions of shareholder primacy.
In the Chinese context, shareholder primacy stands for completely different ideas than those of
corporate capitalism. With the 1993 Company Law, when state-owned firms populated the market,
the emphasis was on the authority of the shareholders’ assembly as a collective, representing the
interests of the public, rather than on the shareholders’ interests as individuals. Some elements in the

For a list of matters that require supermajority consent, see supra note 154. A unique exception where the minority defacto is granted a negative veto is in article 16 of the 2005 Company Law, which requires the approval of a majority of
disinterested shareholders for decisions to provide a guarantee to a shareholder of the company or to its actual controller.
See 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 16.
165 On the shift toward an enabling system in the 2005 Company Law amendment and the contrast with mandatory CSRC
orientation, see Howson, supra note 143, at 698, 701–07.
166 Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 55, 85 (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009) (saying the
same with respect to France).
167 For a discussion on these institutional and structural predicaments, see infra Chapter 2, Section III.
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2005 Company Law still resonate with this approach.168 In particular, the preamble to the amended
Company Law and Article 5 state the company’s obligation to social morality, mandate social
responsibility, and point to the accountability of the company to the general public.169 These articles
reflect a much-criticized view of the company law as still speaking largely to state-owned firms.170
Some commentators even suggested that China’s shareholder primacy approach resembles its
hierarchical political governance, in which the NPC is the source of authority for all lower governance
levels.171 While this view is baffling as it overlooks the ultimate authority of the Party (in both the
corporate and the governmental contexts), it certainly reflects the divergence from corporate
capitalism notions. The consequences go beyond just theory. The divergence carries real implications
for decision making and accountability. For instance, to whom are fiduciary duties owed?172
Relatedly, the widely accepted association of shareholder-primacy with the notion of
shareholder value (maximization of market share price) under corporate capitalism is not the norm in
China.173 In the Chinese context, shareholder-primacy, through the shareholders’ assembly, instead
reflects the primacy of the controlling shareholder’s goals and interests, whatever they are in a given
situation.
Despite the formal recognition of shareholders’ rights and the apparent borrowing of
conventional corporate governance mechanisms, most of these institutions fail to perform their
supposed functions. Investor protections remain weak in practice, and corporate governance has been
deployed in ways that run counter to market efficiency. Notably, implementation is not hindered due
to the lack of appropriate local adaptations, as may have been the case for other transplants around
the world.174 Indeed, a number of commentators praise China’s corporate governance framework as
the product of a well-thought out, decades-long, intellectual sifting and cherry-picking process.175 The
Junhai Liu, Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to Make the Hybrid of Civil
Law and Common Law Work?, 107 EUR. BUS. L. REV 114 (2015) (interpreting the modern corporate law as meaning that
“the power of the corporations shall be from the shareholders, for the shareholders and by the shareholders.”).
169 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 5 (When conducting business operations, a company shall comply with the
laws and administrative regulations, social morality, and business morality. It shall act in good faith, accept the supervision
of the government and general public, and bear social responsibilities.).
170 See generally Donald Clarke, Blowback: How China’s Efforts to Bring Private-Sector Standards into the Public Sector Backfired, in
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND 29 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2016).
171 Liu, supra note 168, at 114.
172 There are multiple options implied by the 2005 Company Law. Article 149 along with articles 148, 150, and 151 with
the derivative suit therein, posit the option of fiduciary duties owed to the company. Article 151 suggests accountability
to the shareholders’ assembly. Article 152, however, seems to be focused on the infringement of shareholders’ interests
(as individuals), raising a private right of action against directors and senior managers. Finally, the preamble and article 5
add the duties of the company, and by extension its representatives, to the general public. See 2005 Company Law, supra
note 147, arts. 5, 148-152.
173 Clarke, supra note 170, at 42 (“A special Chinese twist in the doctrine of shareholder primacy appears here, however: it
is not the same thing as maximization of share value. If that is what the state shareholder wants, then there is no divergence.
But if the state shareholder wants the SOE to pursue other goals, then the SOE may do so.”).
174 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
59 (2000); Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325 (2000).
175 The adaptation to local conditions is reflected not only in the selection of various provisions from different legal systems,
but also through some uniquely Chinese characteristics adopted in the 1993 Company Law and maintained throughout its
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mechanisms borrowed were not blindly-transplanted, but instead were carefully selected and tailored
to the preexisting political infrastructure.
In short, traditional corporate governance institutions in China are weak by design. China’s
own political economy trumped the new laws and corporate governance mechanisms, just as it had
created and then trumped the preceding provisional local arrangements. This time around, the source
within China’s political economy that is responsible for this conscious weakness can be found in the
regime’s state-capitalism attributes. China’s state-capitalism ascended during this transitional stage and
has trapped a growing crowed of public shareholders in what I call a “structured predicament.” As a
result, instead of monitoring insiders and protecting investors, the existing framework gives corporate
control-parties a license to expropriate with impunity.

II. “CHINESE-STYLE” STATE CAPITALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS
A. The State as an Ultimate Controller—Consequences for Public Investors
As seen earlier, the Party-state advanced the organizational features of the public firm in
China—a corporatized non-privatized legal entity embedded within a group structure—to increase
value in SOEs and push back against rising local autonomy. The result was the creation of pyramid
holding groups, within which many of China’s listed SOEs currently reside and on top of which Partystate organs preside as dominant, often-controlling, shareholders that operate through powerful
human agents as corporate insiders. This organizational structure presents insurmountable monitoring
challenges and abundant opportunities for the abuse of public shareholders, affecting both their
governance and economic rights. Furthermore, this ownership structure perpetuates itself. It helps
entrench controlling parties and supports state-capitalism, through which firms can be harnessed in
pursuit of national and political goals, as well as for the personal interests of their control-parties
(corporate insiders and agents assign to supervise on behalf of the state quo controlling shareholders).

amendments. Examples include the “social-economic order” in the preamble and article 1 in both laws, the institution of
legal representative, the dual board structure, and more. See Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First
Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 275 (1995) (on the idiosyncratic legal representative
concept); Xinhe Cheng & Zhenghua Li, The Application of Comparative Law to Chinese Economic Legislation, 3 ASIA PAC. L. REV.
150, 152 (1994). Some Chinese commentators see this cherry picking from different systems as a unique Chinese model.
See, e.g., Wei-Wei Zhang, The Allure of the Chinese Model, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/opinion/01iht-edafrica.3357752.html. For a similar choice of words, see Suisheng
Zhao, The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 419, 424 (2010) (“What
makes the Chinese model unique is that the communist regime has safeguarded its own policy space as to when, where
and how to adopt Western ideas.”).
Some even track this model back to the Qing dynastic 1904 corporate law. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 168, at 112.
But see Liufang Fang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 260 (1995) (critiquing the 1993
Company Law for lack of its “contextualization to the lay of the land”).
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1. Excess Opportunities for Self-Dealing by Agents
By turning in the early 1990s to the modern corporate form with its separation between
ownership and control, China’s policy makers sought to cure mushrooming self-dealing and asset
stripping in SOEs. As commentators note, however, this was an ill-fitting importation of a problem
rather than a solution: 176 “[Yet] calls for government-owned enterprises to be independent of
government ‘interference’ are calls for nothing short of utter nonaccountability for management.”177
The separation of ownership and control during corporatization imported the paradigm vertical
agency problem into a system with an already complex range of idiosyncratic institutional monitoring
challenges.
Corporate theory suggests that when ownership is concentrated, the main beneficiary of any
value increase in the firm is the controlling shareholder. With abundant inside information, controlling
shareholders can also efficiently preempt market reactions by identifying managerial slack early and
simply replacing badly performing managers. The controlling shareholder is therefore the corporate
constituent that is most incentivized and best situated to monitor corporate insiders. Under state
corporate control, however, no ultimate real principal exists at the top of the state’s holdings. This
structural predicament became known as the “absentee principal” or the “absent owner” (suoyouzhe
quewei).178 There is no real principal who would personally benefit from monitoring and thus no one
with the incentive to monitor. This situation creates relative apathy toward corporate misconduct on
the part of government officials, the representatives of the controlling-state shareholder. Consequently,
firms in China became controlled by unmonitored powerful insiders (neibu ren kongzhi).179 Vast selfdealing took place not only by the insiders themselves but also by the agents assigned by the state to
supervise them.180 The modern corporate form, therefore, became conductive to corruption as well.
The absence of a real ultimate principal with enough incentives to monitor on behalf of the
state was presented as one of the primary reasons that led to the establishment of SASAC in 2003.181
SASAC was designed to replace various state-asset management enterprises with a unified national,

TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 190 n.43 (2013).
Clarke, supra note 50, at 498 (suggesting that a more appropriate reform would have been one that focuses on managers’
accountability to the state as a shareholder, rather than a reform that increased management autonomy).
178 Id. at 499.
179 See Hui (Robin) Huang & Juan Chen, Takeover Defenses and Its Regulation in China: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives,
(work in progress manuscript) (on file with author).
180 See Clarke, supra note 71, at 148 (“a 2002 study of corporate governance by the CSRC and the SETC revealed, on the
basis of self-reporting alone, that forty percent of listed companies engaged in related-party transactions with their top ten
shareholders.”). See also Nicholas C. Howson & Donald Clarke, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in
the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243,
248, 254-257 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (“ 'Tunneling' by individual insiders and controlling shareholders, both
state and non-state, by means of related-party transactions is notorious; in 2002 tunneling by controlling shareholders was
estimated at 96.7 billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised in stock markets in the same year.”).
181
See
Main
Functions,
SASAC,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170831013424/http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408521/index.html (last visited
May 24, 2019).
176
177

40

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

ministry-level agency.182 It was assigned to shoulder the State Council’s role as a controlling corporate
shareholder by exercising shareholder governance rights.183 The assigned governance rights are at least
in principle more extensive than those granted to shareholders by the Company Law. 184 In their
account of SASAC’s governance rights, Lin and Milhaupt note that the board of directors, the standard
corporate governing body, seems entirely missing in some of the firms controlled by SASAC. 185
Additionally, SASAC was formally granted vast authority to restructure, regulate, and supervise the
companies under its control. These combined powers arguably gave the agency strong influence on
the reorganization of entire industries.186
Despite its extensive governance rights assigned in the SOE Assets Law, 187 SASAC faces
strong resistance from various interested parties. SASAC shares its administrative powers with other
national-level ministries with a say in relevant industries.188 It can also face strong resistance from the
firms it supervises and facially controls, some of which are also ministry-level, economically-powerful
industry behemoths.189 Most importantly, SASAC exercises its governance powers, and particularly its
control rights in management, in the shadow of an overall Party control.190 This shadow control by
the CCP is achieved through various means, including: 1) the closely-followed recommendations of
the CCP’s Organization Department on the appointments of senior corporate managers in leading
Several Asset Management Companies preceded the establishment of SASAC. The Asset Management Companies
(AMC) was run by an Asset Management Agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. They were assigned
the task of recovering non-performing loans owed to China’s four state banks. For details, see Ben S. C. Fung & Guonan
Ma, China's Asset Management Corporations (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 115, 2002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=846288. See also Nicholas C. Howson, The AMC Debt-for-Equity
Swaps: Opportunities for Foreign Capital, CHINA BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 56.
183 The formal capacity of SASAC to act as the shareholder on behalf of the state was established in law only six years after
the agency was created. See Zhonghua Renming Gonghe Guo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国企业国有资产
法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009) arts. 1, 3 [hereinafter SOE Assets Law], available at
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7195&lib=law.
184 A few examples: 1) SASAC has the power to propose directors and supervisors to the shareholders’ meeting in any
“state invested enterprise” regardless of the ratio held by the state. Compare id. arts. 5, 22(3), 24, with 2005 Company Law,
supra note 147, arts. 37(2), 39, 101, 102.
2) SASAC is granted a formal veto right on the transfer of state-assets of any state-invested enterprise, regardless of its
actual holding ratio in such enterprise. See SOE Assets Law, supra note 183 § 5 (Transfer of State-owned Assets)
(particularly art. 51). See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 743 n.135 (noting the need for SASAC’s approval of share
transfer in a subsidiary).
3) Beyond conventional company law fiduciary obligations, the SOE Assets Law specifically includes a fiduciary obligation
that directors, supervisors, and senior managers owe not only to the company, but specifically to the state as a shareholder.
See SOE Assets Law, supra note 183 arts. 26, 71 (determining directors, supervisors and senior management’s liability for
actions that causes losses of state-owned assets, including administrative liability when such office holders are also state
functionaries).
185 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 738 n.121 (noting that by the end of 2012, only 51 of the core parent companies of
the 117 national business groups had established a board of directors).
186 For extensive analysis of SASAC in support of this view, see id.
187 Supra notes 183-184.
188 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 726.
189 Id. at 736.
190 Id. at 737-738 (referring to this relationship as “a highly institutionalized sharing arrangement between the Party and
SASAC.”).
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firms; 2) the training of most senior SOE managers through the Party school and training system; and
3) the Party personnel evaluation system. More recently, this control has been formalized and
institutionalized into the governance of corporatized SOEs and firms more generally,191 a change that
is further undermining the corporate capacity and administrative authority formally reserved to
SASAC.
Even after the reorganization under SASAC, the Party-state regularly promotes multiple, often
conflicting goals that its agents on the ground must balance.192 Despite the common perception that
the Chinese Party-state operates as a unitary political organization, not only are there various interest
groups at different levels of the state, but the interests of the Party itself might differ from those of
state agencies and officials (at least when looking beyond senior levels of government positions in
which the overlap of Party and state leadership roles is less common).193
Therefore, despite SASAC’s formal role in the organizational chain, it seems that its corporate
capacity is an empty box, to be filled by whichever interested party (a ministry, Party-state organ, or
individuals) is most invested in the situation and has the most political-economic power in each case.
Assigning a central state agency as a controlling shareholder did not solve, and perhaps cannot solve,
the problems that arise from the lack of an ultimate real principal. It only mirrors the institutional
challenges already within China’s political economy.
In the crossroads of these competing forces are the corporate insiders and Party-state
individuals who stand to gain from the disarray of conflicting institutional interests. Indeed, no matter
how many layers are added to the institutional arrangement, since the state (and the Party) is an abstract
collective, it must necessarily operate through human agents. 194 State corporate-control in China,
therefore, features the same type of self-dealing concerns that the paradigm agency analysis envisages,
yet it amplifies the problem by reproducing the links (agents) in the chain that can exploit the situation
while weakening those with direct incentives to limit it. This is an exacerbated form of the well-known
corporate monitoring predicament— “who monitors the monitors?,”195 which is extended in China
to multiple layers of agents inside and outside the firm.
2. Heightened Opportunities for Abuse by Controllers
As if these features of state-corporate control in China are not challenging enough,
corporatized SOEs face further difficulties due to misaligned interests between their various
shareholders. This includes conflicts within the state itself and also between the state as the controlling
See discussion infra Chapter 3, Section III.
Clarke, supra note 50, at 498.
193 I develop this further in Chapter 3, Section I.
194 Clarke, supra note 50, at 497-500. Clarke expressed this with respect to older forms of state asset management
organization and before the reorganization under SASAC, but the substantive claim still stands.
195 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, STAN. L.
REV. 819, 835-836 (1981) (discussing this question as part of the costs of the separation between ownership and control).
191
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shareholder and the “class” of public shareholders. To the extent that the state is able to incentivize
its agents—both the officials assigned to monitor corporate insiders, and the professional managers
appointed to operate corporatized SOEs—to pursue the state’s goals rather than their own selfish
interests, the benefits to the firm and its other shareholders might still be marginalized. Whichever
goal ends up being prioritized, it will not necessarily align with the most efficient and productive
business conduct.
Thus, even under an assumption of benevolent, well-coordinated, state asset management, the
state as a controlling shareholder may direct the firm in pursuit of objectives that simply run counter
to the interest of the firm as a profit-maximizing business. Examples of this in China include the use
of state-controlled firms to advance geopolitical goals without sound expectations for economic
return; 196 harnessing management control to enforce broad social and political agendas, 197 or to
accelerate the implementation of market-structure reforms; 198 using state-controlled firms to
implement special social tasks;199 and, as recently seen, to influence or even control capital market
volatility.200
This phenomenon is not unique to the Chinese state’s corporate control. There are many
examples of governments using their corporate role to advance goals that a profit-oriented shareholder
would probably avoid. 201 The reasons for this are not always clear since governments could
Many investments of Chinese companies in Africa are said to be first and foremost designed to gain a national foothold
in the continent and control over natural resources. Moreover, the use of controlled firms for geopolitical goals is clear
from the robust transaction activity around the Belt and Road initiative. Many of the projects are criticized for being
economically senseless but nevertheless pass corporate governance approvals (even in private firms). See Jenni March, The
Rise and Fall of a Belt and Road Billionaire, CNN (Dec. 2018), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/12/asia/patrick-hoye-jianming-cefc-trial-intl/. By the end of 2016, China’s SOEs contributed sixty percent of China’s outbound investments,
playing an important role in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. See Wendy Wu, How the Communist Party Controls
China’s
Industrial
Titans,
SOUTH
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(June
17,
2017,
9:01
AM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2098755/how-communist-party-controls-chinas-state-ownedindustrial-titans.
197 Clarke, supra note 71, at 140-141, 149 (pointing to the use of state corporate-control in the enforcement of state policies
on birth control among employees).
198 Michael Firth et al., Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China, 45
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 685, 692, 699–704 (2010) (reflecting that SOEs’ managers during the split-share
structure reform easily passed generous compensation schemes, due to pressures to implement the reform quickly, even
when the scheme was against the firm’s economic interests).
199 There are numerous instances of state-controlled firms being called upon to assist the government in a broad array of
social tasks, from the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo, to assistance in the Party-state’s natural
disaster management schemes. See Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China's State-owned Enterprises,
47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 663 (2014) (“According to a Xinhua report, twenty four hours after the Qinghai Yushu
earthquake hit on April 14, 2010, China’s big SOEs, including the state-owned airlines and airports, energy companies,
telecoms, transportation firms, medical companies, and agricultural trading companies, were called upon by the CCP
Central Committee and the State Council (Dangzhongyang, Guowuyuan) to participate in the rescue efforts by providing
services and materials.”).
200 During the 2015-2016 market downturn, buy-sale orders by state-controlled insurance firms and financial institutions
were directed by the Party-state to control market decline. Gabriel Wildau, China’s ‘National Team’ Owns 6 Percent of Stock
Market, FIN. TIMES, (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7515f06c-939d-11e5-9e3e-eb48769cecab.
201 See generally IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND
CORPORATIONS? (2010); ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO G. LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM: LEVIATHAN IN
BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND BEYOND (2014); Curtis Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned
Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform, 50 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 473 (2017); Curtis
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presumably utilize other tools to reach the same results. Yet, states in their shareholding capacity have
harnessed their corporate control to maintain high employment levels in certain firms or industries.202
In some cases, governments have directed corporate decision making to uphold strategic control of
specific industries (e.g., via strategic planning of M&A),203 or fixed sale prices through their corporate
influence in order to curtail inflation, 204 or to ensure sufficient domestic availability of essential
products.205
It is well established that controlling shareholders can promote their interests more easily by
enlarging their voting control relative to their cash flow rights.206 This can be done through deploying
legal structures, such as pyramidal ownership, dual-class shares, cross-shareholdings within business
groups, voting agreements, and other business arrangements.207 The result (and often the aim) of these
ownership structures is the dissociation of public investors from governance, which allows the
controller to extract private benefits of control more freely.208
Increasing the state’s voting control disproportionately to its cash flow rights was actively
pursued in China throughout its market transition to the present day—from the inception of its

Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and Policy Channeling, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 6 (Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröger eds., 2019) (suggesting a distinction between
tunneling, propping and policy channeling). Following Milhaupt and Pargendler’s analysis, most of the examples cited here
would be considered policy channeling.
202 As was the case in Israel, where the state intended to execute its golden share veto right to block a merger of Israel
Chemicals Ltd. with the Canadian Fertilizer Potash Corp., due to expected negative effects on the local workforce. See
Yoram Gavison, כיל-[ עסקת פוטאשPotash-ICL Deal], MARKER (Oct. 31, 2012, 12:25 AM),
https://www.themarker.com/markets/1.1853965. Potash Corp. dropped its bid before the transaction was brought to
approval. See Canada’s PotashCorp Drops Takeover Bid for Israel Chemicals, HAARETZ (Apr. 25, 2013, 4:09 PM),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/potashcorp-drops-bid-for-icl-1.5239707). For an English source that
emphasizes the political and social motives behind the position of the Israeli government, see Pav Jordan, Israel Wants
Details on Potash Corp. Bid for Israel Chemicals Ltd., GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globeinvestor/israel-wants-details-on-potash-corp-bid-for-israel-chemicals-ltd/article4893258/.
203 As in the Israel Chemicals Ltd. example. Id.
204 As in the case of fuel prices charged by Brazilian Petroleum company Petrobras. Milhaupt & Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs,
supra note 201, at 6.
205 As in the case of Coal India price control policy below market prices and against public investor’s objections. See Clarke,
supra note 170. On the Brazilian Petrobras and Brazilian Eletrobras contractual overpayments to the government on
various rights and services, see Milhaupt & Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs, supra note 201, at 3.
206 Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002); Stijn
Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000).
207 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of
Separating Control from Cash-flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
208 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1645 (2006) (“increased productivity accrues to shareholders in proportion to their equity, while private benefits of
control are allocated based on governance power.”). But see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J., 560 (2016) (suggesting that entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them
to pursue their vision the way they see fit, rather than necessarily to reap private benefits at the expense of public
shareholders).
With respect to China, see Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling through Inter-Corporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. FIN. ECON.
1 (finding that the use of intercorporate loans by controlling shareholders to siphon funds from publicly listed companies
is most severe in firms where the controlling shareholders’ controlling rights are larger than their ownership (cash flow)
rights).
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corporatization process with SOEs that raised passive equity capital while keeping state shares nontradable,209 through the reorganization of these firms into larger pyramid holding groups, and to the
recent waves of M&A activity that reduced the number of state-controlled businesses but enhanced
their scope. 210 When it was completed, the Chinese Party-state—including central and local
governments, ministries, and other state bodies—retained, and in fact leveraged, its ultimate control
over the majority of listed companies.211
Instead of relaxing ownership structures in ways that would better align the interests of the
state with those of other shareholders, the Party-state has recently opted to further reinforce the gap
through its mixed-ownership scheme. 212 This economic scheme, branded as a plan to “privatize”
Chinese listed firms through a blend of private and state ownership,213 only deepens the dissociation
further and entrenches the state as a controlling-minority shareholder in many such “privatized” firms.
One might argue that the state’s pursuit of these goals is no different than actions by private
controlling shareholders, which are common around the world. In both cases, the controller uses the
firm to facilitate private benefits of control (pecuniary or nonpecuniary).214 When this is done at the
expense of the firm and its other shareholders, such as through outright theft or by related-party
transactions that are not at arms-length,215 the extraction is equally exploitive,216 whether carried out
by a state or by a private shareholder.

Clarke, supra note 50, at 496-497; Nicholas C. Howson, Protecting the State from Itself? Regulatory Interventions in Corporate
Governance and the Financing of China’s ‘State Capitalism’, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM, 49 (Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2015).
210 CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A COMPARISON WITH EUROPE 5-6 (Jean-Pierre Cabestan et al. eds.,
2002) (pointing out that between 2003 and 2010, the total number of SOEs dropped from 159,000 to 114,500, but the
total assets of 121 large national SOEs managed by SASAC increased from 3 trillion to 20 trillion yuan).
211 Joseph
P. H. Fan et al., The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China 6-9, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686582. For a more general discussion of the market structure and
state dominance during the corporatization period, see Liufang Fang, China’s Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 149, 224-228 (1995).
212 On the current promotion of a “mixed ownership economy,” see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
213 Defined as: “cross-shareholdings by, and mutual blends of, state-owned capital, collective capital, and non-public
capital.” 2013 Communique, supra note 26. This was followed by detailed CCP decisions to guide central and local state
organs (including the NPC and the State Council on its various ministries) on how to implement and pursue the mixed
ownership goal. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (中共中
央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) [Decision on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive
Deepening of Reform] (promulgated by the Central Comm. Communist Party China, Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter The 3rd
Plenum Decisions of 2013], available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html. For critical
analysis, see DANIEL ROSEN ET AL., AVOIDING THE BLIND ALLEY: CHINA’S ECONOMIC OVERHAUL AND ITS GLOBAL
IMPLICATIONS (2014).
214 For the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits that controlling shareholders may extract at the
expense of minority shareholders, see Gilson, supra note 208, at 1661-1667.
215 For the different aspects of related-party transactions, see Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3rd. ed. 2017).
216 The value extraction by corporate controlling shareholders received the name “Tunneling.” For the seminal works on
tunneling, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003); Simon
Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV 22 (2000).
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While this argument has conceptual merits, some practical differences are notable. First,
empirical research points to the prevalence of tunneling in Chinese state-controlled firms relative to
other firms.217 The use of intra-group transfers, such as through loan guarantees,218 which allocate
resources from publicly-listed firms to private related parties, is particularly prevalent in China.219 This
suggests that there is something in the nature or the structure of state control in China that is different
and more conductive to tunneling. Perhaps it is the multiple complex layers within the institutional
structure that intensify conflicting interests as discussed above; perhaps the absentee principal; and
perhaps it is the combination of these features that invites more opportunities for abuse from all
directions.
Second, state controlling shareholders differ from private ones in the externalities of their
actions on public shareholders. State controlling shareholders often have only an attenuated eye to
profits. The persistent choice of the state to maintain control over various industrial firms rather than
to diversify its investments as a passive equity investor raises at least a strong presumption that its
reasons for maintaining control are not for profits only.220 Moreover, while the same might sometimes
also be true for private controlling shareholders, a rational private investor will strive to maximize her
own economic value (or that of her affiliates). Private investors that seek to use the corporation for
other goals are quickly pushed by existing statutes (or case law) to pursue these goals through
alternative forms of business organization.221

M. Jian & T. J. Wong, Propping through Related Party Transactions, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 70 (2010) (finding that abnormal
related sales propping done for the benefit of the controller is more prevalent among state-owned firms and in regions
with weaker economic institutions); Jiang et al., supra note 208 (discussing the scope of abuse by controlling shareholders
through the use of intercorporate loans to siphon billions from hundreds of Chinese listed companies during the 1996–
2006 period, and its significant economic consequences in firms); Qiao Liu & Zhou (Joe) Lu, Corporate Governance and
Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881 (2007) (suggesting evidence
that controlling shareholders use earnings management to tunnel); Winnie Qian Peng et al., Tunneling or Propping: Evidence
from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 306 (2011); Kun Su et al., Ultimate Ownership, Risk-taking and Firm Value:
Evidence from China, 23 ASIA PACIFIC BUS. REV. 10 (2017) (examining risk taking and ownership structure in Chinese listed
firms, results show that the presence of ultimate controlling shareholder and the divergence between its control right and
cash flow right, through pyramid structures, lead to lower corporate risk-taking and firm value); Kun Wang & Xing Xiao,
Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence from China, 30 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y, 89 (2011)
(tunneling by controlling shareholders reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and suggesting
that controlling shareholders have less interest to strengthen pay for performance measures due to their ability to extract
value through private benefits of control).
218 Nan Jia et al., Coinsurance within Business Groups: Evidence from Related Party Transactions in an Emerging Market, 59 MGMT.
SCI. 2295 (2013).
219 Henk Berkman et al., Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties: Evidence from China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN.
141 (2009).
220 At least by accepted theories of risk diversification through diversified portfolio investments.
221 The development of benefit corporations, nonprofit enterprises, and social purpose organizations reflects this.
Especially in the United States, where SEC rules for shareholder proposals limit their substance and influence, and where
case law developments around Dodge v. Ford precludes controlling shareholders from disregarding firm value
maximization in pursuit of other, even socially value-maximizing, objectives. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (critiquing Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).
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To maximize her private benefits, a private controller will deploy control either to self-deal or
to monitor. In both scenarios, the controller first needs to make sure that the firm is sufficiently
successful for value extraction. An increase in the general pie enlarges the delta that is then available
for unequal distribution through e.g., connected transactions. When the controller has enough “skin
in the game,” 222 even a rapacious controller will be interested in increasing value and thus in
monitoring corporate insiders to some degree. The interests of a private controller, therefore, align
with those of public shareholders at least to the point that enables self-enrichment.
When the state is the controlling shareholder, however, and aside from the self-dealing by its
agents, the state often exerts its control for purposes that have only an attenuated link to economic
value.223 Recent evidence on corporate tax compliance in SOEs suggests that tax functions as a form
of “dividend” to state controlling shareholders and as an excess cost to other shareholders. 224
Presumably, the state has low motivation to distribute dividends since it has other, perhaps more
socially legitimate routes, such as taxes, to extract corporate value at the expense of public shareholders
and the firm. Furthermore, as opposed to the portion that a private controller can extract, the
expropriation by the state is not capped by the general corporate pie. The state can, and does, find
ways to stream funds to its controlled firms when needed through cross-subsidizing firms 225 and from
the deep pocket of its citizenry. The use of the corporate form by the state as a controlling shareholder
thus does not depend on the value of the corporation. The link between the financial strength of the
invested firm and the scope of “private benefits” available for extraction by the state is weak. One
might argue that the state will be able to “take” more from a more profitable firm. It is also the case
that for various reasons (not necessarily pecuniary) the Party-state is greatly committed to preventing
a decline in the value of state assets. But as the evidence so far shows, this alone does not induce the
state as shareholder to increase corporate monitoring.226 Instead, so far, other methods to prevent the
decline of value in state assets were applied more firmly.227
Finally, even when the Party-state as a controlling shareholder prioritizes economic valuemaximizing in firms, it differs from private investors in its investment approach. The state as
controlling shareholder is bound to aim at a pie that is far beyond that of a specific firm. The
Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53 (2018).
For examples, see supra notes 196-205. There are of course examples in which a state controlling shareholder would act
as a profit maximizing investor, increase the pie, and then take care of distribution. In these cases, such as in the
Singaporean model of the State Holding Company Temasek or in various Sovereign Wealth Funds, the state is involved
as a relatively passive investor, and its actions as a shareholder are economically oriented.
224 Providing an agency cost analysis for tax compliance or avoidance in SOEs, the authors also found that their results
are particularly pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance
evaluations. See Mark Bradshaw et al., Agency Costs and Tax Planning when the Government is a Major Shareholder, J. ACCT. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2019).
225 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 745.
226 In Chapter 3, I discuss how, while this commitment did not bring the state to monitor effectively, it is part of the
reasons that recently induced the Party to fill-in the monitoring void within firms.
227 For instance, by inducing state-controlled firms and financial institutions to rescue a declining stock market following
recent market decline. Supra note 200.
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corporatization process and the subsequent group formation led to the state systematically holding
ownership of stocks in competing companies within the same industry. With its cross-industry
ownership, the state adopts a broad view of profits that expands beyond a single firm across industries
and the market at large.228 Thus, even as a profit-oriented investor, when adopting an industry-level
(“portfolio level”) perspective, the Chinese state looks beyond the benefit of a specific firm. Some
firms will be sacrificed for others, according to the state’s relative ratio or following “portfolio-level”
goals.229
Viewing the state as a profit-oriented investor with holding positions in firms across industries
suggests significant implications beyond firm-level governance as well. These include implications for
market competition, an issue that recently caught the attention of scholars through the phenomenon
of common ownership.230 The major difference here, of course, is that the Chinese Party-state, in
contrast to ordinary institutional investors as common owners, has much larger stakes (or de-facto
control) and takes up an active position in its invested firms.231 This reality makes both concerns—
competition and the potential disregard for firm-level interests— more pressing.232

Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 745 (referring to the organizational ownership structure under SASAC: “These realities
suggest that the central-SOE sector as a whole, rather than individual firms, is of greatest concern to SASAC in carrying
out its governance responsibilities… the practice of rotating top managers among firms in the same industry makes a good
deal of sense if maximizing shareholder wealth at individual firms is less important to the controlling shareholder than
building up a number of globally competitive firms in critical industries.”).
229 Much like the conflicting interests of an index fund that currently trouble American scholars, albeit not as a passive
investor. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/28/index-funds-and-the-future-of-corporate-governance-theory-evidenceand-policy/.
230 The theory suggests that when investors have multiple holdings in firms within the same sector, they will adopt an
industry level view and will encourage, explicitly or implicitly, anti-competitive practices at the expense of consumers and
the public good more generally. See George S. Dallas, Common Ownership: Do Institutional Investors Really Promote AntiCompetitive Behavior?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec.
2, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/02/common-ownership-do-institutional-investors-really-promoteanti-competitive-behavior/#more-112996.
231 The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission define common ownership as
“the simultaneous ownership of stock in competing companies by a single investor, where none of the stock holdings is
large enough to give the owner control of any of those companies.” See OECD, HEARING ON COMMON OWNERSHIP BY
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION – NOTE BY THE UNITED STATES (2017), available at
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)86/en/pdf.
232 This point is different from the “agency costs of state-capitalism,” which was raised by Milhaupt and Pargendler based
on Gilson and Gordon’s “agency cost of agency capitalism.” These accounts speak to the conflict of interests between the
holding entity and its ultimate beneficiary. In the Chinese case, the state acts on behalf of “all the people.” While this
comparison is fascinating, I believe that the state, even as a shareholder, does not have a corporate-style “fiduciary
obligation” to the Chinese people per se. The Chinese people, as the theoretical ultimate beneficiaries of state ownership,
did not electively entrust their economic and governance rights with the state the way that record holders entrust their
investment with an institutional intermediary (state-owned pension and social security funds excepted). Such a relationship
thus cannot be addressed by the agency theory alone. A different framework, possibly involving public ownership theories,
is required. That concern is outside the scope of this project. See Ronald Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Milhaupt &
Pargendler, Governance Challenges of SOEs, supra note 201, at 5. For an additional account of the agency costs of institutional
investors, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89 (2017).
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The analysis above does not imply any normative claim against state ownership in and of itself,
nor against Chinese state ownership specifically. It can certainly be the case that state corporate control
has benefited the Chinese economy, its market development,233 and Chinese society at large. Rather,
the point here is that the state’s corporate control in China, under the current organizational structure,
is particularly alarming for public shareholders. It combines the ills of dispersed ownership with the
perils of controlling shareholders and amplifies them through every link of the organizational chain.
Public shareholders in China may be losing on all fronts.

B. The Party-State’s Financial and Capital Market Control
Apart from its position as a shareholder, the Party-state’s control is felt in the infusion of its
interests into the Chinese capital market through its central position in other areas that affect corporate
business, particularly the financial industry and labor market. The Party-state implements this control
through its several roles, as a regulator, enforcer, and often owner of the main players in these fields.
This picture is frequently described as Chinese “state capitalism.”234 It is a system in which the Partystate directly or indirectly functions as the controlling shareholder of most significant industrial groups
and their domestic and globally-listed companies, as well as of the commercial and policy banks and
financial industry firms, and at the same time acts as the market’s regulator and the main enforcement
institution.235 A study by Lin and Milhaupt shows the various ways through which the Party-state
controls the debt market. In the bond market, for example, bond issuers are primarily organs of the
central or local governments, thereby circumventing a national level prohibition against local
government debt issuance by using special financing vehicles. 236 The Party-state’s dominance in the
debt market is felt not only in the identity of bond issuers but also throughout the entire network of
market intermediaries. The underwriting industry, despite having a relatively large number of players,
which entails more competition, reveals the absolute dominance of state-owned financial
intermediaries. The main banks, securities companies, and other financial institutions conduct the
underwriting activity, and the great majority of them are owned by the state. At the time of the study,
Recall that the law and finance approach that links investor protections with capital market and economic development
is contradicted by China’s conundrum.
234 See generally REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM
(Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2015); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 697 n.9.
235 Commentators have taken different views as to the Party-state involvement in the economy. Some have argued against
the characterization of the Chinese economy as “state-capitalism.” See, e.g., LARDY, supra note 31 (considering the rapidly
growing private business sector as a major driver of economic growth and employment in China today).
236 Local Government Financing Vehicles issue 36.8 percent of the total outstanding corporate debt instruments. Central
SOEs controlled typically by SASAC issued 28.6 percent, and local SOEs controlled by local SASAC branches issued 21.7
percent of the total. Facially private enterprises issued only 12.7 percent of all outstanding corporate bonds. See Li-Wen
Lin & Curtis Milhaupt, Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on China’s Corporate Debt Market 20-21 (European Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Law
Working
Paper
No.
327/2016,
2016),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810209.
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out of all financial institutions that perform underwriting activity with at least two percent of the
underwriting market, only one (Minsheng Bank) was not state owned, and even it maintained a close
reciprocal relationship with the government.237 Similarly, Lin and Milhaupt found that in the credit
rating industry, which is also seemingly competitive, the state owns the majority of firms (five out of
nine agencies).238 The potential for conflicts of interest and “partisan rating” is clear. As most bond
issuers are politically connected to the Party-state, credit ratings are skewed upwards239 and thus do
not perform well as reputational intermediaries.240
This Party-state control over debt financing resources affects the availability of alternatives to
equity financing and increases its control over the capital market overall. Considering only the
shareholding capacity of the Party-state does not provide a complete picture of China’s state capitalism
and its implications for the capital market. The Chinese Party-state is omnipresent in every market
element: from outright trading suspensions in the capital market; through a licensing regime that can
be exercised to limit the operation of certain market players; geopolitical changes that bring stricter or
laxer M&A and antitrust norms, which affect business conduct and profitability; through monetary
control over the repatriation of funds by SAFE (the State Administration of Foreign Exchange); and
finally, even to protectionist legal enforcement in commercial cases.
The implications for public shareholders—their status and the role they can play in the capital
market—derive from the complete array of Party-state economic control and not merely from its
position as a shareholder. The remainder of the chapter addresses the implications of China’s state
capitalism on the functioning of traditional corporate governance institutions.

III. ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
As seen thus far, China’s political economy and the continued embrace of state capitalism have
created a structured predicament in which public shareholders are disempowered and subject to open
exploitation by various corporate control parties. Howson describes the situation as “a ready invitation
to opportunism, ‘tunneling’, minority shareholder exploitation and oppression.”241 In this section, I
will examine whether traditional monitoring and disciplining mechanisms can overcome this structural
predicament.

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22-23 (also pointing out that sixty percent of all rated corporate bonds were rated by a state-owned rating agency).
However, on expectations for future regulation that will open-up credit rating to foreign agencies, see Miller Matthew &
Umesh Desai, China’s Move to Open Up for Global Rating Agencies May Lift Debt Credibility, REUTERS (Dec. 8. 2016, 6:27 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-ratings-idUSKBN13X168.
239 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 34-35.
240 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 802-803 (2001).
241 Howson, supra note 209, at 6.
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Foundational corporate law theories view the public corporation as a capital-raising vehicle.242
By the same account, corporate governance in public firms (including securities regulation) should be
designed to facilitate the development of the capital market as a dynamic and efficient capital allocation
mechanism whereby capital is allocated to the most deserving firms. Striving for efficiency, capital
markets and corporate governance regimes should minimize the costs of monitoring corporate control
parties. These costs emanate from the separation between the owners of the corporation and those
who control it, and their potential conflicting interests—which constitute the basic premise of modern
public firm theory.243 Following this approach, it is asserted that corporate governance should focus
on mechanisms that will prevent the exploitation of investors by those who control their investment,
or, in positive terms, on “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of
getting a return on their investment.”244 If investors’ expectations for a fair game are met, the theory
goes, they will be reassured and encouraged to continue investing. This will keep the cost of financing
low and will promote a vibrant capital market with minimal monitoring costs. It follows that potential
exploitative behavior by corporate control parties (insider management and controlling shareholders)
can be minimized by an array of monitoring mechanisms gathered under the umbrella of the system’s
corporate governance regime.
The remainder of this chapter examines traditional mechanisms of corporate governance and
their operation in China. By traditional mechanisms, I mean the mechanisms that are conventionally
assigned a monitoring and disciplining role in corporate governance, whatever their contribution to
firm/market value is. For each mechanism, I describe its assigned role under the conventional
understanding and then evaluate if and how it functions in China, and whether it serves the interests
of public shareholders. These traditional mechanisms fall into two categories, firm-internal and
external monitoring mechanisms, as follows:245

Internal Governance Mechanisms:
•

Shareholders (institutional investors, other shareholder coalitions)

•

Other Internal Governing Bodies (board of directors, independent directors, supervisory
board)

•

Other Corporate Constituents (employees, creditors, consumers, managers)

Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967).
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 n.1 (1983) (citing BERLE
& MEANS, supra note 13, at 129).
244 See generally Michal Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 737 (1997).
For different approaches to corporate governance, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1985) (presenting a broader institutional economics contractarian view). See also Stuart L. Gillan, Recent
Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 381 (2006) (presenting a broad, inclusive approach).
245 For the previous appearance of some parts of the following review, see Groswald Ozery, supra note 101.
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External Monitoring Institutions:
•

External Markets (the market for corporate control, capital market, product market,
managerial labor market)

•

Gatekeepers (lawyers, accountants & underwriters, the financial press)

•

The Legal System (public enforcement—the CSRC, stock exchanges; private
enforcement— the People’s Courts system)

A. Internal Governance Mechanisms
1. Shareholders
The failure of monitoring by the state as a controlling shareholder calls attention to the issue
of monitoring by other shareholders, whether public individual shareholders or blockholding
coalitions.
In contrast to controlling shareholders and blockholders, dispersed shareholders have
information asymmetries, collective action problems, and incentives to free-ride others. These make
it difficult and uneconomical for shareholders with few shares to monitor corporate control parties.246
Individual public shareholders therefore typically take passive holding positions. Yet, dispersed
shareholders may form coalitions that increase their ability to monitor and discipline corporate insiders
in various ways. 247 Through aggregate action, they are potentially able to collect enough votes to make
specific corporate governance proposals, challenge the decision-making of incumbent managers, and
even oust underperforming managers and take control of the firm.248
In firms with controlling shareholders, public shareholders, even when building coalitions, are
generally unable to assemble enough votes to contest control directly. Yet, they can still engage in
governance and have some monitoring functions when acting in concert.

Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2005) (positing a
contractarian view, in which shareholders are only owners of a residual claim, not of the corporation itself); Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 243.
247 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
248 See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (providing an example of shareholder participation effort
in the context of a contested election battle—“proxy fight”); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch.
1988) (providing an example for shareholder accumulating votes and submitting a precatory proposal to influence
company business strategy and board composition).
246
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i. Institutional Investors
Over the last few decades, shifts in shareholder composition, particularly in widely-held
markets, have raised expectations for greater public participation through institutional investments.249
Although the views on institutional investors’ actual engagement in governance and contribution to
firm value are far from conclusive,250 it certainly seems that the recent accumulation of corporate
power and potential for activism by institutional investors is transforming the corporate governance
landscape.251
Certainly, the degree of involvement by institutional investors depends on the country’s
political economy, including the applicable regulatory framework, the sophistication of the financial
industry, and the extent to which such institutional investors have been co-opted. 252 When a
controlling shareholder exists, the power of institutional investors to influence corporate decision
making and monitor effectively is limited from the outset. The presence of institutional investors is

For the canonical view, see Black, supra note 247 (depicting traditional institutional investors as promising monitors);
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (suggesting a model by which institutional
investors are affecting “the passivity story”). For a more recent perspective, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 247, at 1042,
1047–70 (explaining the disillusionment about the traditional institutional investors’ activism, yet reflecting similar hopes
regarding hedge funds as new, promising activists).
250 For views supporting institutional investors’ activism, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (empirically testing and refuting the claim that activists’ interventions by hedge
funds are costly to firms and their shareholders in the long term); Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An
International Study, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2933-2971 (2017) (finding that incidents of activism and their contribution to
return is greater with high institutional ownership, particularly with respect to U.S. institutions); April Klein & Emanuel
Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 187-229 (2009) (examining the
success rate of activist campaigns by Hedge funds, VC funds, PE funds, and individual investors).
249

For the opposing views, see, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (arguing that engagement by activist hedge funds has costly externalities on
long term firm investment); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical
Evidence, CONTEMP. FIN. DIG., Autumn 1998, at 10 (concluding that no empirical evidence supports the claim that activists
improve long term market performance); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE. J. ON REG. 174, 187–219 (2001) (reviewing studies on shareholder proposals submitted by
public pension funds in the United States and finding an insignificant effect on firms’ performance).
251 For recent reports on the rise of institutional investors’ ownership in the United States and its potential implications
on governance, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 232, at 91, 92-93; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 232, at 865; John C. Coates,
The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve, (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 19-07,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337.
252 Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA .
L. & BUS. REV. 1, 24–25 (2008) (discussing the conditions that made the United Kingdom a more favorable jurisdiction
for shareholder participation through institutional investors, compared to the United States).

53

A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
more limited,253 tied to the state,254 or co-opted within a group of dominant shareholders.255 In these
markets, while institutional investors are technically able to overcome apathy and collective-action
problems that hold back monitoring by dispersed shareholders, they rarely have the incentives to do
so. Scholars have begun to explore the complexity of internal agency problems that affect the power
and function of institutional investors, even in dispersed markets. 256 Such agency issues are
exacerbated where institutional investors are entwined with larger business groups through business
relations and ownership, as is the case in many concentrated markets. In some cases, institutional
investors are even controlled by the listed firm whose public share float they manage.257 This increases
their support for incumbent insiders without accountability to their ultimate beneficiaries. This
situation has prompted several scholars and policy makers to propose more mandatory intervention
in concentrated markets that seek to promote public shareholder engagement through institutional
investor stewardship.258
With respect to the PRC, the institutional investment industry experiences all the general
predicaments that impede the ability of institutional investors to monitor and engage in governance,
and then some. The limited scale of the industry is one of these impediments. According to reports
by China’s stock exchanges, most retail investors manage their equity investments individually and not
through institutional investor accounts. Out if their total accounts, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and
the Shanghai Stock Exchange respectively report that 0.33 percent and 0.46 percent are institutional
accounts compared to individual (retail) investors’ accounts.259
Only a small scope of institutional investment, measured by assets under management, was noted for Portugal, Greece,
Spain, Turkey, Poland, and other OECD countries. See OECD, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 112 (2011); Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, The Colors of Investors’ Money: The Role of
Institutional Investors Around the World, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 499, 524–30 (2008) (providing data on institutional ownership by
country).
254 Such as in China (see the discussion that follows). Regarding India, see Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, Large Shareholder
Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India, 1 INT’L REV. FIN. 161, 166 (2000).
255 Such as in Israel, France, Korea, Singapore, and Brazil. For the Israeli case, see Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh,
Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691 (2012). For France, see Carine Girard, Success of Shareholder
Activism: The French Case, BANKERS, MARKETS & INVESTORS, Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 26. See generally Stuart Gillan & Laura T.
Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective, (Weinberg Ctr. for
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 2003-01, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=439500.
256 Bebchuk et al., supra note 232; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 229; K. A. D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30
IOWA J. CORP. L. 219, 223, 241 (2004).
257 Hamdani & Yafeh, supra note 255.
258 Id. at 711-14 (“it is legal intervention—rather than minority shareholders’ voting power—that drives institutional
investors to cast a vote” … “Institutional investors tend to be active primarily when legally required to do so.”). For recent
efforts in the EU, see Directive 2017/828, Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of LongTerm Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1, available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/9b871b38-3d20-11e7-a08e-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. See generally Goshen, supra note 162 (arguing that
corporate laws must incorporate some form of minority protection as a mandatory rule and examining various such forms
in different jurisdictions).
259 These reports might be somewhat misleading as some institutional investors hold individual accounts. For the relative
number of individual and institutional accounts See SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE
STATISTICS
ANNUAL
475-6
(2014),
available
at
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/tjnj_2014.pdf
(in
Chinese);
INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT OF SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET FACT BOOK
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The scope of institutional investment services in China is still strictly regimented with limited
investment choices. For example, pension funds are funded and managed by local-level provincial and
city governments and until very recently could only invest in national treasury bonds and deposits. 260
Only in late 2015 did the State Council permit pension funds to invest in equity securities.261 Similar
investment limitations apply to the PRC’s National Social Security Fund, which functions as the
central government’s social security reserve fund.262 As for mutual funds, in recent years there has
been an increase in the number of mutual funds and their total equity investments. In 2012, mutual
funds held 7.6 percent of all shares. Yet at the firm level, their holdings are still marginal. In 2011,
mutual funds held a median of 0.067 percent in firms. 263 Scholars note a short-term investment
horizon as one factor in institutional investors’ firm level small holdings264 and lack of influence. Their
strategy is to invest speculatively and hold shares for short periods of time. The investment pattern of
institutional investors is thus similar to that of individual investors, making them similarly unlikely to
monitor. Still, there is no doubt that the institutional investment industry in China is growing.265 This
should remain true especially after the 2015 and 2016 stock market collapses, when institutional
investors were instructed to increase their positions.
An additional impediment relates to competency issues in the industry, which is relatively
young and not yet skilled enough to have a meaningful effect on managerial powers.266 The Qualified

269
(2013)
[hereinafter
Shenzhen
Stock
Exchange
Fact
Book],
available
at
https://web.archive.org/web/20170722151420/http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/largepdf/20150319145710.pdf
(in
Chinese). But see Clarke, supra note 3 , at 147, 154 (“official and unofficial investment funds often use (legally or illegally)
individual accounts.”).
260 See
ROBERT C. POZEN, TACKLING THE CHINESE PENSION SYSTEM 3–6, 8 (2013), available at
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/31-reforming-chinese-pension-system-pozen.pdf. Insurance
funds and mutual funds have other restrictions. See also Chao Xi, Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice,
17 INT’L COMPANY & COMM. L. REV. 251, 252 (2006).
261 The new rules allow pension funds to invest up to thirty percent of their net assets in domestic equities. Guowuyuan
Guanyu Yinfa Jiben Yanglao Baoxian Jijin Touzi Guanli Banfa de Tongzhi (Guofa (2015) 48 hao) (国务院关于印发基
本养老保险基金投资管理办法的通知 (国发 （2015） 48 号)) [State Council Administrative Measures for Investment
Management of Pension Funds] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 17, 2015) [hereinafter State Council Administrative
Measures for Investment Management of Pension Funds], http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201508/23/content_10115.htm.
262 For general information, see QUANGUO SHEHUI BAOZHANG JIJIN LISHI HUI [NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY FUND], http://www.ssf.gov.cn (last visited May 25, 2019).
263 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 197 tbl.6, 211.
264 Id. at 211 (pointing to an average holding period of less than six months by mutual funds in 2011). Previous research
had pointed to even shorter holding periods (one to two months). See Clarke, supra note 3, at 154-155.
265 See State Council Administrative Measures for Investment Management of Pension Funds, supra note 261, arts. 36, 37.
This move was said to potentially contribute up to RMB 600 billion, managed by the PRC pension fund, into the PRC
domestic stock markets. See Phillip Inman, China to Allow Pension Funds to Invest in Stock Market for the First Time, GUARDIAN,
(Aug. 23, 2015, 3:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/23/china-to-allow-pension-fund-to-invest-instock-market-for-first-time.
266 Yongbeom Kim et al., Developing Institutional Investors in People’s Republic of China, (World Bank, Country Study Paper No.
30248,
2003),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/280421468743976037/pdf/302480CHA0deve1titutional0investors.pdf.
For a more recent and more positive analysis of institutional investors in China, see Xi, supra note 259.
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Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)267 program was expected to bring experience and professional
skills that would improve the quality of domestic institutional investors and their market involvement
levels.268 The “educational” value of QFIIs, however, remained marginal. Confined by operational
quotas and informational asymmetries due to operating in a foreign system, QFIIs have prioritized
maintaining a strong relationship with Party-state controlling shareholders. QFIIs often entrust the
controller’s appointees to vote on their behalf, 269 instead of opting for direct action that might
maximize value for their unit holders and other minority shareholders.270 It should nevertheless be
noted that in recent years the Chinese government has increased the QFII quota allotment several
times.271
Other recent initiatives outside the QFII system were taken in a similar direction. The 2013
Shanghai Free Trade Zone included various experiments with a reduction of barriers to foreign
investors’ participation in the capital market.272 At the national level, the recent China–Hong Kong
Stock Connect initiative and the Mutual Recognition of Publicly Offered Funds between Hong Kong
and the PRC were designed to increase investments by off-shore institutional investors and to
introduce a wider range of investment tools into the PRC domestic market.273 These recent initiatives
will presumably somewhat increase the activity of foreign institutional investors that are less embedded
in business group affiliations and Party-state control than domestic institutional investment firms. On
the margins, increasing the scope of authorized foreign investors might, with time, bring more
engagement by institutional investors, as hoped for.

The program was introduced in 2002, revised in September 2009, and once again in December 2012. A separate
program was approved in 2011 to facilitate the use of Renminbi held outside mainland China for investments in the
domestic market – Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. General information on the QFII and RQFII
schemes, including summaries of important policy revisions and relevant quotas, is available on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange website. QFII & RQFII, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, http://english.sse.com.cn/investors/qfii/what/ (last
visited May 13, 2019). For ease of reference, I will refer to these programs together as QFII.
268 See generally Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate
Governance, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 265, 319 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
269 OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN CHINA: SELF-ASSESSMENT BY THE CHINA SECURITIES
REGULATORY COMMISSION 39 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/48444985.pdf.
270See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J.
INT’L L. 169, 190 (2004) (providing examples of how these considerations may have led to the generally passive role of
foreign institutional investors in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as well).
271 See supra note 267. See also QFII Investment Quota to be Increased by 50 Billion U.S. Dollars, CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION
(Mar.
4,
2012),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/OpeningUp/RelatedPolices/QFII/201212/t20121210_217805.html.
272 See Policy Measures for the Capital Market to Support and Promote the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION
(Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201311/t20131126_238765.html.
267

The mutual stock-connect initiative allows off-shore retail and institutional investors mutual stock market access
between the SSE and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The Mutual Recognition of Funds opened up an authorization
process for off-shore funds to trade in the respective domestic markets, thus increasing the access of PRC and Hong Kong
investors to asset management funds registered in the Hong Kong/PRC market, respectively. See Mainland-Hong Kong
Mutual Recognition of Funds, SECURITY FUTURES COMMISSION, https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/faqs/mainland-hong-kongmutual-recognition-of-funds.html (last visited May 25, 2019).
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Given the likelihood that the market share, competency, and sophistication of institutional
investors in China will increase in the foreseeable future, the question then arises whether the industry
could become meaningful in corporate governance and, if so, how. Can institutional investors in China
become actively involved in the governance of listed firms, and might they actively monitor corporate
insiders at least to the extent that they do so in other concentrated markets? In my view, other
impediments established in China’s political economy will continue to stand in the way of a more
active and influential institutional investors industry.
The following factors will likely prevent institutional investors from becoming true stewards
of public shareholders’ interests in the Chinese capital markets. First, institutional investors in China
are subject to close regulation, supervision, and enforcement at several administrative levels. Various
competing central government ministry-level bodies regulate the industry: the CSRC, the China
Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, National Council for
Social Security Fund, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. This divided regulatory and
supervisory system produces multiple, cumbersome, and often overlapping regulations and competing
interests that limit institutional investors’ initiative and autonomy.274 It may also hold back policies
that the CSRC would have otherwise promoted and that might have encouraged institutional investors
to be more engaged. For example, it likely impedes any potential intention to require cumulative voting
or to mandate voting by institutional investors on certain matters, as seen in other concentrated
markets.275
Most importantly, China’s state capitalism attributes are likely to inhibit institutional investor
engagement in governance going forward as well. Even compared to other concentrated markets, the
conflicts of interest experienced by PRC institutional investors are particularly acute. Firms in the
institutional investors industry are closely affiliated with SOE groups, publicly listed firms, and their
senior insiders through ownership and contractual arrangements, as well as with key political players

For instance, both the CSRC and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange are responsible for the administration
of the QFII schemes. See QFII & RQFII , supra note 267. The CSRC and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission
share administrative authority over the operation of pension insurance funds that are also securities investment funds. The
authority of the China Banking Regulatory Commission to regulate and supervise the entire banking industry includes
some authority interface with the CSRC’s authority over mutual funds, since financial institutions often operate as
securities companies.
275 The CSRC requires disclosure of the votes of the ten largest public shareholders on certain issues discussed at a
shareholders meeting. See Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohu de Ruogan Guiding (关于加强
社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定) [Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the
General Public Shareholders] (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 7, 2004), art. 1.1.(5) [hereinafter CSRC
2004 Provisions], available at http://shlx.chinalawinfo.com/ newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=56204. Yet, there is no
affirmative duty of institutional investors to vote (a duty that regulators in other markets, e.g., Israel, require for certain
matters). The CSRC could, potentially, push for a corresponding mandatory vote. Without such a requirement and given
institutional investors’ network affiliation described above, a requirement to disclose the votes is more likely to discourage
the vote of these public shareholders altogether.
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at various levels of the Party-state system.276 Furthermore, the Party-state is strongly involved in the
capital market not only through its control of many listed companies, but also through its control over
the financial industry and the major players in the investment sector. Besides the state’s direct
ownership in financial firms and securities companies,277 another way the Party-state exercises control
over the industry is through the reshuffling of senior executives between firms in the industry and
between firms and the administering state organs.278
Thus, in the PRC, central organs of the Party-state have not only both administrative and
regulatory control over the financial and investment sectors, but also absolute ownership and
management control of the firms in these sectors. The PRC Party-state is therefore able to advance
its interests through its controlling shareholder position in its subsidiary listed firms, through state
regulatory agencies and the legal system, and also through its controlling ownership position in most
of China’s fund managers, insurance companies and other public investment vehicles, securities
companies, and banks.279
This control model certainly poses barriers to institutional investors acting autonomously from
the larger Party-state apparatus. The solutions applied in other concentrated markets, through which
institutional investors are empowered and their conflicts are somewhat overcome, 280 are simply
irrelevant in the Chinese context. For example, the institutional investor industry embedded in the
Party-state system will not exercise even a formally granted minority veto against Party-state

See Firth et al., supra note 198 (providing an interesting insight into institutional investors’ decisions during the splitshare structure reform, when mutual funds were pressured politically to accept compensation schemes to rush the
implementation of the reform even when not in the best interests of their unit holders); Xi, supra note 260, at 258–63.
277 See, e.g., LARDY, supra note 31, at 20–23 (measuring state control over the financial industry by asset-holding ratio,
finding that private bank assets account for only seventeen percent of all bank assets, and ascribing a more limited scope
to institutional investors).
278 For example, transfers of executives between the central bank, commercial banks, and branches of the administration
such as China Banking Regulatory Commission and the CSRC. See Nicholas C. Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial
Banks—The Old Nomenklatura System Serving New Corporate Governance Structures?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123 (Martha Avery et al. eds., 2009).
279 Kim et al., supra note 266. See also HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN MAINLAND CHINA
(2004), available at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/rpaper/Documents/IIMC.pdf.
280 Such as negative veto rights, super majority requirements, mandatory participation of minority public shareholders in
certain business decisions, minority public shareholder involvement in directors’ elections, and their right to submit
governance proposals to the board. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 163, at 30–37 (listing countries that have adopted various
forms of minority negative veto rights). Israel is one example of a highly-concentrated market where the state regulator
sought to increase institutional investor participation and power by addressing the passivity of institutional investors and
their co-option within a larger, dominated group and the potential conflict of interest resulting therefrom. Israel’s Company
Law requires that an “extraordinary” transaction between the company and its control party (including affiliates) be
approved by the shareholders’ general meeting, provided that the approving majority votes will include a majority of
disinterested (minority) shareholders participating in the meeting (abstentions not counted). The minority approval
requirement is in addition to an approval by an audit committee and by the board of directors. See Company Law, 57591999, § 275(a),1 LSI 44 (1999). At the same time, various financial laws and regulations mandate that institutional investors
cast a vote in certain matters, thereby leveraging shareholder consent into a regulatory device. Hamdani & Yafeh, supra
note 255, at 696–700.
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controlling shareholders, such as the one provided for in the CSRC 2004 Provisions.281 Likewise, an
effort like the one recently taken in Israel in which business groups were structurally and actively
required to disentangle—separating institutional investors from industrial firms—is not a viable
option in the Chinese case. 282 Separating the affiliation of asset management institutions from
corporate groups in China will not suffice to eliminate their complex conflicts of interest. Real
autonomy and independence of institutional investors from the corporate groups would require their
detachment from the Party-state. This scenario is unlikely. Such an overhaul would contradict the
reasons for which the Chinese state capitalism system was established in the first place and maintained
thus far. Hence, even if the market share and proficiency of domestic institutional investors in China
grows, that increase will not translate into any reduction in control by corporate insiders or any
increase in real stewardship and governance engagement by institutional investors in the cases where
it is needed the most.

ii. Coalition-Building Shareholder Monitoring
Nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and other social organizations are
emerging as significant stakeholders in several concentrated markets. 283 These players are often
involved in governance indirectly, by instigating broad public attention that puts pressure on
controlling shareholders and directors and by lobbying regulators for public shareholder–friendly
corporate governance mechanisms. In some systems, social organizations may facilitate coalitionbuilding share-ownership for public shareholders, especially where institutional investors are less
prominent. In this capacity, they may actively participate in governance by exercising their associated
governance rights through voting, submitting shareholder proposals, and taking advantage of ex-post
legal claims. 284 Their involvement can discipline corporate insiders and control parties, expose
problems, and push firms and their management to act in a socially responsible manner.
CSRC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275, art. 1.1.(5). The ownership-market structure and the network of conflicting
interests make it more reasonable to assume that institutional investors, when involved, will take informal private
negotiations as their preferred method.
282 In a novel regulatory step, the Israeli legislature adopted “The Law for the Decrease of Concentration and Increase of
Competition.” It aims to strengthen competition and curtail the excessive clout of a relatively small number of business
groups over the Israeli economy by limiting pyramid groups to two holding layers and separating ownership of financial
institutions from non-financial corporations. See Ido Baum et al., What Is Israel’s New Business Concentration Law and Why
Should We Care?, HAARETZ (Dec. 29, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/1.565986.
283 See, e.g., Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund
Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR. FIN. L. REV. 328, 350–54, 370 (2013) (describing a decline in hedge
fund activism in Italy and the rise of the “Assogestioni”—a nonprofit association that serves as a facilitator for minority
shareholder minimum board representation and advocates stronger engagement of intermediaries in corporate
governance); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29
YALE J. INT’L L. 169 (2004) (discussing NPOs governance participation as shareholders as one of the most important
corporate law enforcement agents in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan).
284 Emma Sjöström, Translating Ideologically Based Concerns: How Civil Society Organizations Use the Financial Market to Protect
Human Rights, 6 INT’L J. ENV’T & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 153 (2007).
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In the French capital market, for example, associations d’actionnaires ([public] shareholders’
associations) have become influential institutions able to coordinate minority shareholder action,
despite significant ownership concentration in French firms long supported by the government. The
French Commercial Code permits public shareholders with at least five percent of the voting rights
and that have held their shares for more than two years to form associations d’actionnaires to act in concert
to further public shareholders’ collective interests. 285 Scholars have argued that coalition-building
efforts enabled by these associations have meaningfully strengthened minority public shareholder
engagement in the governance of French firms.286
It is unlikely, however, that a role comparable to the one played by the French shareholders’
associations is possible for Chinese social organizations in the capital markets governed by the PRC’s
authoritarian, single party regime. The need for social organizations to be able to rely on law and legal
institutions to enforce their rights, as well as an ability to publicly critique corporate misconduct
through a relatively free financial press, are functions that are not readily available in China. The
Chinese People’s Courts are not an independent branch of government and are part of the Party-state
bureaucracy. This means that the Chinese judiciary is weak and, in many cases, lacks the technical
competence, bureaucratic autonomy, or political independence necessary for it to act against far more
powerful Party-state actors.287
Furthermore, one must understand the current state of civil society in China in order to assess
the possibilities for Chinese social organizations, even as shareholders, as corporate governance
participants in the PRC. The emergence of civil society, including citizens’ access to rights-enforcing
institutions, is a matter of some complexity in China, but clearly the Western notion of freedom of
association is absent. Civil society and social organizations, as well as the financial press, are largely
confined to areas that do not threaten central Party-state interests or that can help the center keep
local power in control.288
In addition to these limitations on the judicial system, the financial press, and civil society at
large, there also exists in China an embedded traditional cultural perception that the legal system is a
coercive instrument of control and that administration is to be reserved to the state.289 As Clarke puts
See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] arts. L.225-103, L.225-105, L.225-230-L.225-233, L.225-252
(Fr.). See also Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest from the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157,
197-98 (2014) (discussing relevant sections of the French CODE DE COMMERCE).
286 Girard, supra note 255. See also Nili, supra note 285, at 199, n.229.
287 Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, supra note 142, at 327-356. I discuss the People’s Courts more
extensively below.
288 See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S PRIVATE
SECTOR (2008); Donald C. Clarke, The Private Attorney-General in China: Potential and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 241 (2009); Benjamin L. Liebman, Changing Media, Changing Courts, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA 150,
151 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011); Benjamin Van Rooij, People’s Regulation: Citizens and Implementation of Law in China, 25 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 116 (2012); Benjamin Van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action against Pollution in China, 19 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA, 55 (2010).
289 See, e.g., Derk Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China, 107 PROC.
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 375 (1963); Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture,
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it, “The notion that private citizens should be involved in law enforcement for public goals does not
find a ready home in… [the] Chinese political culture. The state jealously guards its control over the
machinery of coercion….”290 Thus, law and legal institutions operate so as to restrict any non-state
institutions, especially social organizations, from taking the lead on the enforcement of private rights
of any kind. This is certainly the case when they are asked to enforce private shareholders’ rights
against superior forces of the PRC Party-state.
The exclusion of private rights holders from effective use of the formal legal system, coupled
with a strong concern about the maintenance of social and political stability, are evident in the
constraints applied on private enforcement through group litigation. These constraints deny securities
law class actions outright and radically minimize the number of corporate law derivative lawsuits,
especially those involving Party-state controlled companies or their management.291 Thus, while some
Chinese social organizations may now operate legally, they are extremely unlikely to be permitted any
meaningful role in disciplining and monitoring corporate control parties.292

2. Other Internal Governing Bodies
i. Board of Directors
The board of directors plays a central role in corporate governance and is defined as the main
internal governance body in many modern corporate laws.293 The board appoints senior managers,
makes major policy decisions and approves others, and generally oversees the operations of the firm.
Elected by the firm’s shareholders, the directors’ oversight replaces a more costly and harder-tocoordinate monitoring by shareholders.
In controlled firms, however, and more generally in concentrated markers, board
independence and its commitment to all shareholders is challenged on both operational and normative
levels. The firm’s controlling or dominant shareholders dictate the election of board members in
controlled firms. This is clearly the case in China. The Company Law requires listed firms, as well as
other CLSs in the PRC, to have at least five directors on their board and no more than nineteen.294
3 J. CHINESE L. 55 (1989). Both sources emphasize the punitive and coercive aspects of the Chinese traditional legal system
through an analysis of China’s legal culture and the meaning of “Law.”
290 Clarke, supra note 288, at 242–43 (concerning private litigation, but applicable to other private enforcement channels).
291 Howson & Clarke, supra note 181, at 254-257.
292 A possibility remains that some form of a quasi-public institution will be established with the endorsement of the partystate. A party-state-sanctioned institution is vastly more likely to be permitted greater latitude to promote minority public
shareholder interests. For my previous exploration of this option, see Groswald Ozery, supra note 101.
293 For examples in the United States, see, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code tit. 8 § 141. See also Model
Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2002). Conversely, according to the PRC corporate law, the shareholders’
assembly is defined as “the company’s organ of power.” 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 98.
294 2005 Company Law, supra note 147 art. 108. Articles 46-48 stipulate the board’s powers. See id. arts. 46-48.
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The shareholders’ meeting elects and dismisses the directors, and also has the power to decide on
matters regarding their salary and other compensation.295 Majority rule – and thus decisions by the
controller or by dominant shareholders – generally determines the results of the shareholders’
meetings, including decisions respecting directors..
Most board members, and the board of directors as an organ of internal governance, therefore
lack independence and are largely captured by the controlling shareholders who appointed them. This
weakness of oversight by boards of directors in controlled companies is especially significant when
corporate malfeasance is done by the controlling shareholders or their affiliates in the firm. To address
this concern, some systems have opted to guarantee minority shareholder board representation
through different means, such as cumulative voting.296 China’s Company Law, however, includes only
an optional cumulative voting provision.297 The Code of Corporate Governance actually does require
listed firms with a dominant shareholder that owns more than thirty percent of the votes to have
cumulative voting for the selection of directors and supervisors.298 However, as mentioned earlier, the
Code is rarely enforced and merely offers a standard setting. Surprisingly, a recent study found that a
large majority of PRC listed firms have included cumulative voting in their articles of association. Yet,
the formal adoption of cumulative voting in these firms had only limited implication in practice. 299
Firms either did not exercise their cumulative voting mechanisms or the implementation did not bring
more independence to the board through minority shareholder representation for other reasons.
In sum, board members in China often turn a blind eye or even cooperate with insiders’
misconduct when it occurs under the cover of the controlling shareholder’s support or acquiescence.
When board members do monitor management, they do so to protect the interests of controlling
shareholders. Their incentives and ability to represent all shareholders are undermined. Such weakness
emphasizes the importance of having other strong internal monitoring governance bodies, such as
independent directors and audit committees, as well as a strong ex-post accountability regime.

ii. Independent Directors
Over the last two decades, particularly following the wave of corporate scandals of the early
2000s, independent directors have become an important element of corporate governance and the

Id. arts. 37, 99.
Non-controlling shareholders’ board representation is required in Italy. See Erede, supra note 283, at 350–54.
297 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 105. (“A shareholders’ assembly may adopt a cumulative voting system to elect
the directors or supervisors according to the bylaw or its resolutions.”) (Emphasis added.).
298 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission, Jan. 7, 2001), art. 31 [hereinafter Code of Corporate
Governance], available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.html.
299 Chao Xi & Yugang Chen, Does Cumulative Voting Matter? The Case of China: An Empirical Assessment, 15 EUR. BUS. ORG.
L. REV. 585, 585-613 (2014).
295
296

62

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

focus of corporate legal reform in many countries.300 While legal systems use different terms and
definitions for this internal governance institution, 301 independent directors in all systems share a
prescribed capacity to monitor corporate control parties (either generally or with respect to specific
transactions).
This development in corporate governance did not bypass China. China’s Company Law
contains a general and obscure provision about independent directors, leaving the matter to secondary
regulation.302 Among the various relevant rules,303 the most pertinent and comprehensive set of rules
is the CSRC-issued 2001 Independent Directors Guidance for Listed Firms (here, Independent
Director Guidance, or the Guidance).304 Per the Guidance, one-third of the total number of directors
on the board of any listed company should be independent, with at least one independent director
being an “accounting professional.”305 Listed companies are required to include independent directors
in their articles of association.306
The Guidance imposed on independent directors “a duty of good faith and due diligence and
care to the firm and all its shareholders.”307 They “shall protect the overall interests of the company
In the United States, the main relevant governance reforms include the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 2003 revisions in
NYSE and Nasdaq listing rules, and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. See generally Ronald W. Masulis et al., Directors: Older and
Wiser, or Too Old to Govern? (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 584/2018, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284874. A greater role for independent directors is reported in the United Kingdom
following the release of the Cadbury Report, and similar trends are observed in Japan in the same period. For a review of
this trend, see Clarke, supra note 71, at 150-175.
301 For a complete analysis, see Clarke, supra note 71.
302 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 122. (“A listed company shall have independent directors. The concrete
measures shall be formulated by the State Council.”). This provision applies specifically to publicly listed firms and not to
joint stock companies more generally.
303 For the current legal framework, see id.; Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors
of Listed Companies, (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Aug. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Independent
Directors Guidance], http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.html; Code
of Corporate Governance, supra note 298, which includes “best practices” guidance with no specific number of
independent directors nor specific powers prescribed for conflicted transactions); CRSC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275;
CSRC Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies (2016 Amendment) (promulgated by China Sec.
Regulatory
Comm’n,
Sept.
30,
2016),
available
at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201804/P020180427331974952658.pdf (which in
article 96 limit the number of “inside directors” to no more than fifty percent of all directors, but define them as those
who concomitantly serve as executives or employee representatives—therefore opting not to refer to their independence
from other controlling parties); Shangahi gongsi duli dongshi luz hi zhiyin ([上市公司独立董事履职指引) [Guidelines
for the Performance of Duties by Independent Directors of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Association
for Pub. Companies (CAPO), Sept. 12, 2014) (a national self-regulatory nonprofit organization, supervised by the CSRC,
that issues recommended best practices to listed firms).
304 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303. The Guidance was, and still is, the most detailed effort to establish
the institution of independent director in Chinese listed companies, but it was not the first. There had been prior initiatives
at various administrative levels—local governments, central ministries, stock exchanges, and the CSRC itself—of various
scopes and varying degrees of commitment. For a complete review, see Clarke, supra note 71, at 175-201. Clarke’s review
shows how the CSRC in its draft and prior efforts actually aimed to establish a far more rigorous independent director
mechanism that would have had broader and more specific powers in the firm than those finally established by the
Guidance.
305 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303, art. I.3.
306 Id.
307 Id. art. I.2.
300
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and shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being
infringed.”308 To that end, the Guidance limits the number of firms in which an independent director
can hold a similar concomitant position to five, and emphasizes their independence from the
“influence of the company's major shareholders, actual controllers, or other entities or persons who
are interested parties of the listed company.”309 From this it seems clear that the CSRC took the
position that an independent director should serve the interests of the company while protecting
particularly public shareholders and being free from the influence of any interested party.
Various powers are formally conferred upon independent directors. They are given a role in
the auditing, nomination, and compensation board committees, of which they should constitute at
least half of the members “when such committees are set up.”310 They are given the power to approve
major related party transactions before such transactions are submitted to board discussion.311 They
can propose engagement with an accounting firm to the board and propose that the board of directors
call a special shareholders’ meeting or a meeting of the board. Independent directors can appoint
outside auditors and consultants, and they can solicit proxies before a shareholders’ meeting is held.312
None of these powers are binding except perhaps the power to approve major related party
transactions. The binding effect of that approval is also questionable considering that non-compliance
requires merely a disclosure.
Independent directors are also required to offer an opinion on certain matters, including
decisions on the appointments, dismissals, and remunerations of other directors and senior managers.
An opinion is also required on any event that the independent director considers to be detrimental to
the interests of minority shareholders.313 Where the matter is subject to public disclosure by other laws
Id.
Id. The “Independence Requirement” is further made clear, in article III:
“III. Independent directors shall meet the "independence" requirements:
A person may not hold the position of the independent director in any of the following circumstances:
1. a person who holds a position in the listed company or its affiliated enterprises, their direct relatives and major social relations (direct
relatives refer to their spouse, father, mother and children etc.; major social relations [these are also based on familial ties]
refer to their brothers, sisters, father-in-law, mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, spouse of their brothers, sisters,
and their spouse's brothers and sisters etc.);
2. a person who holds more than 1 percent of the outstanding shares of the listed company directly or indirectly, or the natural person
shareholders of the 10 largest shareholders of the listed company, or such shareholder's direct relative;
3. a person who holds a position in a unit which holds more than 5 percent of the outstanding shares of the listed company directly or indirectly,
or of the unit which ranks as one of the 5 largest shareholders of the listed company, or such employee's direct relative;
4. a person meeting any of the three above-mentioned conditions in the immediate proceeding year;
5. a person providing financial, legal or consulting services to the listed company or its subsidiaries;
6. a person stipulated in the articles of association;
7. a person determined by the CSRC.”
Id. art III. (Emphasis added.)
310 Id. art. V.4.
311 Id. art. V.1.a (defining “Major related party transactions” as transactions with related parties in whose “total value
exceeds RMB three million or 5 percent of the company's net assets audited recently”).
312 Id. art. V.4.1.b-f.
313 Id. art. VI.
(“1. Apart from carrying out the above-mentioned duties, the independent director shall provide the independent opinion
on the following matters to the board of the directors or to the shareholders' meeting:
308
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and regulations, their opinion should also be disclosed, and where consensus was not reached, their
opinions should be disclosed separately. 314 While these disclosure provisions seem relatively far
reaching and might lead independent directors to perform their role in earnest, they might also cause
them to suppress their judgment, side with their peers to reach a consensus, or simply default to a nocomment opinion for fear of retaliation by the interested parties.
Existing evidence shows that most companies have followed the Guidance with respect to the
appointment of independent directors and made relevant bylaw amendments. 315 This fact alone,
however, does not say much about the directors’ performance of the above roles in practice or the
practice the institution brings to shareholders and corporate governance more generally. Given that
the Guidance has been in effect for almost two decades, these aspects can now be tested. 316 The
empirical studies on this subject have produced vague and often conflicting results.317 There is general
theoretical skepticism about the ability of independent directors to effectively perform their oversight

a.
Nomination,
appointment
or
replacement
of
directors;
b.
Appointment
or
dismissal
of
senior
managers;
c.
Remuneration
for
directors
and
senior
managers;
d. Any existing or new loan borrowed from the listed company by or other funds transfer made by the company's
shareholders, actual controllers or affiliated enterprises that exceeds RMB three million or 5 percent of the company's net
assets audited recently, and whether the company has taken effective measures to collect the amount due;
e. Events that the independent director considers to be detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders;
f. Other matters stipulated by the articles of association.”)
314 Id. arts. VI.2, VI.3. The Guidance does not make clear whether the identity of each independent director should be
disclosed along with her/his opinion.
315 Clarke, supra note 71, at 200.
316 Clarke’s review includes the limited empirical research that was available at the time, which mainly examined the
characteristics of independent directors (educational and professional background and their salary).
317 Here is a sample of relevant empirical studies:
Juan Ma & Tarun Khanna, Independent Directors' Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China, 37 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1547 (2016) (examining 24,212 independent directors’ opinions disclosed between 2001 and 2010 and identifying
scarce instances of dissent (only in 119 individual cases). The study concludes that independent directors would generally
defer to top management and that dissent is more likely when there is an “end game” situation in the firm); Xuesong Tang
et al., The Effectiveness of the Mandatory Disclosure of Independent Directors’ Opinions: Empirical Evidence from China, 32 J. ACCT. &
PUB. POL’Y 89 (2013). (suggesting that independent directors’ “NO” opinion, signals negatively to public shareholders,
affecting firm value); Lihong Wang, Protection or Expropriation: Politically Connected Independent Directors in China, 55 J. BANKING
& FIN. 92 (2015) (based on 7,487 firm observations between 2003 and 2012, the author suggests that politically connected
independent directors—an independent director who is a former government official or a current or former member of
the People’s Congress / CPPCC— enlarge the magnitude of related-party transactions with the controlling party in both
listed privately controlled firms and listed local SOEs. Notwithstanding, the author also concludes that a large fraction of
politically connected independent directors increases firm value in Chinese-listed, privately controlled firms but is
detrimental to firm value of listed SOEs, especially those under local-government control); Karen Lin et al., Voice or Exit?
Independent Director Decisions in an Emerging Economy (Oct. 22, 2012) (SSRN paper), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2166876 (examining independent directors’ opinions and
resignation notices by Chinese listed firms between 2005 and 2009. The authors find that the likelihood of an opposing or
dissenting opinion by an independent director is low (only 179 of a sample of 47,052 opinions, or 0.38 percent of all
opinions). In contrast, the authors also find that voluntary resignation by an independent director is a more common event
(1.8 percent of independent directors resigning before the end of their appointment each year). The authors conclude that
independent directors are more likely to resign than to dissent when they have private information about adverse corporate
events.).
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role, particularly where controlling shareholders exist.318 Similarly, the debate around the practical
contribution of this institution to corporate governance and firm performance is unsettled elsewhere
as well.319 With respect to China, the value brought by independent directors to shareholders and the
functional efficacy of this monitoring mechanism are questionable.
Upon inspection of the Guidance and other related legal frameworks, 320 three major
impediments clearly stand in the way of making independent directors effective monitors in China.
First, controlling or dominant shareholders can ultimately elect the independent directors.. According
to the Guidance, the board of directors, supervisory board, and shareholders who independently or
jointly hold more than one percent of the shares may nominate independent directors. 321 The
shareholders’ meeting then votes on and elects the nominees are by majority vote. The very nature of
the independence of independent directors is therefore dubious, particularly with respect to future
decisions when they might feel that they owe their election to a particular shareholder. The complex
network of business, social, and political ties surrounding listed firms in China, and the identity of the
controlling shareholder, commonly a state body, 322 only make the availability of true independent
directors more scarce.323 For example, despite the procedures set in the Guidance, a recent study found
that the chairman of the board in firms, usually the representative of the controlling shareholder,
“handpicks” nearly all independent directors from his or her own social network.324
Second, under the current legal framework, there seems to be no positive motivation for
independent directors to fulfill their intended roles, nor are there any legal consequences for directors
or firms that violate the Guidance. While the general fear of liability under fiduciary duties and
procedures established in the 2005 Company Law may motivate independent directors, 325 these
general incentives are the same as those of inside directors. Nothing is provided to make them act
differently.326 In addition, the binding power of the Guidance is unclear. As a matter of black letter
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271 (2016)
(noting that both the election and retention of independent directors largely depends on the controlling shareholder).
319 See generally Ronald W. Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, How Valuable are Independent Directors? Evidence from External
Distractions, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 22,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/22/how-valuable-are-independent-directors-evidence-from-externaldistractions/ (“empirical assessments of the value of independent directors are decidedly mixed, leaving the value of
independent directors an important unsettled question in the literature”).
320 See supra note 303.
321 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303, art. IV.1. Before elections, proposed nominees should first be
approved by the applicable branch of the CSRC. Id. art. IV.3.
322 The independence criteria are focused on independence from natural persons, not institutions. See id. art. III.
323 A striking example of this can be seen in a statement of the dean of Changjiang School of Business about his service as
an independent director. Clarke, supra note 170, at 43 (“I have never thought that the independent director is the protector
of medium and small shareholders; never think that. My job is first and foremost to protect the interests of the large
shareholder, because the large shareholder is the state.”).
324 Ma & Khanna, supra note 317, at 1549.
325 On the firm’s right to sue on violations of fiduciary duties, see 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 151. For
shareholders’ standing with respect to violations of any law, administrative regulation, or bylaws that damaged shareholders’
interests, see id. art. 152.
326 Clarke, supra note 71, at 209-210.
318
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law, the failure to comply with the Independent Directors Guidance (or any other provision pertaining
to independent directors under the relevant legal framework327) does not seem to constitute illegality
or lead to any specific formal enforcement by the CSRC. The CSRC may pressure companies to
comply in various soft power-ways, and the general fear of delisting might also encourage compliance,
but the Guidance itself does not prescribe any administrative sanctions. This ambiguity concerning
enforcement practically renders the implementation of the Guidance selective and leaves it in the
hands of firms and their controlling insiders. There is no reason to assume that dominant or
controlling shareholders would selectively appoint truly independent supervisors over their heads,
particularly given the mixed evidence on the effect of the mechanism on market value.
It is still possible that the pressure of the reputation market could incentive independent
directors, once selected, to monitor on behalf of public shareholders.328 The market for independent
directors is likely much sounder today than it was when the Guidance was established, and reputation
can play a significant role. However, a recent study that examined independent directors’ dissents
found that dissent rates dropped drastically after 2006. Independent directors thereafter generally
deferred to top management.329 While the authors did not offer any causal inferences, it is possible
that this was a result of a regulatory change. The inclusion of the independent director mechanism in
the 2005 Company Law, or possibly the parallel reform that exposed previously-untradeable state
shares to market forces for the first time, could have pushed independent directors to be less
confrontational, perhaps fearing retaliation by corporate control parties. The evidence of their
decreasing dissents might thus reflect that gaining the support of internal corporate control parties
substitutes for reputation in the external labor market for future appointments.
Finally, nothing since the Independent Directors Guidance was established has changed the
fact that the “requirements” in the Guidance are not mandatory. Firms can still avoid being considered
“violators”—and thus avoid repercussions—simply by disclosing their failure to implement. A failure
to comply with any of the provisions does not automatically invalidate a decision.330
Given the above, it seems that despite the adoption of the institution itself in most listed firms
in China today and regardless of its potential effects on market value, independent directors generally
do not function to secure the interests of public investors or monitor against corporate malfeasance
by corporate control parties.

See supra note 303.
I discuss the reputation and managerial labor market as external monitoring institutions below.
329 Ma & Khanna, supra note 317, at 1550.
330 Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303, art. V.3 ; Clarke, supra note 71, at 194.
327
328

67

A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
iii. Supervisory Board
The PRC’s dual board structure combines an Anglo-American style board of directors and a
German style supervisory board. In addition to the board of directors, any joint stock company must
have a board of supervisors with employee electors. At first glance, it seems that the structure is a
transplant of Germany’s two-tiered board and co-determination mechanisms. 331 However, the
Chinese dual board structure is very different from Germany’s mechanism and is widely considered
to be a failure. China’s 2005 Company Law does mandate that firm employees elect one-third of the
supervisory board members and the general shareholders’ meeting elects the rest.332 However, unlike
its German inspiration, not only is there no hierarchical relationship between the PRC’s supervisory
board and the board of directors, but these two supposed monitoring bodies also lack independence
from the controlling shareholder. The supervisory board has no power whatsoever with respect to
appointing the board of directors, who are elected by the general shareholders’ meeting—which is,
again, dominated by the controlling shareholder.
Legal reforms and various regulations that have been instituted over the years concerning the
governance of PRC listed firms did not even try to correct the sheer irrelevance of the supervisory
board. Some options that could have made the supervisory board more relevant to firm governance
include granting negative veto rights or requiring the approval of the supervisory board for certain
board decisions. Any attempt to empower this institution, which theoretically is supposed to have a
supervising function, is entirely missing from both laws and regulations. 333 Thus, instead of
constraining the power of control parties or providing any kind of monitoring mechanism that would
benefit employees or public shareholders, the Chinese dual board structure further entrenches the
power of those dominating the firm.334

iv. Audit Committee and/or Other Special Committees
Some legal systems have installed special committees to address intrinsic power imbalances in
the ownership structure of firms in their market. These committees are often involved in the approval
I discuss the German board structure further below under both the Creditors and Employee Monitoring subsections.
2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 53, 117, 188. Moreover, article 108 enables the board of directors in CLSs to
have employees-elected representatives as well. Id. art. 108.
333 The supervisory board is authorized: to examine the financial affairs of the company; to propose the removal of
directors and senior managers who violated their duties, laws, regulations, company bylaws, or shareholders’ resolutions,
and under certain conditions initiate a derivative lawsuit following such violation; to demand that the violators rectify their
actions; to propose a shareholder meeting or to assemble one where the board of directors fail to do so; and to put forward
proposals at a shareholders meeting. The supervisory board members may also observe the meetings of the board of
directors as non-voters. Id. arts. 52-54, 117-118, 152.
334 Especially since cumulative voting is currently not mandatory. Supra note 297 and the accompanying text. See Clarke,
supra note 71, at 161–62, 173–75 (discussing the supervisory board in Germany and the failure of the supervisory board
mechanism in China).
331
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process for suspicious transactions, in which conflicts of interests are inherent and the independence
of traditional governing bodies is compromised. In Israel, for example, the company law mandates
the creation of an audit committee with both independent directors and a majority of outside directors,
as well as a compensation committee, in every listed firm.335 The audit committee is entrusted with
auditing the conduct of management and with approving certain related-party transactions. When the
transaction is essential or an extraordinary transaction, as defined in the law, the approval process is
more stringent, and the audit committee basically receives power to veto the transaction even before
it is brought to the board. The same committee is also charged with ensuring that a competitive pricing
negotiation process was followed in related-party transactions. Israel’s recently-introduced
compensation committee is tasked with creating compensation guidelines as well as with approving
the compensation of high-ranking company officers. It is required to re-evaluate its guidelines and
update them as need be, at least once every three years. All outside directors are required to serve on
the compensation committee, and they must comprise the majority of the committee’s members.336
The Israeli regulator designed these mechanisms to handle the inherent conflicts and power
imbalances within Israel’s capital market, in which firms’ ownership reflects strong controlling
shareholders and, until recently, concentrated business groups. In contrast with this regulatory action,
China’s company and securities laws and regulations do not mandate the creation of similar audit
committees or other special committees. As mentioned earlier, independent directors are given a role
in the board’s auditing, nomination, and compensation committees “if such committees are set up,”
in which case they should constitute at least half of the members.337 Thus, internal auditing, including
scrutiny of related-party transactions, is left in the hands of the internal governing bodies and is
therefore tainted with the problems pertaining to those bodies.338

3. Third-Party Corporate Constituents
In many concentrated markets, corporate governance accommodates a role for stakeholders
who do not own any equity interest in the firm. Such non-shareholder constituents have some
disciplinary power over corporate insiders. While these constituents monitor in their own interest,
their interests sometimes coincide with those of public shareholders.

See Company Law, 5759-1999, § 114, 115, 117, 118(a), 118(b) 1 LSI 44 (1999).
For further details on these committees, see Itai Fiegenbaum & Amir Licht, Corporate Law of Israel, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL
10 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2019) (noting that, “In addition to these statutorily mandated committees, recent court
decisions have facilitated the adoption of ad-hoc ‘Special Independent Committees’. Purporting to rely on customs and
precedents from Delaware courts […].”).
337 See supra note 310.
338 External institutions (such as the CSRC and the Stock Exchanges) scrutinize related party transactions and financial
auditing but the review in this section refers only to the role of intra-firm governing institutions.
335
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i.

Creditors

Creditors are perceived to have both the ability, through contractual loan covenants, and
incentive to monitor corporate conduct. Since their earnings are based on interest rates and on the
firm’s residual assets upon liquidation, which both depend on the firm’s financial stability, they would
like to see the firm maximizing its value. Therefore, conventional wisdom goes, creditors monitor
corporate conduct toward this goal. This aligns their interests with those of shareholders to some
degree as long as the firm is not facing insolvency. By the same logic, high leverage is known to
discipline managers since high levels of debt lead to close monitoring by creditors. 339 In addition,
political economies in different systems have created an institutional setting in which creditors own
shares in listed firms, thereby aligning the interests of creditors and shareholders more directly.
It is important to distinguish between various types of creditors, which can be roughly
classified into external debt providers, such as banks and other loan-providing financial institutions,
and corporate bond holders. While the interests of these creditors are similar, their characteristics
differ in ways that affect their ability to monitor. For example, corporate bond holders’ access to
information largely depends on the efficacy of information disclosure in a given market. Widely
dispersed corporate bond holders’ ability to monitor often depends on third-party intermediary
institutions, such as trustees, underwriters, and credit rating agencies. In addition, in order for
corporate bond holders to have any disciplinary effect on corporate conduct, they need a wellfunctioning, liquid debt market through which they can trade their bonds. Finally, since bond issuance
agreements are mainly based on boilerplate provisions and rarely provide covenants that involve bond
holders in the governance of corporations, corporate bond holders largely depend on ex-post legal
enforcement to have their rights protected.
On the other hand, external debt providers, such as banks can establish effective information
disclosure processes in their loan agreements and are less dependent on other intermediaries. They are
better positioned to negotiate for loan covenants that will require their consent for certain corporate
acts, thus giving them more direct monitoring capacity. Banks typically also have enough incentive
and means to monitor without the need for coalition building. Finally, while banks do sometimes
require the help of enforcing institutions (especially for liquidation proceedings), they are less
dependent on them and can rely on their financial position and reputation market sanctions in a repeattransaction environment.
The best-known examples of systems that have encouraged corporate monitoring by financial
institutions as external debt providers are those of Japan and Germany. In both systems this was
achieved through parallel equity stakes that large financial intermediaries held in firms. Furthermore,
in both systems, the role of financial intermediaries in corporate governance was guided by certain
Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61 (1989) (concerning the governance power
of debt through LBOs).
339

70

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

industrial organizational structures and the local political economy that buttressed their preferred
monitoring position. In Japan, cross-holding ownership structures within Japanese post-war
conglomerates, the horizontal Keiretsu, relied on a main bank to provide each business group with
credit, while holding concomitant shares in the borrowing firms. This has historically positioned the
main banks at an informational advantage to monitor poor performance in industrial firms.340
In Germany, despite some decrease in ownership concentration,341 there is still a continued
emphasis on the interests of third-party stakeholders, including creditors, which are given a path for
direct involvement in the affairs of the corporation. This is achieved mainly through the two-tier board
system and the mechanism known as “co-determination.”342 As part of this corporate governance
institution, employees and shareholders elect equal numbers of representatives to the supervisory
board of large corporations. The supervisory board then appoints the members of the firm’s
“management board.” 343 Since banks in Germany function not only as creditors, but also exert
influence as direct and indirect shareholders, and in addition act as something like trustees for public
investors, banks often de facto exercise the public shareholders’ voting power by proxy. 344 This
includes the vote on the selection of supervisory board members and, by extension, management
board members. Consequently, the banks’ monitoring role as creditors is enhanced through a parallel
shareholder (and proxy) position, 345 which gives them access to information and positions them to
engage, and sometimes even control, the decision-making process.
As one of the richest economies in the world set in a social democratic political system, which
has historically strong banks and weak securities markets,346 Germany offers an interesting model for
comparison with China. Indeed, in China too, while shareholding by financial institutions is slowly
being liberalized, capital financing is still overwhelmingly led by bank lending rather than by equity
capital markets.347 As opposed to Germany or Japan, however, China’s state-owned commercial banks
Masahiko Aoki, Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 3 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark
J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, YALE L.J. 871, 871906 (1993) (yet suggesting an alternative, more complex analysis in which bank monitoring is one component of a complex
contractual governance system that monitors the production process); Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the
Main Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 425 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
341 Marc Goergen et al., Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 175, 178-79 (2008).
342 John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European
Union, 24 L. & POL’Y 355, 362-68 (2002) (revealing how the choice to preserve a “stakeholder” oriented corporate
approach, rather than adopt a pure shareholder wealth one, despite growing dispersion in the capital market, emanated
from various political power struggles and continued social obligations).
343 Goergen et al., supra note 341, at 184–86.
344 The proxy-vote system in Germany provides banks with effective voting powers. Id. at 178-186 (noting that historically
the bank that owns shares in the listed firm is also the firm’s main creditor).
345 But see id. (noting some regression in the scope of monitoring by large banks).
346 See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE
IMPACT 71 (2003).
347 Zhiwu Chen et al., The Asset Management Industry in China: Its Past Performance and Future Prospects, J. PROF. MGMT., SPECIAL
CHINA ISSUE, 2015, at 12 (showing continuing dominance of bank financing over equity financing, whereby equity
financing stayed below five percent of total bank loans in quantity (measured 1991–2013)). See Christian Edelmann et al.,
340

71

A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
act exclusively as creditors of listed companies because direct equity investment by commercial banks
in nonfinancial business enterprises is generally prohibited.348
Historically, and to a large degree today, Chinese banks have been conduits of the state and
based their lending decisions on political guidance rather than on sound financial considerations. Being
connected to the state, therefore, China’s main banks lack a “monitoring culture” as well as incentives
to monitor.349 One result is the low default rate of distressed companies, which distorts the market to
not reflect risk properly.350 In fact, an important critique of the design of China’s company law is that
it emphasizes creditors’ protection against “their own misguided lending decisions” rather than
enlisting the help of banks in monitoring corporations.351 Even more striking is the finding that banks
continue to lend to firms even in the face of clear cases of continuous tunneling by controlling
shareholders.352
There are some recent signals that the Party-state is now willing to consider direct equity
holding by commercial banks in nonfinancial business enterprises. The Chinese government looks to
solve onerous debt burdens seen in many of the PRC’s large listed companies, and the central
government encourages further rounds of debt-for-equity swaps through various schemes.353 While
China enlisted asset management companies (AMCs) to recapitalize the banks’ non-performing loans

Asset
Management
in
China,
OLIVER
WYMAN
(Aug.
2014),
http://www.oliverwyman.com/ourexpertise/insights/2014/aug/asset-management-in-china.html#.VmTbPa6rRE5 (noting that in 2014, the bulk of China’s
$145 trillion financial assets were either bank deposits or low risk securities).
348 See Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (商业银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 10, 1995, last amended Aug. 29,
2015),
art.
43
[hereinafter
Law
on
Commercial
Banks],
available
here:
https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/c42fffd534ac8f10bdfb.html (prohibiting such equity investment by commercial banks
unless otherwise provided by regulation). Exceptions to the general prohibition were implemented by a debt-for-equity
swap scheme during the late 1990s that allowed indirect equity holding through AMCs. See infra note 354 (based on
Howson, supra note 182). A similar scheme intended to handle non-performing loans and extreme corporate leverage was
in the making in recent years. See Lingling Wei, China is Set to Allow Banks to Swap Bad Loans for Equity in Borrowers, WALL
STREET J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 12:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-plans-debt-for-equity-swap-program-to-helpreduce-corporate-debt-1460649581. See also infra note 353.
349 Clarke, supra note 115, at 175-176.
350 By the late 1990s, the financial system was insolvent due to an extreme level of bank lending to failing SOEs and
consequent levels of non-performing loans. GREEN, supra note 104, at 22. Yet, despite several efforts to rehabilitate and
restructure the system, the phenomena of “bad debt” and “soft budget constraints” continue to threaten China’s financial
strength and resilience (especially from the provincial level down).
351 Clarke, supra note 115, at 176, n.17.
352 Meijun Qian & Bernard Y. Yeung, Bank Financing and Corporate Governance, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 258 (2015).
353 Evidence of this includes Premier Li Keqiang’s announcement concerning an expected reform of the financial system
that would, among other aspects, employ market-oriented debt-to-equity schemes to reduce the leverage in enterprises.
Lei Ying, Li Keqiang: Yao Gaige Wanshan Jinrong Jianguan Tixi, [Li Keqiang: Reform and Improve the Financial System], CHINA
NETWORK (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.china.com.cn/lianghui/news/2016-03/16/content_38038507.htm. See also
Guanyu Shenhua Tourongzi Tizhi Gaige de Yijian (关于深化投融资体制改革的意见) [Opinions on Enhancing the
Reform of Financial Investments System] (promulgated by the CCP Central Committee and St. Council, July 5, 2016), art.
10, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-07/18/content_5092501.htm (mentioning pilot projects in which financial
institutions will hold equity in enterprises).
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in the past,354 the AMCs were not found to be effective monitors, since they suffer many of the
weaknesses found in the banking system itself—the political clout of the debtor’s business group and
their own government ownership.355 But now, for the first publicly celebrated time, direct bank equity
holdings were implemented through a debt-equity swap in China Huarong Energy Ltd.356
It will be interesting to see if the set of incentives directing the banks’ role will change following
the expected increase in their direct equity holdings. If applied on a large scale, this could better align
the interests of Chinese banks, as creditor-shareholders, with those of public shareholders. It might
push banks, as equity-investing creditors, toward real financial monitoring, thus leading to more
disciplined management of distressed assets and better risk allocation.
The obvious caveats in this scenario should be noted. Due to the clashing power hierarchy
between national firms and leading banks, it is unlikely that the banks will be permitted to have a
dominant equity position in firms where a strong central or local state controlling shareholder already
exists. Without a dominant position, marginal bank holding will most likely not create enough
incentives for the bank to monitor against existing powerful, often politically connected, corporate
control parties. Furthermore, and paradoxically, since most banks belong to the state, even if permitted
to hold a dominant equity position in firms, there is no reason to believe that the bank will be any
different than other state-affiliated controlling shareholders. Thus, theory aside, financial institutions
are still instruments of the Party-state and continue to be guided by interests that are different from
those of public minority shareholders.
As for the corporate bond market in China and its potential monitoring capacity, there is a
similar if not identical political factor. While China’s bond market is currently the third largest bond
market in the world, trailing only the United States and Japan in 2014, most of the bond market is
comprised of government bonds and financial institutions’ bonds. Only ten percent of the entire bond

Four AMCs were created in 1999, carved out of the big four banks to purchase the respective bank’s non-performing
loans. Organized as wholly state-owned corporations held by the Ministry of Finance, these “non-bank financial
institutions” issued their own bonds to the banks to fund the purchase of the non-performing loans, which were then
converted to equity. The Ministry of Finance directly guaranteed the AMC bonds. It was intended that AMCs would act
to discipline the poorly performing corporations and push for their restructuring when needed. For further review, see
Howson, supra note 182.
355 Clarke, supra note 115, at 177.
356 The first publicly announced case of a debt-to-equity swap that resulted in direct bank equity holdings in an industrial
company was approved in March 2016, whereby a total of RMB 17.1 billion (USD 2.6 bn) worth of debt in China Huarong
Energy Ltd (a shipbuilding company) was converted to shares and distributed among various banks and financialinstitution creditors, resulting in the issuance of fourteen percent equity shares to the Bank of China, which became the
dominant shareholder in the company after the issuance. See Lingling Wei, China Regulators Speed Up Help for Banks on Bad
Loans, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 13, 2016, 8:23 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-regulators-speed-up-bad-loans1457871782. See also Angela Yu, Bank of China to Become Largest Shareholder in Huarong Energy, FAIRPLAY (Mar. 10, 2016, 10:43
AM).
354

To the best of my knowledge, however, article 43 of the Law on Commercial Banks was not yet amended, and neither
were other regulations issued to formally enable direct equity holding by commercial banks. See Law on Commercial Banks,
supra note 348, art. 43.

73

A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
market were corporate bonds in 2014. 357 While this does not necessarily preclude the monitoring
capacity of corporate bond holders, it does suggest that considering the large scope of debt financing
versus equity financing and the sheer size of bank loans within it,358 the influence of bond holders is
marginal.
In addition, recent data suggests that the main corporate bond holders in China are
commercial banks holding sixty-three percent of corporate bonds as of 2014, while individuals
represent only two percent of corporate bond holders.359 If this is correct, then the common bond
holders in China are the same credit financiers that provide corporate loans—China’s banks, sharing
the same characteristics and facing the same impediments to monitoring. Here too firms are shielded
through implicit or explicit guarantees by the state.360 In a cyclical manner, the failure of the general
debt market to default distressed firms causes bond holders, as other creditors, to price their risk on
the basis of other considerations, such as political connections, rather than on the financial stability of
the debtors. This low-risk environment lowers the cost of debt financing and erases creditors’
motivation to monitor.

ii. Employees
The embrace of co-determination in China reflects an ambivalent approach toward employee
board representation. On the one hand, employee board representation has been an enduring feature

In 2002, the corporate bond market represented only 2.8 percent of the total bond market. See Kim et al., supra note
266, at 27-30. But see HONG XIE, A CHANGING BOND LANDSCAPE IN CHINA (2014) [hereinafter S&P 2014 REPORT],
available
at
https://www.spindices.com/search/?query=landscape+china&Search=Go&sortType=Relevance&resultsPerPage=25&
ContentType=Research (pointing out that government bonds and policy bank–issued bonds comprised seventy percent
of the entire bond market as of September 2014, corporate bonds comprised ten percent, and various financial institutions–
issued bonds comprised twenty percent). But see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 2, 7, 15-16 (noting that the measures
for “corporate bond” in China include different types of debt instruments, including those issued by local government
financing vehicles, therefore reducing the actual size of true corporate issued bonds even further. According to the authors,
in 2016, there was a substantial spike in the issuance of corporate bonds after a more lenient approach by the CSRC that
started permitting issuance of corporate bonds by unlisted firms. Yet, the authors measured corporate bonds in 2016 to
account for nineteen percent of the outstanding balance of the bond market.).
358 See supra note 347.
359 The remainder is held mostly by non-bank financial institutions. See S&P 2014 REPORT, supra note 357, at 3. However,
note that Lin and Milhaupt present different classification ratios for bond holders as of 2016: 32.2 percent of all outstanding
corporate debt instruments are reported to be held by trusts and other non-financial institutions—the vast majority of
which are owned by local governments or by SOEs, while the national commercial banks hold 25.4 percent of all
outstanding corporate bonds according to the authors. The ratio of individual bond holders and other instruments within
the shadow banking system is less clearly differentiated. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 23-24.
360 The first bond default was recorded in 2014. The number of firms (mainly private) allowed to default has grown since
but is still small due to implicit guarantees mostly from local governments. For an analysis of recent default and neardefault cases, see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 236, at 37-47 (suggesting that the “no-default norm may begin to unravel as
the Chinese economy slows”).
357
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of Chinese company law and survived throughout its various legal reforms.361 China’s Company Law
still mandates that firm employees elect one-third of the supervisory board members of CLSs and the
general shareholders meeting elects the rest. Thus, without any share-ownership requirement, China’s
co-determination legal provision could presumably give rise to engagement in governance by
employee-constituents.362 While the interests of employees and public shareholders might not always
align, both share a general interest in maximizing firm revenue. For employees, it provides job security
and can lead to higher salaries; for shareholders, it offers higher profits through dividends or share
price increase. Both constituent groups should therefore strive to minimize value-reducing activities
through monitoring against management waste, abuse, and corruption.363
On the other hand, as mentioned in the context of the supervisory board, the law takes only
an enabling approach concerning representation of employees on the board of directors itself.
Moreover, absent a hierarchical relationship between the supervisory board and the board of directors,
the Chinese dual-board structure is largely failing, and with it, the co-determination mechanism loses
its bite. Even within the supervisory board, while employees have a voice in the election of one-third
of its members, the reminder two-thirds are appointed by the same body that appoints the regular
board members: the shareholders’ assembly—thus, the controlling shareholder. Therefore, instead of
monitoring the controllers’ power, the Chinese dual-board structure, and the employees-constituent’s
representative within it, further enhances it.364
One might expect to see in the PRC, as a “workers’ state,” some empowerment of labor as a
non-shareholder constituency, even separate from the co-determination role. Labor unions are given
a formal participatory role in every PRC firm notwithstanding the lack of any share-ownership.365
However, labor union representatives at PRC firms are actually hired by firm management and are
paid by the firm and therefore invariably have a close relationship with incumbent management.
Furthermore, the labor union organization itself is entirely subordinated to the CCP 366 and thus
promotes the interests of the PRC Party-state, as do the board of directors, the party committee
behind the board of directors, the supervisory board, senior management, the controlling shareholder,
Compare 1993 Company law, supra note 66, art. 52 leaving the ratio of worker’s representatives to be determined in the
articles of associations, with the 2005 Company law and its various amendments, supra note 147, art. 51.
362 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 18, 108, 117.
363 Pargendler et al., supra note 123, at 585.
364 Especially since cumulative voting is currently not mandatory. 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 105. See Clarke,
supra note 71, at 161–62, 173–75 (regarding the supervisory board in Germany and the failure of the supervisory board
mechanism in China).
365 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 18, 108, 117 (establishing the grounds for union involvement and presence in
every China domiciled company). Article 18 states the following “…when making a decision on restructuring or any
important issue relating to business operations, or to formulate any important bylaw, a company shall solicit the opinions
of its labor union, and shall solicit the opinions and proposals of the employees through the assembly of the representatives
of the employees or in any other way.” Id. art. 18.
366 The unions are members of the “All-China Federation of Trade Unions,” which is the official union organization of
the Chinese Communist Party. See generally Mary E. Gallagher & Baohua Dong, Legislating Harmony: Labor Law Reform in
Contemporary China, in FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A
CHANGING CHINA 36, 41-5 (Sarosh Kuruvilla et al. eds., 2011).
361
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and the firm itself. Labor unions and their representatives in firms are thus exceedingly unlikely to
advocate an agenda that is supportive of oppressed minority shareholders, much less one that goes
against the control parties of the firm.
iii. Consumers
Here I consider customers as constituents of a firm, while putting aside questions of corporate
social responsibility 367 and related normative claims about the purpose of the corporation. 368 The
underlying assumption here is that the consumer-base of a firm can potentially monitor corporate
insiders. This is the case simply because consumers are able to push firms to produce more value, e.g.,
reduce costs or improve quality, through consumer behavior and litigation.
Theoretically, the performance of the stock market and consumers’ behavior and consumption
levels are mutually related. Research conducted in Western, liberal markets found that an increase in
overall market share prices boosts consumer confidence in the economy, leading consumers to spend
more. 369 In turn, consumers’ behavior in various forms, including quality monitoring and social
criticism, affects the profitability of firms and induces further growth. 370
When looking at the Chinese consumer market, it becomes clear that consumer power is
increasing along with shifts in the sources and scope of economic growth. With the increase in average
wages and the economic shifts from low-income manufacturing industries to higher-earning services
and technology-based industries, Chinese consumption is expected to continue to grow at an annual

For shareholder value maximization, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of a Business to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), available at http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf; Jensen & Meckling, supra note
244. For critiques of this premise, see LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Steve Denning, The Origin of ‘the World’s Dumbest Idea’:
Milton Friedman, FORBES (June 26, 2013, 11:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/theorigin-of-the-worlds-dumbest-idea-milton-friedman/#751ddb18870e.
368 Some recent analysis calls for an alternative “costumer capitalism,” whereby managers should be first and foremost
concerned with increasing costumers’ satisfaction. This claim holds as a way of creating shareholders’ value as well. See
Roger L. Martin, The Age of Customer Capitalism, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan-Feb 2010, https://hbr.org/2010/01/the-age-ofcustomer-capitalism. See also Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Case for Consumer-Oriented Corporate Governance, Accountability and
Disclosure, 17 PA. J. BUS. L. 227 (2014) (calling for an expansion of the scope of corporate law and firms’ accountability
towards the inclusion of consumers interests as corporate stakeholders).
369 For empirical research on EU countries, see W. Jos Jansen & Niek J. Nahuis, The Stock Market and Consumer Confidence:
European Evidence, 79 ECON. LETTERS 89 (2003) (referring also to previous empirical research regarding the U.S. market).
The opposite direction—that is, the correlation between consumer behavior to stock market price—is far more established.
See, e.g., Gerard J. Tellis & Joseph Johnson, The Value of Quality, 26 MARKETING SCI. 758, (2007) (examining changes in
stock market return following consumers’ quality review). See also infra note 370.
370 Elizabeth Demers & Baruch Lev, A Rude Awakening: Internet Shakeout in 2000, 6 REV. ACCT. STUD. 331, 331-59 (2001)
(finding that nonfinancial measures, such as the products’ reach to costumers, explain the share price of Internet
companies); Sunil Gupta et al., Valuing Customers, 41 J. MARKETING RES. 7, 7-18, (2004) (suggesting a model in which value
based on costumers is a strong determinant of firm value).
367
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rate of nine percent during the coming few years.371 Commentators have predicted that this level of
increase in China’s consumer market will continue even considering an overall economic slow-down
of GDP growth to 5.5 percent below official targets.372 More importantly, the characteristics of China’s
consumer base are changing toward the upper-middle-class household and more sophisticated
consumers.
Despite this continuous growth in China’s consumer base, the limited available research on
the relationship between the stock market and consumption in China shows a weak link between
capital market performance and consumer behavior. 373 This might suggest that the level of
consumerism is not influenced by market trends and share performance. It may partially derive from
the small number of investors relative to population. Unofficial estimates show that less than seven
percent of urban Chinese invest in the capital market.374 Or perhaps the limited scope of available
income that retail investors put into the capital markets (four percent of household assets) might
explain the attenuated relationship between consumerism and capital markets in China.375
Still, the change in the characteristics of consumers suggests that Chinese consumers will
become more sophisticated, demanding more value, and therefore perhaps start being more engaged
with firms and their products. Provided there is an institutional framework that would enable such
engagement, consumer activism could be on the rise. A rising volume of consumers’ complaints either
on social media, other press, or through formal courts proceedings would inflict reputational harm on
a company and its managers, and may reduce profits and market price.376 The main impediments to
consumers’ activism effectuating a disciplinary mechanism for better firm and managers’ performance
are intertwined with the current institutional setting of the press and group and representative
litigations in China.377

Youchi Kuo, 3 Great Forces Changing China’s Consumer Market, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/3-great-forces-changing-chinas-consumer-market/.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 See Arthur R. Kroeber, Making Sense of China’s Stock Market Mess, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/making-sense-of-chinas-stock-market-mess/ (whereas, according to the same
source, in the United States estimates go up to fifty percent of the population).
375 Only four percent of private household asset allocation in China is invested in stocks and mutual funds. See Evelin
Cheng, Chinese Investors are Putting Their Money in a Lot of Places: That Rarely Means Stocks, CNBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018, 1:00
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/15/chinese-investors-are-picking-other-assets-over-stocks.html.
376 Mushrooming lawsuits following the introduction of consumer-rights laws even allowed press reports to be submitted
as evidence of the merits of a case. Craig S. Smith, Chinese Discover Product-Liability Suits, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 1997)
(also stating that "In the three years since China's consumer-rights laws took effect, liability lawsuits have risen to more
than half a million annually.”).
377 The weaknesses of the media in contemporary China are discussed below as part of the discussion of market gatekeepers.
The court system and specifically the status of group and representative litigations will be discussed as part of the legal
system.
371
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iv. Managers (ownership and compensation incentives)
Allocating shares to managers and setting performance-based incentives378 are designed to
optimize managers’ performance and better align their interest with those of shareholders.379 These
methods were used extensively during various stages of corporate reform in China to incentivize
managers to increase firm productivity and profitability.380
Nonetheless, recent empirical research found that managerial ownership in China is relatively
insignificant, and managerial ownership plays a limited governance role.381 Managers’ small percentage
of ownership in China, it is argued, leaves ample incentives for the insiders to expropriate, as the value
from expropriation is greater. Higher levels of managerial ownership exist in situations where the
managers are also the dominant or controlling shareholders, which entrench managers and give rise
to the tunneling of value through their shareholding capacity.
Concerning performance-based incentives, empirical research shows that until 2007 managers
in SOEs were not better compensated than managers of other types of firms, even though SOEs were
much larger and continuously growing corporations.382 This started to change in 2007. The scholars
conducting the research suggest that the change derived from the fact that many large SOEs went
through IPOs in the mid-2000s, subsequently raising their managerial compensation, which was tied
to salary levels in the government before the offering.383 In addition, the authors point to a CSRC
document that was released in December 2005 calling for SOEs to adopt incentive mechanisms to
motivate managers’ performance. Despite these changes, performance incentive measurements
remained limited due to explicit and implicit caps on the compensation of managers. Such caps are in
place presumably to avoid social unrest over individuals’ capital accumulation (the issue of rising
crony-capitalism), as well as to reduce the undisciplined use of operational costs that bite into the

378Jensen

& Meckling, supra note 244.
Philippe Aghion et al., The Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern Europe, Pre-Privatisation, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 1327 (1994)
(pointing to the importance of reforming the managerial incentive system for successful economic transition in former
socialist economies); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley
Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (surveying relevant empirical literature). See also Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, Executive
Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 945 (2006) (referring to both pieces).
380 For empirical research on various methods of managerial incentives in China (such as profit responsibility contracts
and profit retention methods) see Kato & Long, supra note 379, at 948 (providing references).
381 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 197 table 5, 206 and the references therein.
382 Chong-En Bai & Lixin Colin Xu, Incentives for CEOs with Multitasks: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises, 33 J.
COMP. ECON. 517 (2005).
More generally on lower incentives for bureaucrats, see Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction
Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999).
383 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 199 table 8, 203. (specifically mentioning the Industrial Commercial Bank of China, Bank
of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, China National Petroleum Corporation, China Railway,
Shenhua China, and Aluminum Corp of China).
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profitably of SOEs.384 Moreover, despite a dramatic increase in managers’ compensation in recent
years, the authors find that compensation is still modest in China compared to other countries.385
Other incentives for managers in China are informal pay benefits, 386 such as on-the-job
consumption that was found to exceed the average executive pay by two to fifty times, 387 hidden
payments, and nonpecuniary benefits. The latter includes particularly the prospect of professional
advancement to higher ranking positions in the government or the Party.388
The evidence of the power of such benefits to incentivize better performing managers is
inconclusive. Some studies show that certain nonpecuniary benefits and “hidden payments” with no
specific disclosure obligations,389 such as travel allowances, business entertainment expenses, housing,
office expenses, and overseas training, correlate with better firm performance in SOEs. 390 These
findings suggest that in Chinese state-controlled listed firms, nonpecuniary benefits and the hope for
future promotions in the Party-state system substitute for managerial ownership and compensation in
terms of their incentivizing power.391 Another study found that hidden on-the-job consumption does
not correlate, or has a significant negative correlation, with company earnings in SOEs.392
Either way, while these components influence managerial conduct one way or the other, they
do not align their interests with those of public shareholders specifically. Thus, while they may have a
disciplinary effect on managers to conform with the goals of the supervising Party-state authority or
controlling state-shareholder, it is not necessarily a goal that increases firm value or otherwise serves
the interests of the firm and all its shareholders.

Xuequan Mu, China Ties SOE Employees' Salaries to Profitability, CHINA DAILY (June 4, 2015, 9:45 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-06/04/content_20907244.htm.
385 See Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 203 (reporting that in 2012 the median compensation for top managers of SOEs was
470,000 RMB, which was equal roughly to USD 77,000).
386 Li-Wen Lin, Behind the Numbers: State Capitalism and Executive Compensation in China, 12 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 140 (2016)
(discussing informal pay practices and how they are detached from formal pay disclosures by listed firms in China,
particularly SOEs).
387 Yang Rong, Research on Executive Compensation of Listed Companies of Monopolistic Industries — Based on Perquisite
Consumption, 5 FUDAN J. (SOCIAL SCIENCES ED.) 133 (2011), available at http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTALFDDX201105017.htm (in Chinese) (based on data of 1,320 listed companies monopolistic industries examined between
2002 and 2009).
388 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 207; Kato & Long, supra note 379. I discuss this elaborately in Chapter 3.
389 Shrouded in Mystery: Chinese Executive Compensation and the Numbers Behind the Numbers, WHARTON U. PA.:
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 14, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/shrouded-in-mystery-chineseexecutive-compensation-and-the-numbers-behind-the-numbers/.
390 Pattarin Adithipyangkul et al., Executive Perks: Compensation and Corporate Performance in China, 28 ASIA PACIFIC J. MGMT.
401 (2011); Hongbin Cai et al., Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel
Costs of Chinese Firms, 54 J.L. & ECON. 55 (2011).
391 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 207.
392 Donghua Chen et al., Regulation and Non-pecuniary Compensation in Chinese SOEs, 2 ECON. RES. J. 92 (2005), available at
http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTotal-JJYJ200502009.htm (in Chinese).
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B. External Monitoring Institutions
1. External Markets
i. The Market for Corporate Control
For widely-held firms, the market for corporate control is considered one of the strongest
monitoring corporate governance mechanisms. 393 The market for corporate control is generally
understood to function as follows. Managers who run the corporation poorly or systematically
disadvantage equity investors will cause shareholders to sell their shares, with a resulting decline in
share price. This will in turn increase the cost of raising new capital and will make the firm a target for
takeovers by those who believe they can run it better. These potential insurgents will use the
opportunity to acquire shares cheaply, gain control, and oust the existing management.394 Where there
is a market for corporate control, inefficient behavior or self-dealing by incumbent managers therefore
jeopardizes the position of these insiders, so that the market functions as an ongoing discipline and
accountability mechanism.
In concentrated markets, however, there is usually no active market for corporate control.395
In such markets, the controlling shareholder elects its own nominees to the board of directors and is
able to direct management absolutely. If the controlling shareholder is unsatisfied with the
performance of its appointees, it will simply replace them. There is no possibility for other
shareholders to oust the controlling shareholder’s strong ownership position in the controlled firm.396
Any change in corporate control in these markets will have to obtain the consent of existing
controlling parties. This also implies that when inefficient management stays in place, maximizing
performance is presumably not the primary goal of the controlling shareholder. Alternatively, in this

The market for corporate control was first described in the seminal article by Henry G. Manne. Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965).
394 The change of control can be affected in various ways: via a direct purchase through mergers or acquisitions or by the
purchase of shares in the open market, or by replacing incumbent directors through proxy contests. In any of these ways,
control over the firm shifts, and incumbent insiders will be replaced. Id.
395 But see John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical
Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 273–85 (2011) (examining the prospect for hostile takeover regimes in China, Brazil,
and India); Goergen et al., supra note 341 (discussing block trades as a market for partial control in Germany).
396 See John Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds 12 (European Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Law
Working
Paper No.
136,
2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1489336 (asserting that “influence-driven
activism is unlikely to be deployed where dispersed ownership is lacking,” yet, providing examples of how such influence
is nevertheless possible in certain cases despite an existence of a dominant shareholder (albeit within the U.S. market)).
393
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scenario, the controller has other means to maximize her returns on investment that are not shared
with all shareholders.
As in many other markets evidencing similar concentration, there is currently almost no hostile
takeover activity, and thus no market for corporate control, in China. Nevertheless, there is some
evidence that the Chinese market is developing a weak form of a market for corporate control, as
limited takeover activity is surfacing in recent years. I hypothesized elsewhere on the possibility that a
partial market for corporate control is currently underway within China’s controlling apparatus—that
is, between groups of powerful and politically connected firms.397
Fracturing within the political controlling apparatus might set the stage for an economic
disentanglement in the current structure of firm ownership in the PRC in a way that will have implications
for a market for corporate control. In the current Chinese market, business groups are still mainly
clustered in specific industries and face a host of impediments regarding investment or business
activity outside of their specific industry or sector. Such impediments include strict regulation of
permitted “business scopes”; specific franchising grants that create monopoly-like opportunities; path
dependency resulting from the corporatization without a privatization process that produced firms
tied to specific ministries and thus specific industrial sectors;398 PRC listed firms’ historic dual share
structure before 2006 that allowed “state shares” to be transferred only to other state shareholders;399
the personnel appointment system for senior management with reshuffling of senior managers within
the same industry; 400 and finally, Party-state direction and heavy regulation of M&A and takeover
activity.401
Notwithstanding these constraints and the resulting limited competition between corporatized
SOEs across sectoral lines, the Chinese Party-state is not monolithic, and neither are the firms that it
has established and controls. In fact, the PRC Party-state has a myriad of internal conflicts, expressed
in competition between government agencies at the central and local levels, and between party and
state institutions at all levels. Nor does the Party itself lack contradictions, as conflicts exist as well
within the various levels of the Party organization and among its individuals. These conflicts reduce
the capacity of the PRC Party-state to act in a unified manner with respect to policy generally, or

Or, in firms in which the party-state has no interests, mostly within the SME market. See Groswald Ozery, supra note
101, at 56-62.
398 See Chapter 1, Section I.A.2.i supra
399 See Chapter 1, Section I.A.2.i supra, and note 78 supra.
400 See Howson, supra note 278; Chih-shian Liou & Chung-min Tsai, Between Hierarchy and the Market: Managerial Career
Trajectories in China’s Energy Sector, in CHOOSING CHINA’S LEADERS 124 (Chien-wen Kou & Xiaowei Zang eds., 2013).
401 Mainly through: 1) required review by the Ministry of Commerce and its approval related to acquisitions and mergers
affecting market concentration (equal to an antitrust review); 2) approval by SASAC for mergers and acquisitions involving
state assets; 3) approvals by additional ancillary authorities as required according to the industry, business scope, and the
involvement of foreign investors (e.g., SAFE, NDRC, SAIC); and most importantly 4) a review by the CSRC, through its
designated “M&A and Restructuring Examination Committee,” which has a broad authority to regulate and handle all
issues related to mergers and acquisitions of listed companies (including takeovers, and dispute resolutions in cases of
hostile takeovers and the use of defensive tactics). See Huang & Chen, supra note 179.
397

81

A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
through the firms it dominates. As a result, the system often serves more particularistic interests,
whether individual, institutional, local, or across “systems” (xitong).402
While this of course leads to rampant self-dealing by firm insiders, at the macro level it also
gradually leads to economic disentanglement of some firms and business groups from the Party-state.
This is especially striking in the alienation of local government-controlled firms from the central Partystate. China’s economic success has boosted the power of local governments and local government–
promoted firms. Local officials have enormous incentives to maximize economic growth in their
jurisdictions, very often at the expense of national Party-state interests.403
As local government–controlled firms become ever more invested in profit maximization for
their own benefit,404 the more they try to compete on market share with other PRC firms in their same
region and nationally. Mergers and acquisitions activity across industries and regions has been
increasing.405 More market-oriented competitive M&A activity can induce the sales of distressed assets,
which in turn can contribute to competition and to firms’ efficient operation.406 The consequence of
this form of greater market competition between local government–controlled but listed firms might
eventually bring about a partial market for corporate control between dominant blockholders (still
mainly among such controlling parties).407
A limited number of hostile takeover battles provide examples that this form of a partial
market for corporate control is indeed emerging: For instance, in October 2003, the management of
ST Meiya (a textile company traded at the time on the Shenzhen stock exchange) applied defensive
tactics to push against a change of control in the company,408 which essentially resulted in the transfer
of shares from one state-owned shareholder to another. In this case, the dominant shareholder of ST
Meiya—Heshan State Assets Management Bureau, a city-level state asset management office—had
signed a share transfer agreement to sell a 27.49 percent stake to the private Wanhe Group. It appears

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND
PROCESSES 135, 141-142 (1990) (referring to “xitong” as an organizational concept describing vertical functional systems
of hierarchy that comprise China’s governing bodies).
403 See Kenneth Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation, 1 CHINA ENV’T SERIES
3, 4-6 (1997) (addressing the situation of conflicting interests and incentives related to the implementation of
environmental policy).
404 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 262 (2011) (analogizing
Chinese state-controlled enterprises to private equity firms).
405 See
Barry Chen, Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions: What’s Next, MANZELLA REP. (July 1, 2015),
http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/strategies-section/1014-chinese-mergers-and-acquisitions-what-s-next
(reporting on a number of 1,536 M&A transactions that were closed in 2014, the majority of which (sixty-five percent)
related to SOEs restructuring). See also Dezan Shira & Associates, Understanding Mergers and Acquisitions in China, CHINA
BRIEFING, 166, June-July 2016, available at http://www.iberchina.org/files/2016/mergers-acquisitions-in-china.pdf
(reviewing latest M&A market trends including proportions and distributions across industries, and reporting an increase
of thirty-nine percent in inbound M&A deals from 2010 to 2015).
406 Moreover, if implemented on a large scale, the debt-for-equity swap scheme that is currently ongoing will contribute to
asset fluidity as well. See supra notes 348-356.
407 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 101, at 56-62.
408 See Huang & Chen, supra note 179, at 30-31.
402
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that this move was taken without any involvement of ST Meiya’s managers, thus presumably raising
alarms for their jobs. Incumbent managers obtained the support of the firm’s employees (after finally
making delayed payments),409 and together they opposed the transaction. The main justification for
their “anti-takeover” action was that the intended transfer would be harmful to the firm’s long-term
interests since the acquirer operated in an entirely different industry and was not competent to run the
company. Indeed, following these pressures, and despite its contractual obligations, the local
government shareholder terminated the share transfer agreement. Instead, it made an agreement with
another acquirer that was favored by the management to sell 24.99 percent of its shares. Interestingly,
the second acquirer, Guanxin Foreign Trade, one of China’s largest import-export enterprises, is a
state-owned company.410 In its public announcement, ST Meiya mentioned that since the new acquirer
is state-owned, its “operational mechanisms are not so different” than those of ST Meiya, which was
a major consideration for choosing them as the acquirer.411
Other “hostile” efforts and defenses reflecting signs of a partial market for corporate control
within China’s political economy are reflected in more recent cases. In 2012, locally state-owned
Beijing Enterprise Group sharply increased its stake in China Gas Holding Ltd., a Chinese energy
company whose shares are listed on the Hong Kong exchange, thereby challenging a prior hostile
takeover attempt by another state-owned conglomerate, Sinopec. Sinopec, a state-controlled national
champion, had joined with a privately owned, politically connected firm, ENN Energy Holdings
Ltd.412 Similarly, in a more recent bidding war, Baoneng Group, an apparently private Shenzhen-based
real estate conglomerate, gradually bought shares in China’s largest residential area developer, Vanke
Co. Ltd. The gradual acquisition by Baoneng Group overtook state-owned China Resources Co. Ltd.
as Vanke's new largest shareholder. 413 Vanke’s incumbent managers have applied various antitakeover measures to fend off a potential takeover by Baoneng, ultimately cooperating with another
local-government-owned SOE.414
Id.
Wanhe Group, the original private acquirer, tacitly consented to the termination of its acquisition agreement, without
any disclosed compensation, even though their contractual rights were violated.
411 Aibing Lu & Wenxiang Yao, ST Meiya “feichang supei” Wanhe bingbai fan shougou an [The Anti-takeover Case of Defeating ST
Meiya and Wanhe’s “Extremely Fast Match”], XINHUANET, (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/200312/09/content_1220874.htm.
412 Guo Aibing, Beijing Enterprises Group Buys More Shares in China Gas, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-07/beijing-enterprises-becomes-single-largest-china-gasshareholder.
413 Li Xiang, Vanke ‘Ropes in Govt Help’ to Ward Off Biggest Shareholder Baoneng, CHINA DAILY EUROPE (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:27
AM), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-12/22/content_22769475.htm.
414 The antitakeover tactics included Vanke’s management first initiating a trade suspension on December 18, 2015 and
renewing the suspension repeatedly until July 4, 2016, presumably to halt further purchase of shares by the hostile acquirer.
See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, REPORT ON SUSPENSION OF TRADING DUE TO MAJOR CAPITAL RESTRUCTURE (June
15, 2016, available at http://disclosure.szse.cn/finalpage/2016-06-15/1202368720.PDF. In March 2016, the company
applied a “white knight” strategy in which a strategic cooperation with an alternative friendly buyer (in this case a locallyowned SOE, Shenzhen Metro group) was sought out to fend off a hostile acquisition. See Shenzhen Metro Group and Vanke
Achieved a Strategic Cooperation, VANKE (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.vanke.com/en/news.aspx?type=8&id=4260. In
January 2017, Vanke’s dominant state shareholder sold its shares to the same locally owned SOE, Shenzhen Metro Group,
409
410
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These latest events certainly signal an adversarial shift in business conduct and perhaps a more
general market-oriented approach by the firms operating in China’s capital markets. Yet, for a
corporate control market to have a disciplinary effect on managers, it must cultivate enough competing
control parties. The examples above illustrate how a potential hostile acquirer will find it difficult to
acquire control (or a significant block) without the cooperation of an insider, either management or a
dominant blockholder.
An attenuated market for corporate control between dominant blockholders is bound to face
a challenge from China’s legal framework. Current regulations provide dominant shareholders with
the power to block acquisitions in certain circumstances even without equity control. A supermajority
(two-thirds) shareholder approval is required for certain corporate decisions, such as the approval of
mergers or major asset restructuring.415 The CSRC 2004 Provisions apply this two-thirds approval
requirement to additional issues, including the sale of major assets, restructuring, and share issuance.416
Perhaps even more relevant in this context are China’s 2006 Securities Law and the CSRC
2006 Takeover Measures that subject takeovers to a mandatory bidding mechanism.417 Under this
regulatory framework, creeping acquisitions are substantially restricted by a disclosure requirement at
the five and twenty percent thresholds.418 Furthermore, any acquirer of a listed company (outside
investor or inside shareholder) exceeding a thirty percent ownership threshold must undergo a
mandatory tender offer to further increase its stock ownership.419 Another significant provision is
Article 33 of the Takeover Measures, which prohibits the use of certain takeover defenses without an
approval by the shareholders’ meeting.420 This provision gives dominant stockholders a veto power
which acted as the white night under the initial management’s anti-takeover strategy. See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE,
REPORT
ON
REGISTRATION
OF
TRANSFERRED
SHARES
(Jan.
25,
2017),
available
at
http://disclosure.szse.cn/finalpage/2017-01-25/1203052214.PDF.
415 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 103, 121.
416 CSRC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275, arts. 88, 96.
417 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengchuan Fa [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nati’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, amended Oct. 27, 2005, last amended Aug. 31, 2014), arts. 88, 96
[hereinafter 2006 Securities Law], available at https://www.pkulaw.com/en_law/e3a5d596aa075797bdfb.html.
The CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures elaborate the bid process. See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa (上市公司收
购管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec.
Regulatory Comm’n., July 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006, amended Aug. 27, 2008, amended Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter
CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures]. See also CSRC Decision on Amending Article 62 and Article 63 of the Measures for the
Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Comm., Dec. 29,
2011) (amending the CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures).
418 See CRSC 2006 Takeover Measures, supra note 417, Part II (“Disclosure of Interests”) (particularly articles 12-17).
419 2006 Securities Law, supra note 417, arts. 88, 93, 96. See also CSRC 2006 Takeover Measures, supra note 417, arts. 22, 23
(stipulating the same). These provisions also distinguish between a “general tender offer”—when a purchaser intends to
acquire all of the shares of a company—and a “partial tender offer” – when a purchaser intends to acquire only part of
the shares. See also id. arts. 26, 35 (stipulating the “equal treatment” and minimum price consideration for all shares of the
same class sold). Interestingly, the acquirer can ask the CSRC for an exemption form the bidding process. See id. arts. 62,
63.
420 See id. art. 33 (“During the period between the issuance of the alert by the acquirer and completion of the takeover
offer, … the board of directors of the target company may not, without the approval of the shareholders' general meeting,
materially affect the company's assets, liabilities, interests or business results through the disposal of company assets,
investment in third parties, adjusting the company's core business, providing security, taking out loans, etc.”). What the
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over the adoption and employment of anti-takeover defenses and turns any possible control battle
into a battle between powerful existing blockholders.421
Taken together, even if a supply of competing dominant blockholders is developing and can
form an attenuated market for corporate control, the existing regulatory framework increases the cost
of acquisitions and has a chilling effect on potential acquirers, likely limiting them to China’s biggest
or most politically connected firms. The development of a partial market for corporate control in
China, if it is indeed underway, can have some disciplinary effect against managerial misconduct. It is
possible that even a weak and partial market for corporate control will open up greater investment
alternatives that are currently completely missing from the PRC capital markets, which would in turn
empower public shareholders to at least vote with their feet.

ii. The Capital Market (Debt & Equity Markets)
a. Debt Market422
The theory of the benefit of debts in reducing agency costs suggests that the use of debt in
the capital structure of a firm can discipline managers. 423 Creditors, concerned about the firm’s
financial stability, will require high interest or stringent covenants in their loan agreements. Once debt
is granted, failure to pay off the debt will push the firm into bankruptcy quicker. Alternatively, creditors
might refuse giving credit to the firm altogether. In that case, the cost of capital for an inefficient or
poorly run firm becomes higher. Debt financing, therefore, keeps managers on their toes to ensure
enough cash flow exists.
Many Chinese listed firms have high debt financing ratios,424 and yet debt is not likely to have
a strong disciplinary effect on managers. Chinese banks tend to lend to state-owned firms, large firms,
and politically connected firms regardless of their financial stability.425 It is assumed that central and
local governments, which rely on employment by listed firms for social stability, will come to a firm’s
aid before it reaches bankruptcy. Banks commonly prefer to have nonperforming loans on their
statements rather than initiate bankruptcy proceeding. As Clarke summarizes, “because banks are still
“etc.” at the end of the article stands for is unclear, but opens up the need to approve any material decision in this period
with the shareholders’ meeting.
421 For an account of the regulatory and practical impediments to takeovers in China, see Hui (Robin) Huang, The New
Takeover Regulation in China: Evolution an Enhancement, 42 INT'L L. 153 (2008); Huang & Chen, supra note 179.
422 In my reference to “debt market,” I do not differentiate between credit and bond-based debt. As mentioned, most
bond holders in China are typically the common loan providers—China’s commercial banks.
423 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986); Jensen,
supra note 339.
424 Recent estimates suggest a median debt ratio of fifty percent among non-financial Chinese listed firms. See Jiang & Kim,
supra note 80, at 203.
425 Id. at 208.
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often required to lend for political reasons, the result is that corporate management has been subject
to the discipline neither of the credit market when seeking a loan nor of lender monitoring after
obtaining it.” 426 Listed firms in China, and especially state-controlled firms, have little fear of
bankruptcy. This makes the debt market’s penalty for poor management minimal and reduces, if not
eliminates, monitoring and the disciplinary effect of debt financing.427

b. Equity Market
Current indicators of China’s capital market growth is brought in the introduction. The data
reflects a continuous growth relative to the domestic economy as well as to other global capital markets.
Yet an increase in market capitalization, impressive as it is, does not say much about the role the stock
markets play in China’s corporate governance system. This is especially so since the share price of
Chinese listed companies is not a good signal for real firm value, as many China-specific empirical
accounts found.428 If this is indeed the case, then the monitoring effect that a vibrant stock market has
on corporate insiders is removed, or at least significantly reduced, when it comes to the Chinese stock
markets.
Nevertheless, the Chinese stock market does have an attenuated monitoring capacity, albeit
exercised in a very idiosyncratic way. Some theoretical qualifications should be mentioned first on
how equity markets are believed to discipline corporate insiders elsewhere. Stock market monitoring
is carried through the market firm’s stock performance as reflected in the firm’s public share price.
This stock market and firm value indication is influenced by shareholders’ exit, colloquially termed

Clarke, supra note 115, at 176.
Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 208.
428 While with respect to all markets there are various metrics to assess real firm value, stock market price being one
indication, there is usually a high correlation and predictive power between various metrics of firm performance (e.g., P/E
ratio, ROE, ROI indicators) and the firm’s stock price. It is widely accepted in the relevant literature, however, that this is
not the case for China. See Gul Ferdinand et al., Ownership Concentration, Foreign Shareholding, Audit Quality, and Stock Price
Synchronicity: Evidence from China, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 425-442 (2010) (showing higher synchronicity for firms where the
largest shareholder is affiliated with the government, concluding that stock prices are less reflective of firms’ specific
information for these companies); Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why do Emerging Markets
have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000) (examining country level synchronicity and finding that
stock price movements are more synchronous in emerging markets than in developed markets, attributing the difference
to uninformed trade. The authors report that China has the second highest synchronicity among forty sample countries);
Zhiwu Chen, Stock Market in China’s Modernization Process—Its Past, Present and Future Prospects 40-41 (Yale Sch.
of Mgmt. Working Paper, 2006) (on file with author) (studying co-movement levels among individual stocks, concluding
that Chinese investors treated every stock the same; from the investors’ perspective the stocks were indistinguishable from
one another). See also Yujuan Zhao, The Relationship Between Share Price Gains, Corporate Performance and Risk, 5 IBUSINESS 110
(2013); William T. Allen & Han Shen, Assessing China’s Top-Down Securities Markets, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research., Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 16713, 2011.
For recent evidence suggesting contesting views on the level of informational inefficiency in China’s capital market, see
infra note 433.
426
427
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“voting with their feet” or “the Wall-Street Walk.”429 This market price mechanism has been shown
empirically to have a disciplinary effect on firm management. In fact, even the credible threat of
shareholders selling has a disciplinary effect on management. This function of the stock market is
believed to provide groups of shareholders some traction in influencing management decisions,
thereby amounting to a form of public shareholder monitoring.430 Of course, this governance leverage
is only amplified in situations where there is a functioning market for corporate control, whereby mass
selling decreases the price to a level at which a hostile acquirer can purchase control cheaply and then
oust incumbent management. Still, in a vibrant stock market, the firm’s public share price operates as
a disciplinary mechanism even without a threat of a hostile acquirer.
There is no a priori reason why the same principle should not also apply in concentrated
markets without a market for corporate control. Without a doubt, a share price drop from mass
shareholder defections has consequences for firm market value in these markets as well. Similarly, the
relative success or failure of a corporation, as measured by firm market value, will almost certainly
affect the reputation and/or advancement of corporate insiders in controlled firms too. A controlling
shareholder can be similarly affected by a threat of large-scale defection of public investors and the
expected decrease in market value, especially regarding the cost of future capital. Finally, where
ownership is concentrated but control is organized through business groups, a reduction in the market
value of a given firm in the group and the associated reputational harm caused to the control parties
can have negative implications at the group level and on individual firms within the group. Hence,
under conditions where there is sufficient liquidity in the public float of a controlled firm431—meaning
an easy availability of exit for shareholders or the credible threat of it—even firms and their managers
in concentrated capital markets can be disciplined by standard capital markets mechanisms such as
market share price and exit threats.
While the theory has much to commend it, there are difficulties in this argument when applied
to China’s capital markets. The theory about the disciplining effect of the market price presupposes a
certain level of market sophistication and informational efficiency. It also assumes that a certain
Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2645 (2009) (distinguishing between overt activism and a threat of exit as a form of shareholder activism).
430 Id. (providing a model whereby the threat of exit by a large shareholder on the basis of private information can have a
disciplinary impact on managers’ decisions); Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes Around
Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003).
431 Most of the research on market liquidity is focused on widely held firms. See Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig Von
Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control, 53 J. FIN. 1, 2 (1998) (asserting that “the benefits of dispersion are mainly
greater market liquidity and better risk-diversification”); Amir Rubin, Ownership Level, Ownership Concentration and Liquidity,
10 J. FIN. MARKETS 219 (2007) (examining the relationship between liquidity level to ownership concentration measured
by insiders’ ownership and institutional investors’ holdings in U.S. listed firms). Some studies attempt to examine liquidity
in concentrated markets as well. See Marco Becht, European Corporate Governance: Trading off Liquidity Against Control, 43 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1071, 1077 (1999) (asserting that “[f]or the United States, there is extensive empirical evidence . . . that the
number of shareholders is positively related to liquidity” and attempting to provide similar evidence for the German and
Belgian markets); David A Lesmond, Liquidity of Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (2005) (examining liquidity of
emerging markets on a macro level, cross-country basis).
429
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volume of reliable information is flowing into the market, signaling to investors the relative desirability
of a given investment and, at the same time, reflecting investors’ assessments of past and future
performance of a given firm. The Chinese capital markets do not function this way presently, as they
are in many ways informationally inefficient. Share prices often seem to be driven not by economic
considerations based on information disclosed in the market but instead by factors unrelated to firm
fundamentals,432 suggesting that the market does not allocate capital efficiently.433
This does not mean that movements in the share price do not influence managers, but they
are simply one factor in the assessment of the firms’ success and in the evaluation of managers’
performance that are weighted by the relevant bodies of the Party-state. Although incentive-based
compensation plays a marginal role in motivating managers of state-controlled firms to perform
better, 434 this does not mean that these managers are not penalized for poor performance. The
advancement of nomenklatura appointees within the management ranks of China’s corporatized and
listed SOEs is directly influenced by the success of the firms they manage. While in the past empirical
research showed a low correlation between managers’ turnover and firms’ market performance, this
has been changing. There is greater consideration today for market price monitoring in the assessment
of SOE managers. 435 Of course, the prospect for advancement in the CCP hierarchy motivates
successful performance as well. While not much is known about the details of this internal monitoring
mechanism, it is known that the public share price of a corporatized SOE is taken into account for
Chinese Communist Party personnel system evaluation. A drop in the share price of a PRC issuer,
whether or not reflecting actual economic performance, may block firm managers’ future
advancement within the Party.436
Despite this link between public share price and the evaluation of managers and their
professional and political advancement, it is important to emphasize that there are also other nonmarket criteria used to measure the firm’s success and managers’ performance.437 More importantly, it
is not the stock market per se that disciplines managers. Public shareholders in PRC firms in many
See supra note 428. See generally Khanna & Palepu, supra note 268 (citing Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of
Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000)). For more
recent claims for poor capital market performance, see Allen et al., Dissecting the Long-term Performance of the Chinese
Stock Market, supra note 7 (positing that China’s domestic stock market performs poorly and is disconnected from the
overall economic growth, and suggesting several institutional explanations for that, mainly inefficient IPO mechanisms
and corporate governance problems).
433 Importantly, new research suggests that this view of the Chinese capital market is outdated. See Jennifer N. Carpenter
et al., The Real Value of China’s Stock Market (Bank of Fin. Instit. of Econ. in Transition, Discussion Paper No. 2/2018,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106656 (arguing that since the reforms of the mid-2000s,
China’s stock market became informationally efficient. Stock prices, they argue, reflect future firm profits and are linked
to firm fundamentals in ways that are consistent with other large economies).
434 See supra Chapter 2, Section III.A.3.iv.
435 Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 207.
436 I elaborate on these mechanisms further in Chapter 3.
437 Other evaluation criteria include contribution to GDP growth, tax compliance, reduction in environmental footprint,
and the amount of social unrest created around corporate conduct (reflected, for example, through shareholder complaints
and derivative suits). I elaborate on the various evaluation criteria in Chapter 3. Section II. Infra.
432
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cases cannot effectively utilize exit, or the threat of exit, as a disciplinary mechanism. The response to
the 2015 and 2016 stock crashes by the PRC central government, during which share prices were
propped up through massive mandated purchase orders and blanket suspensions of trade,438reflects
the limited impact of public shareholders’ own assessment of firms compared to the direct influence
of government policy on market share prices.
In addition, alternative investments in PRC listed firms that evidence better governance and
potential for better performance are scarce. The high percentage of listed firms that are ultimately
controlled by state affiliates leaves investors with little choice but to hold shares in those firms.439 This
is one reason why public investors in China tend to invest alongside dominant Party-state shareholders,
even if performance is lackluster or a corporate governance violation becomes apparent. Instead of
relying on information for performance evaluation and voting with their feet accordingly, many prefer
to rely on the inside knowledge and relationships of the Party-state control party.
Hence, the factor of share prices through the capital market creates an attenuated monitoring
mechanism, but it functions mainly through the Party personnel management system, while the
disciplinary effect of massive sales (or threats of a “Wall Street Walk” exit) by public shareholders is
much more limited.

iii. The Product Market
According to theoretical law-and-economics accounts supported by empirical research in
Western developed markets, inefficient firms are eventually eliminated through a natural selection
process in the product market. Competitive pressures in the product market, therefore, restrain
tunneling and mismanagement by corporate insiders and compensate for weak corporate
governance.440
In China, import-export limitations have been gradually reduced, and competition in the
product market is constantly increasing between state-controlled firms and between state-controlled

By July 8, 2015, 1,300 listed firms, representing forty-five percent of the market, suspended trading to hold back share
price decrease. See Almost Half of China's Firms Halt Trading as Market Dives, FRANCE 24 (July 8, 2015, 4:19 PM),
http://www.france24.com/en/20150708-almost-half-chinese-firms-suspend-trading-market-dives.
439 MUSACCHIO & LAZZARINI, supra note 201 (pointing to seventy percent of overall Chinese stock market capitalization
represented by firms that are ultimately controlled by state organs). For other sources supporting the inference of the
absence of investment alternatives, see also supra note 428.
440 Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices, 66 J. FIN. 563
(2011) (suggesting that competitive pressures in the product market can mitigate the agency costs of weak governance);
Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1983) (finding that product market
competition reduces managerial slack); Klaus M. Schmidt, Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition, 64 REV. ECON.
STUD. 191 (1997) (finding that in markets with increased competition there is an increased probability that firms with high
costs will become unprofitable and reach liquidation; this “threat of liquidation effect” was found to induce managers’
work discipline).
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firms and private firms.441 This raises the possibility that the product market will become a significant
external corporate governance institution in China.
Despite the promising disciplinary role of product market competition in China, a few cautions
should be noted reflecting a preliminary assessment of the possible directions that competition in a
growing product market can take in China, based on past studies and current market trends.442 First,
constant change in China’s economic and institutional infrastructure makes it harder for market forces
to signal out inefficient firms and eliminate them fast enough. In a rapidly evolving market, it is
possible that the disciplinary force of the product market actually becomes weaker rather than stronger,
at least until institutions are able to adjust. Another possible path for development in the product
market views increasing market competition as an opportunity for misconduct, rather than as a
disciplinary mechanism. Lacking reliable enforcement institutions, corporate misconduct will be
carried out to gain a competitive edge.443 As is often pointed out, a large number of firms in China
operate outside the rules of the market and the legal system, at a time when violations of IP rights,
product quality, and safety standards can still be advantageous to them. The turning point in the
development trajectory when such violations will become more harmful to firms and their insiders
than useful, could be rather far away. Finally, even if market competition works as the law and
economics theory predicts and increasingly disciplines insiders’ misconduct in the Chinese market,
some firms, particularly those affiliated with state entities, remain shielded from competition. In
certain industries and regarding specific firms, monopoly power is intended or at least accepted. 444
The potential disciplinary effect of the product market is therefore limited at the outset to certain
market segments and firms.

iv. Managerial Reputation and Labor Market
In a well-cited paper, Fama argued that career prospects induce managers to operate efficiently.
Managers’ concerns for their reputation and future careers, as well as competition in the managerial

John McMillan & Barry Naughton, How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China, 8 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y
130 (1992).
442 Qiao Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional Determinants, 52 CESIFO ECON.
STUD. 415 (2006) (product market competition is unlikely to be an important governance mechanism in China given
institutional deficiencies). But see Jiang & Kim, supra note 80, at 213 (suggesting that product market competition in China
can discipline managers because they do not want to “lose face” when compared to benchmark competitive firms and
managers).
443 Hongbin Cai et al., Does Competition Encourage Unethical Behavior? The Case of Chinese Corporate Profit Hiding
(2005) (conference paper - The First Asia Corporate Governance Conference, Shanghai, China, 2005), available at
https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/114986/1/Content.pdf?accept=1 (finding that competition encouraged Chinese
firms to hide profits for tax reasons).
444 For market entry restrictions that effectuate monopoly-like powers for certain firms in China, see Wentong Zheng,
Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 660–663
(2010).
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labor market, push them to perform better and eliminate unnecessary risky behavior.445 Similarly, it is
argued that sanctions of shaming and moral disapproval by the public threaten reputational harm and
operate as a disciplinary force in corporate governance.446
With respect to China, with the development of the financial market and as professional
education improves, the supply of professional managerial talent is constantly growing. The labor
market for top managers in listed firms is no longer confined to inexperienced bureaucrats and exmilitary. Organs of the Party-state evaluate SOE managers, and the Party’s Organization Department
dictates the appointments of senior managers in significant firms. These appointments and career
decisions are not merely bureaucratic processes; market performance is increasingly considered in the
appointment, evaluation, and promotion of Party-state managerial appointees. A study conducted
during the early managerial reforms in SOEs (1980-90s) found that the allocation of managers in SOEs
was already responding to nascent market forces. Managers were subjected to more frequent review,
were demoted, or even fired for poor performance.447 In more recent studies, reputation through
relation-based exchanges was found to have an important contribution to China’s economic
development even outside communal settings.448 Another study reflects the importance of reputation
for monitoring and disciplining managers in China, through evidence of public criticism in China’s
stock exchanges and public shaming funneled by the media.449 Together, these studies indicate that
reputational sanctions, and by extension the labor market for managers, bolster capital market activity.
This is true, yet some limitations should be noted. While growing in size, sophistication, and
experience, the managerial labor market for senior positions is still confined to a specific pool of
people. Competition is narrow since appointments are limited to candidates with certain backgrounds
or to those already fostered within specific business groups or state organs. In state-controlled
companies, these are often the fortunate officials and party members whose names are listed on the
Organization Department personnel lists.450 Political science research documents how the top of these
lists became occupied by the children of the older generation politicians, often called China’s
“princelings”—taizi dang, the princes of the party (or literally, the princes’ party).451 The managerial
labor market for state-controlled firms is largely confined to this closed knit layer of cronies.

Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2011).
447 Groves et al., supra note 33.
448 Franklin Allen et al, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 59 (2005) (“corporate governance
mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships … support the growth of the private sector”).
449 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market, COLUM. L. REV. 929, 973976 (2008).
450 Liou & Tsai, supra note 400.
451 CHENG LI, CHINA'S LEADERS: THE NEW GENERATION 127-175 (2001); Jeremy Page, Children of the Revolution, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 26, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904491704576572552793150470. See
generally Ting Chen & James Kai-sing Kung, Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land
Market, 134 Q. J. ECON. 185 (2018).
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This should not imply that there isn’t fierce competition between the members of this class, but it
does mean that the demand and supply for managers in many listed firms is not only quantitatively
limited, but also that the appointments are often motivated by factors outside professional
performance assessment. While this has not yet been examined empirically, it appears that the
managerial labor market within the Party-state’s institutional infrastructure can incentivize managers
to perform better and discipline their actions, but not in a way that is guided by efficiency
considerations alone. Other political-economy considerations often guide the appointment, evaluation,
and promotion of managers in many listed firms and particularly in state-controlled firms.452 This
changes the traditional corporate governance function of reputational sanctions and managerial labor
market in China.

2. Gatekeepers
i.

Lawyers, Accountants, and Underwriters

Corporate governance theory prescribes an important monitoring role to third-party
gatekeepers. Lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and other third-party market gatekeepers are repeat
market players whose reputation depends on their ability to monitor effectively and expose corporate
mismanagement. Because third-party gatekeepers have a legally reserved role in certain corporate
activities, they have access to information that gives them the capacity, and often the obligation, to
monitor. Moreover, since their future earnings depend on their reputation, they are presumed to also
have an incentive to monitor even without the stick of collateral liability. It is commonly believed that
incentives for monitoring by third-party gatekeepers (or the sanctions for failing to do so) outweigh
the potential gains from cooperating with corporate wrongdoing and mismanagement.453
The research on the role of third-party gatekeepers in the enforcement of China’s corporate
governance and capital market regime is fairly limited. With respect to underwriters, pervasive state
ownership and Party-state control over the industry place underwriters in China in a conflicted
position and weaken their monitoring capacity.454 There is also doubt as to their professional capability
to monitor. In a 2008 article, Clarke presents the view that the legal and accounting professions in

While presenting the importance of reputational sanctions on firms and capital markets activity in China, Liebman and
Milhaupt found a more limited applicability of such sanctions with regards to state-owned firms. See Liebman & Milhaupt,
supra note 449, at 964-996.
453 For a full account of the enforcement role played by gatekeepers in corporate governance, see Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
454 See the discussion of underwriters as part of the Party-state’s control in the financial industry and capital markets
generally in Section II.B. supra. See also Chao Chen et al., The IPO Underwriting Market Share in China: Do Ownership and Quality
Matter?, 46 J. BANKING & FIN. 177 (2014); Bill B. Francis et al., Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence
from China, 28 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 696 (2009).
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China were not yet equipped to play an effective gatekeeper role.455 Lawyers and accountants at the
industry level still lack the professional capability and the independence needed to expose complex
financial fraud. A shortage of qualified accounting firms and the (albeit narrowing) shortage of trained
lawyers shrink the potential importance of good reputation in these industries. Recent accounting
scandals involving Chinese firms investigated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
suggest that this has not improved much since.456
With limited reputational rewards and with little policing against wrongdoing gatekeepers,
third-party gatekeepers are less incentivized to monitor corporate control parties. Under the current
institutional setting in China, they often have more to gain from cooperating with corporate
malfeasance than from monitoring and exposing it.

ii. Financial Press
The financial press is known as a meaningful “watchdog” against corporate malfeasance,
taking up an important role as an external corporate governance mechanism in many systems around
the world. By exposing corporate wrongdoing and disseminating information, an active financial press
also facilitates the monitoring role of other institutions, such as the stock market, reputation, and
public and private enforcement.457 Transparency and objectivity are the cornerstone of an effective
financial press. These are preconditioned on the financial press’ ability to be independent from various
interested parties.
Sources of information and media platforms in China are growing constantly, creating
increased competition in an industry that until recently was open only to the state. This opens up
access to information and potentially leads to competition on the quality and accuracy of the news as
well. The academic literature points to the rise of the Chinese media as a social influencer in recent
decades, and its growing role within the Chinese legal system. Moreover, it shows that the
commercialization of media and expanded editorial discretion leads to some458 critical reporting.459
The same literature also reports that these platforms are still controlled, and in many cases
owned, by the Party-state through various means. Formal licensing and content regulation govern the
field and impose entry barriers, while libel laws as well as formal and informal Communist Party policy
Clarke, supra note 115, at 181-182.
See SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big Four Accounting Firms with Violating U.S. Securities Laws in Refusing to Produce Documents,
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012249htm.
457 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 798-799 (2000).
458 For the idea that the press has a supervising role over citizens in China, see Benjamin Liebman, The Media and the Courts:
Towards Competitive Supervision?, CHINA Q. 833, 847 (2011) (suggesting that the press is competing with other horizontal
institutions on a “supervising” authority).
459 Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-41 (2005).
455
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through local propaganda departments direct content management.460 Most influential among these
are informal rules directing editorial decision making, which are said to control the targets and the
subject matter of reports, as well as to limit true investigative journalism to jurisdictions outside the
location where the media is operating.461
Thus, while the financial press is becoming more autonomous and increasingly influential, it
still lacks independence from the most important interested party—the CCP. Media reports are still
ultimately subject to Party scrutiny and will therefore continue to be used first and foremost to
maintain Party-state legitimacy or advance its other priorities. Two recent examples of this can be
viewed in the cherry-picking and timed coverage of officials accused in the anti-corruption campaign462
and the state-promoted media campaign in the wake of the two recent stock market crashes. In the
latter case, state-controlled media covered extensively the arrest of “disloyal” journalists for their
contribution to market-price declines, and “foreign forces” were blamed for market volatility.463 In
both examples, it is clear that the press assumes a disciplinary role and can bring light on corruption
and other corporate abuse, but in a controlled and guided manner that can easily be directed to
strengthen the current regime.

3. The Legal System
i. Public Enforcement — The CSRC
It seems that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has put the protection of
so-called “public” (gongzhong) shareholders at the forefront of its mission. The CSRC has stepped into
aspects of internal governance that are traditionally reserved to the Company Law. It has done so not
only by issuing recommended best-practices, such as the 2001 Code for Corporate Governance, but
also by enacting a number of mandatory regulations that override what is only enabled in the primary
statute.464
For instance, even before the 2005 amendment of the Company Law, the CSRC issued the
Guidance for Independent Directors discussed earlier, which required listed firms to amend their

Id. See also Liebman, supra note 458, at 845 (noting the use of libel laws as means of media control, as well as the use
of defamation litigation to protect local interests).
461 Liebman, supra note 459, at 41-56.
462 This was reflected in the scope of anti-corruption investigations on which news items were published as opposed to a
much higher number of investigations and the vast nation-wide coverage of the case of Bo Xilai, which was presumably
to achieve populist legitimacy for the move. See Anti-Corruption by the Numbers, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/corruption-by-the-numbers/?lang=en.
463 China Is Trying to Blame Its Stock Market Crash on Journalists and Businessmen, VICE NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015),
https://news.vice.com/article/china-is-trying-to-blame-its-stock-market-crash-on-journalists-and-businessmen.
464 Howson, supra note 143 (offering reasons as to why the CSRC was allowed this position).
460
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bylaws and appoint independent directors to their boards.465 Around the same time, it enacted rules
that were designed to make the decision-making process with respect to the sale, exchange, or
purchase of major assets independent from the controlling shareholders of the firm.466 Perhaps most
reflective of the CSRC’s investor protection orientation are the CSRC 2004 Provisions, which
promoted minority shareholders participation in governance through a public- shareholders’ negative
veto on certain corporate decisions.
The 2004 Provisions required approval by the shareholders’ assembly (with the support of at
least fifty percent of the “general public shareholders,” understood to mean holders of publicly-listed
shares not affiliated with the controlling parties) for the following matters: issues that would have a
material impact on public shareholders; any new issuance of stock or convertible debt to the public;
rights offering; major asset reorganization; repayment of a debt by a shareholder; and any overseas
listing by a significant subsidiary of the listed company. 467 This negative veto conferred on noncontrolling shareholders in listed firms outside primary law is a meaningful mechanism for minority
shareholder protection and provides an opportunity for their participation in governance. The CSRC
2004 Provisions also urge (not require) firms to proactively increase the presence of public
shareholders in shareholders’ meetings and to enhance their participation by enabling solicitation of
voting proxies and cumulative voting.
The rules set forth in the CSRC 2004 Provisions are only one example of how China’s capital
markets regulator is increasingly intent on responding to broad investors’ expectations in order to
encourage the flow of capital to the market. 468 However, granting protections and guaranteeing
protections are two separate things.469 While the CSRC was allowed leeway for regulatory action, its
power to enforce its policies has been curtailed by design. Many CSRC rules do not set forth any
enforcing mechanisms and leave remedial measures to be set by primary laws.470 Without prescribing
administrative sanctions or remedies for violations of these rules, CSRC enforcement is largely

Independent Directors Guidance, supra note 303. For discussion, see supra note 304.
Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shangshi Gongsi Zhongda Goumai, Chushou, Zhihuan
Zichan Ruogan Wenti de Tongzhi (中国证券监督管理委员会关于上市公司重大购买、出售、置换资产若干问题
的通知) [Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Several Issues Concerning Major Purchases, Sales and
Exchanges of Assets by Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Oct. 12, 2001, effective
Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=38021&lib=law.
467 CSRC 2004 Provisions, supra note 275, arts. 1(1)(a)–(d) (referring to the “general public shareholders group” (“shehui
gongzhong gu gudong”)).
468 Examples of regulatory activism by the CSRC are numerous. For details on more recent regulatory action by the CSRC,
including its 2007 three-year campaign that examined the implementation of corporate governance norms in Chinese listed
firms, see OECD, CHINA COUNTRY STUDY: SELF-ASSESSMENT AGAINST THE OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdf.
469 Gongmeng Chen et. al, Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement Actions, J. ACCT. &
PUB. POL’Y (2005).
470 The 1993 Company Law, which was in force when many of the CSRC rules were enacted, only addressed declaratory
remedies or cease and desist orders for violations of shareholders rights. See 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, arts. 111,
150.
465
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discretionary. In that endeavor, the CSRC has to navigate the myriad of tensions and power conflicts
within the PRC political economy.
Public enforcement by the CSRC, particularly against insiders and other controlling parties in
state-controlled firms, is not welcomed by powerful Party-state organs and is often held back.
Consequently, publicly listed state-controlled enterprises enjoy more lenient enforcement of facially
uniform legal standards. 471 The CSRC, like other state agencies, is more likely to enforce laws,
regulations, or policies (or enforce them more rigorously) against violators that are unaffiliated with
the Party-state apparatus than against those that are affiliated, even in clear cases of oppression or
fraud.472 One example is the fraud case involving Nanjing Textile Import Export Corp., Ltd. The firm
was an SSE-listed company with the Nanjing Municipal branch of SASAC as its controlling
shareholder (at 35 percent). The company falsified and publicly declared a total of RMB 350 million
(approximately USD 54 million) of profits for five consecutive years. The fraud was designed to
conceal losses that would have forced the company to de-list. In response, the CSRC merely issued
an administrative penalty and minor fines against the company and several of its managers. This was
despite broad public calls to apply delisting norms and to enforce more rigorous sanctions, as was the
case for other, presumably less-politically connected firms.473
Pressures on the CSRC are bound to come from other sources as well. As mentioned, the
CSRC is but one state-organ with an authority over the variety of firms that are active in the capital
market. It shares the same hierarchical position as some of the most powerful listed groups and also
with other ministry-level state organs that take part in regulating and supervising some of the same
firms. Overlapping authorities, as well as regulatory competition, make it difficult for the CSRC to
enforce its own prescribed shareholder protections in conflicted cases.474
Finally, while the norms and mandatory provisions of the CSRC sometimes result in the
empowerment of public shareholders to receive fairer treatment, their overall contribution depends
on the relative power of the CSRC within the political infrastructure at any given time. The position
of the CSRC within China’s administrative and political hierarchy has weakened since the 2015–2016
market crash. Subsequent legal enforcement and Party disciplinary procedures were taken against
CSRC leading officials. These developments have discredited the agency and wounded its authority
Henk Berkman et al., Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China,
45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1391, 1393 (2010); Allen & Shen, supra note 428.
472 Henk Berkman et al., supra note 471.
473 See Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Nanjing Fanzhipin Jinchukou Fufen Youxian Gongsi, Dan
Xiaozhong, Ding Jie Deng 13 Ming Zefuren) (中国证监会行政处罚决定书（南京纺织品进出口股份有限公司、单
晓钟、丁杰等13名责任人）) [Administrative Penalty Decision (Nanjing Textile Import & Export Co., Shan Xiaozhong,
Ding Jie and 13 Responsible Persons), Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui (中国证券监督管理委员会)
[China Sec. Reg. Comm.] (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306212/201407/
t20140707_257345.htm?keywords= percentE5 percent8D percent97 percentE4 percentBA percentAC. The company was
fined RMB 500,000 (approximately USD 76,000), and the individual managers were fined sums between RMB 300,000 –
30,000 (USD 46,000 – 4,600). Id.
474 See the discussion of Institutional Investors supra pp. 53-59.
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within China’s political economy. 475 Recently, the CSRC, along with other state institutions, has
apparently pulled back from capital market governance to make way for more direct involvement by
party institutions.476

ii. Stock Exchanges – Self Regulatory Institutions
As private (or semi-private) institutions that are commonly owned by their own members,
stock exchanges have direct incentives to have well-governed firms. Self-regulation by stock exchanges,
therefore, commonly constitutes a meaningful mechanism for monitoring and disciplining firms and
their control parties.477 The New York Stock Exchange, for example, promoted rules that ensured
investors’ protection in the U.S. market at a time when formal laws and institutions were missing. 478
Several concentrated and emerging markets have similarly recognized the potential of stock exchange
self-regulation and allowed for the emergence of designated exchanges with higher disclosure and
minority protection requirements, alongside their traditional and path-dependent listing arrangement.
In Brazil, the “Novo Mercado” segment of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange was developed to enable
companies to voluntarily commit to better minority shareholder protections. The Brazilian
arrangement reduced pressures for comprehensive legal reforms and enabled the adoption of
governance mechanisms that otherwise would have been thwarted by existing interest groups. 479
Additionally, some systems – including China’s – allow firms to cross-list their shares in other markets,
which presumably offer better corporate governance. Cross-listing in these markets, the argument
goes, enables firms to commit themselves voluntarily to higher investor protection standards in
exchange for broader reach to capital and tapping new markets.480
Party disciplinary proceedings took place against Yao Gang, vice chairman of the CSRC, and Zhang Yujun, assistant
chairman of the CSRC. See, e.g., Zhongyang Jiwei Jiancha Bu (中央纪委监察部) [Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection], Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Dangwei Weiyuan, Fu Zhuxi Yao Gang Shexian Yanzhong
Weiji Jieshou Zuzhi Diaocha (中国证券监督管理委员会党委委员、副主席姚刚涉嫌严重违纪接受组织调查)
[Investigation of Yao Gang, Member of the Party Committee and Deputy Chairman of CSRC, under Suspicion of Serious
Disciplinary
Violations]
(Nov.
13,
2015),
available
at
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jlsc/zggb/jlsc_zggb/201607/t20160704_83027.html. More formal institutional consequences in
this direction can be seen in the removal of Xiao Gang, the chairman of the CSRC, from his position following the crises:
See China Removes Xiao as CSRC Head After Stock Market Meltdown, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 20, 2016, 7:47 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/head-of-china-s-securities-regulator-to-step-down-wsj-reports.
476 See infra Chapter 3.
477 Mahoney, supra note 21.
478 Coffee, supra note 21.
479 Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the
European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475 (2010) (discussing Germany’s Neuer Market and Brazil’s Novo Mercado).
480 Most research supporting this theory, known as the “legal bonding hypothesis,” is focused on foreign listings on U.S.
markets. Coffee, supra note 132, at 641; William A. Reese Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests,
Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002).
Yet, limited but notable exceptions reflecting on bonding with other markets show that the motivations for cross listing
are numerous and are not necessarily those of self-commitment to advanced governance standards. See Jaiho Chung et al.,
475
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In terms of promoting investor-friendly norms through “private regulation,” China’s stock
exchanges have been relatively active. The two national stock exchanges produced rules for disclosure
and voting procedures that preceded regulatory efforts. Furthermore, they were the first to offer
comprehensive corporate governance guidelines. Indeed, in October 2000, preempting the CSRC
Code for Corporate Governance, the Shanghai Stock Exchange released a draft set of corporate
governance guidelines for all listed companies. 481 Anglo-American corporate governance norms 482
heavily influenced these guidelines, which set forth shareholder rights, high disclosure standards, and
duties on directors and managers. Perhaps most notably, in 2006, both SSE and SZSE created a
detailed chapter in their listing requirements on the approval and disclosure process of related-party
transactions in all listed firms,483 something that the national regulators have still failed to do. A year
later, the SSE launched its SSE Corporate Governance Board (CG Board). The CG Board is a special
listing index with governance rules that seek to prevent public shareholder abuse. Firms included in
the index are required to disclose conflicts of interest relating to controlling shareholders, including
with respect to dividend distribution, related-party transactions, and board appointments. This
resembles the efforts of some stock exchanges in other markets, which enable firms to signal
commitment to more stringent investor protection norms within the same capital market.484
In terms of the sanctions applied by the stock exchanges for violations of their rules and their
overall disciplinary power, the research is limited. The 2006 amendment of the Securities Law
broadened the authority of the stock exchanges and granted them powers that until then had been
reserved to the CSRC alone: to accept listings, suspend trade, and delist companies. Despite the
amendment’s defining them as self-regulatory organizations, the stock exchanges are still in fact
conduits of the CSRC. The traditional view of stock-exchanges as self-regulatory bodies that rely on
private, member-run, independent governance is not applicable to China. 485 Nevertheless,
commentators believe that China’s stock exchanges have an important enforcement role through
various reputational sanctions.486 Observing and analyzing a total of 109 cases of public criticism
Is Cross-Listing a Commitment Mechanism?: The Choice of Destinations and Family Ownership, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE 307 (2015)
(empirically examining destinations for cross-listing and hypothesizing on firms’ motivations in selecting a destination for
cross-listing); Nicholas C. Howson & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Reverse Cross-Listings - The Coming Race to List in Emerging
Markets and an Enhanced Understanding of Classical Bonding, 47 CORNELL INT'L L.J., 607 (2014) (proposing a theoretical
account for a budding phenomenon they refer to as “reverse cross-listing” on emerging markets).
481 Fu, supra note 139, at 11.
482 Primarily on U.S. corporate governance principles, the 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, and the UK
Combined Code. See id.
483 Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (promulgated by the Shanghai Securities
Exchange, May 19, 2006), Ch. 10 (“Related-Party Transactions”) [hereinafter SSE Listing Rules]. The Shenzhen Securities
Exchange installed a similar listing rule at the same time.
More detailed implementation guidelines followed the SSE Listing Rules. Guidelines for the Implementation of Connected
Transactions of Listed Companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (promulgated by the Shanghai Securities Exchange,
May 1, 2011.)
484 For example, the Brazilian Novo Mercado and Germany’s Neuer Markt. See Gilson et al., supra note 479.
485 Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 449, at 945-947.
486 The authors note the following sanctions at the exchange’s disposal, in order of severity: oral warnings, letters of
oversight and supervision, notices of criticisms, and public criticisms. Other sanctions are to deem individuals to be
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issued by China’s stock exchanges against 89 different companies between 2000 and 2006, Liebman
and Milhaupt found that public shaming initiated by stock exchange sanctions has significant effects
on firms and their insiders (measured by abnormal stock price returns). Interestingly, it was also found
that the majority of all sanctioned companies (58 percent) were private listed firms, in contrast to the
higher ratio of state-ownership of listed firms in the market as a whole at that time. 487 The authors
conclude that China’s “stock exchanges have carved out a meaningful, if limited, self-regulatory role
for themselves despite severe institutional constraints on their independence.”488
As meaningful as the stock exchanges may be for corporate governance, they are in no way
autonomous institutions. They can exercise their regulatory role only within the confines allowed by
the CSRC, which in itself is restrained by the various elements within China’s political economy.
China’s stock exchanges, therefore, while no doubt important to market discipline, do not have
enough influence on firms and the corporate governance culture on their own.

iii. Private Enforcement —The People’s Courts System
The most shareholder-empowering legal standards and even explicitly mandatory provisions
can be easily evaded absent reliable enforcement institutions. I have reviewed the main challenges for
administrative enforcement by the CSRC and the limited latitude of self-regulatory institutions. The
situation with respect to China’s People’s Court system is unsurprisingly similar.
The approach to private securities litigation in China has not been particularly welcoming,
despite some positive shifts since the turn toward law in the early 2000s. As in many other systems
around the world, an American-style securities law class action is not recognized under the current
legal framework in China.489 A private right of action based on a securities law claim can take the form
of either an individual action or a joint action.490 The latter is available for claims in which the number
of plaintiffs is fixed at the time of filing or when the court decides to adjudicate several individual suits
together for particular reasons.491 Individual actions also do not have a free pass to courts. In the early
unsuitable to serve as senior managers or directors in listed companies, and to order companies to remove their secretaries.
Id. at 947-948.
487 Id. at 964-966 (proposing various interpretations to these findings).
488 Id. at 983.
489 See generally Xin Tang, Protecting Minority Shareholders in China: A Task for both Legislation and Enforcement, in TRANSFORMING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 141 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2008) (explaining key points in the discussion around
class action in China).
490 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa De Minshi Peichang Anjian
De Ruogan [Guiding Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning the Acceptance and Trial of Civil
Compensation Securities Suits Involving Misrepresentation] (effective Feb. 1, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 SPC Circular])
(incorporating article 54 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law and by implication rejecting article 55 of the same law which
governs class actions).
491 For a detailed analysis of the differences between the Chinese joint action and a more recognized (U.S.-style) class
action, see Hui (Robin) Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-Year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment,
AM. J. COMP. L. 757 (2013).
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2000s, from a complete rejection of private litigation claims based on securities law, courts moved to
accepting some claims, but subject to substantive and procedural limitations.492 Primary among these
limitations is the narrow scope of underlying claims accepted, which is limited to misrepresentationbased claims, as well as a requirement that a claim will be heard only following an adverse finding in
public enforcement procedures (administrative penalty or a criminal procedure).493
This narrow path has been available to injured investors since 2003, under a Supreme People’s
Court (SPC) internal policy that was issued to guide lower People’s Courts on the adjudication of civil
securities claims pertaining specifically and only to misrepresentation claims. 494 Policy statements
issued by the SPC as well as its judicial interpretations are non-binding and are formally considered to
be guiding in nature. Still, scholars have noted that in practice these documents have been accepted
as authoritative within the judicial system. 495 Practically, this means that without an SPC-issued
guidance, lower courts will not hear claims based on other securities law claims. A formal legal basis
for private securities litigation was acknowledged in the 2005 Securities Law revision, but there as well
private litigation seems to have been limited to misrepresentation-based claims.496 In an informal 2007
statement, the vice-president of the SPC guided lower courts to also accept cases based on insider
trading and market manipulation claims. 497 This is similarly implied in a more recent SPC and CSRC
joint opinion on matters related to disputes in securities.498 Yet, as Huang pointed out, very few such
For more information on the relevant Supreme People’s Court circulars and background on private securities litigation
in China, see id. at 760-761 (citing the following circulars: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu she Zhengquan Minshi Peichang
Anjian Zan Buyu Shouli de Tongzhi [The Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Temporary Refusal of Filings of
Securities-Related Civil Compensation Cases] (Sept. 21, 2001); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan
Shichang Yin Xujiachengshu Yinfa de Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [The Notice of the
Supreme People’s Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising from Misrepresentation on the
Securities Market] (Jan. 15, 2002); 2003 SPC Circular, supra note 490.
493 For a review of additional procedural hurdles embedded in the 2003 SPC Circular, see Guiping Lu, Private Enforcement of
Securities Fraud Law in China: A Critique of the Supreme People's Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities Litigation, 12
PACIFIC RIM L. & POL'Y J. 781 (2003) (elaborating on procedural provisions regarding standing, jurisdiction, and other
prerequisites which the author argues make private action based on securities law “very hard”).
494 See 2003 SPC Circular, supra note 490.
495 Randy Peerenboom posits that through this activity the courts perform a “quasi-legislative activity.” Taisu Zhang argues
that the SPC have been expanding its judicial interpretation capacity through Guiding Cases, a process that gives the SPC
a “stare decisis-like authority to select cases.” Peerenboom, supra note 48; Taisu Zhang, The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting
the Supreme People’s Court of China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 8 (2012).
496 Although the revised Securities Law acknowledges the compensation liability of an inside trader and of traders who
conducted market manipulation (when it resulted in losses for investors), it has not yet provided the legal basis for private
civil litigation based on such claims. Therefore, investors injured by such actions are left to rely on general tort or contract
law claims. See Nicholas C. Howson, Punishing Possession - China's All-Embracing Insider Trading Enforcement Regime, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 327, 341-342 (Stephen Bainbridge ed., 2012).
497 See Huang, supra note 491, at 761 n.11.
498 Zuigao renmin fayuan zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanliweiyuanhui guanyu quanmian tuijin zhengquan qihuo jiufen
duoyuan huajie jizhi jianshe de yijian (最高人民法院 中国证券监督管理委员会 关于全面推进证券期货纠纷多元
化解机制建设的意见) [Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Supreme People’s Court on
Accelerating the Construction of Diverse Mechanisms for Securities and Futures’ Disputes] (promulgated by the Supreme
People’s Court and the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Nov. 13, 2018), art. 13 [hereinafter SPC & CSRC Joint Opinions],
available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201811/t20181130_347505.html (“For civil disputes
arising from illegal acts such as false statements, insider trading, and manipulation of the market, the people’s courts need
to declare legal rules through judicial decisions…”).
492
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cases have since been brought based on these claims, and most cases are rejected or withdrawn due
to lack of SPC guidance on how to adjudicate them.499Furthermore, the recent SPC and CSRC joint
document and subsequent provincial courts’ opinions reflect that the People’s Courts system is ever
more intent on pushing securities claims away from courts into alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.500
With respect to a private right of action based on governance claims established in the PRC
Company Law, the 2005 revision took an important step to protect the rights of shareholders with
judicial remedies. These included the enactment of several liability provisions and shareholder access
to courts: liability for shareholders that abused the interests of the company or of other shareholders,
with compensation set as a remedy for the company and other shareholders’ losses;501 shareholders’
standing to enforce their legally-granted preemptive rights in courts;502 an access to a type of appraisal
by the court in certain cases where shareholders are bought out by the company;503 an option to ask
the court to revoke certain decisions for legal and procedural violations; 504 standing rights against
directors and managers for violations that have injured shareholders;505 and finally, the ability to file a
derivative suit on behalf of the company. 506 In August 2017, the SPC issued the No.4 Judicial
Interpretation of the Company Law507 to clarify some of these provisions and guide lower courts when
adjudicating claims based on violations of the Company Law. Although it remains to be seen to what
extent the No.4 Interpretation will help facilitate adjudication in these cases, prima facie at least, it
seems that it did not resolve many of the most criticized hurdles that stand in the way of potential
derivative suit plaintiffs.508
Huang, supra note 491, at 761 n.11.
SPC & CSRC Joint Opinions, supra note 498. The Shanghai Financial Court was apparently the first to formally develop
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for securities law disputes, which received the title “Model Judgment
Mechanism.” The Beijing Higher People’s Court followed recently with a similar model on a trial basis. Under this
mechanism, a securities law dispute (practically limited to misrepresentation claims) may be selected as “a model case” for
other “parallel” cases belonging to the same group securities disputes, to be deliberated in principle in mediation, based
on the model case’s fact-finding process and legal analysis. The first application for approval of a model case was submitted
March 21, 2019. See Regulations of the Shanghai Financial Court on the Model Judgment Mechanism for Securities
Disputes, January 16, 2019 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/lM6Y7VOG9YiOlPEYZHLMhQ; Beijing Higher People’s
Court trial Opinions on the Fair and Efficient Handling of Group Securities Disputes According to Law [Jinggao Fafa,
2019, No. 243], April 23, 2019 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/P7_NNPhA2HukvpBf60Kogw
501 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 20, 21 (determining similar liability and requiring compensation from corporate
controllers and insiders who have injured the interests of the company by taking advantage of their affiliations).
502 Id. arts. 34, 71-72.
503 Id. art. 71(3).
504 Id. art. 22.
505 Id. art. 152.
506 Id. art. 149, 151.
507 PRC Judicial Interpretation No. 16, 2017, Supreme People's Court Judicial Interpretation No.4 of the PRC Company
Law (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Supreme People’s Court, Dec. 5, 2016, effective Sept. 1, 2017), available
at http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-57402.html. Prior SPC interpretations of the Company Law were issued in
March 27, 2006 (No.1); May 5, 2008 (No. 2); and December 6, 2010 (No. 3).
508 For example, with respect to the financing of derivative litigation and the recovery right from the company, the SPC
No.4 Interpretation clarifies that the recovery right is only for reasonable costs—without clarification of what this means,
and only when the suit was successful. See id. arts 23-26.
499
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Shielding the rights of public shareholders with liability provisions and access to courts are of
course significant and vital steps in any system that aims to protect investors, but it can hardly ensure
implementation. The first impediment to overcome in applying the remedies formally granted to
shareholders is the absence of a body that can act on behalf of dispersed investors as a group.
Institutional investors in China are captured within a network of state ownership and control, and
other coalition-building efforts are restricted.509 In prior work, I have discussed the option of Partyendorsed organizations that could act on behalf of minority public shareholders. Other Asian
countries provide for similar forms of government-backed shareholder coalitions.510 Scholars in the
PRC, Greater China, and abroad have raised the possibility that China would adopt a mechanism
similar to Taiwan’s Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center (SFIPC).511 Similarly, one of
the recently considered draft amendments to China’s Securities Law included a proposal to establish
a government-sanctioned organization—the Securities Investors Protection Agency—to support the
rights of public shareholders. It was postulated that the institution would hold minimum shares in
PRC listed firms, through which it could exercise standing rights in its own name to bring civil claims
for securities law violations on behalf of defrauded public investors.512 Other proposals in the draft
amendments contemplated a National Securities Investor Compensation Fund, which would help
compensate public investors for unrecovered damages from securities violations and consequent court
proceedings. 513 Given the current and historical wariness in the PRC regarding civil society and
autonomous institutions, I believe that shareholder-representative institutions endorsed by the Partystate are vastly more likely to overcome the barriers that private coalition-building efforts face than
private efforts would be.514 These draft amendments of the Securities Law, along with any state-backed
form of shareholder coalition-building, however, are currently stalled.
Perhaps the most serious barriers that limit the formally granted access to courts are
institutional impediments within the judicial system itself. Three main impediments are frequently
mentioned in the literature: the professional inadequacies of judges, particularly in commercial and
business law matters;515 the courts’ lack of authority to develop “case law” due to various reasons,
See the discussion above in monitoring by Other Shareholders.
Milhaupt, supra note 128, at 204–05.
511 Endorsed and partially funded by Taiwan’s securities regulator, the SFIPC holds 1,000 shares of each public company
in Taiwan. The organization uses this position to strategically implement available corporate governance mechanisms to
promote the interests of minority public shareholders. Specifically, the SFIPC files derivative and class-action suits against
insiders, functions as a mediation center for investors’ disputes, operates a protection fund to compensate unobtainable
investors’ losses, and is also authorized to enforce profit disgorgement cases. See Wen-Yeu Wang Wallace & Jianlin Chen,
Reforming China’s Securities Civil Actions: Lessons from US’s PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government Sanctioned Non-Profit
Organization, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN. L. 115 (2008).
512 See Revised Draft for Proposed Amendments to the PRC Securities Law (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory
Comm’n), arts. 144, 147 (informal copy on file with the author).
513 Id. arts. 141, 142. The operation and funding of the compensation fund is unspecified in the draft; presumably these
public-shareholder-interest organizations would be funded by a form of tax levied on securities companies, as in Taiwan’s
SFICP model.
514 Groswald Ozery, supra note 101, at 41-44.
515 Professor Gu Weixia provides a comprehensive review of the state of affairs of the judiciary in China. Weixia Gu, The
Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis Chinese Courts?, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 303 (2013).
509
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including their relative position within the administrative hierarchy, a general social distrust in the
courts’ system,516 and the limited role historically reserved to courts as a legal institution; and finally,
the court system’s capture within the existing political economy, which leads to its complete lack of
independence. Howson’s noteworthy analysis distinguishes between the People’s Courts’ competence;
their institutional autonomy, defined in the PRC context as “the ability of the judicial institution to act
with its own institutional authority”; and their political independence, defined as “the ability of courts
and judicial officers to act independently from, and against the interest of, political or military
power.”517 Gu adds an additional, valuable layer of analysis that distinguishes between the institutional
independence of the judiciary as a whole and the independence of decision making by individual judges.
The former is compromised due the way courts are administratively accountable to the corresponding
level of the People’s Congress and funded by the corresponding local People’s Government, while
the latter is compromised due to individual judges’ job insecurity that stems from their terms of office,
the political nature of their appointment, and the politically-infused structure of their professional
evaluation.518
These barriers are felt particularly when controversial cases arise. These are cases that pose
potential threats to the legitimacy of the Party-state system, based not only on their substantive matter
but also on the identity of the litigants. Cases in which investors’ claims are against state-controlled
companies and affiliated defendants, claims potentially pertaining to a large number of litigants, or
simply those that reflect badly on either the Party or the state (central or local governments) are often
pushed away by the courts. Howson and Clarke have shown that derivative lawsuits involving listed
PRC companies are almost completely absent from the People’s Courts. They attribute this (among
other barriers to derivative litigation519) to the fact that cases involving publicly-listed firms commonly
include large plaintiff groups and often seek the accountability of Party-state actors and institutions.
Thus, according to the authors, these cases are potentially sensitive because they may affect social
stability in politically related contexts, and they are therefore discouraged or prohibited:520
In most cases, it [the controlling shareholder] either is or is closely connected to a
governmental entity or Party organization. This means that there is a higher likelihood that a
shareholder lawsuit or a derivative suit involving a corporatized entity, especially a politically
privileged one that has been allowed to access the public capital markets, will, in substance, be
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reports “over 68 percent of surveyed judges identified local
protectionism as a major cause of unfairness in judicial decisions.” Judicial Independence in the PRC, CONGRESSIONALEXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc (last visited May 25, 2019).
See also Yuhua Wang, Court Funding and Judicial Corruption in China, 69 CHINA J. 43 (2013) (examining the setting and practice
of courts’ funding and their perceived judicial corruption).
517 See Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, supra note 142, at 327-329 (discussing cases from the Shanghai
People’s Courts reflecting more and less autonomy).
518 Gu, supra note 515, at 313.
519 See supra note 508.
520 Howson & Clarke, supra note 180. See also Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, supra note 142, at 404–
407.
516
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directed at a Party group, the state, a state-affiliated agency, or the agent of any of these. The
claim will therefore be politically sensitive—something that is likely to affect the willingness
and ability of judicial institutions to accept the lawsuit and hear the underlying claim.521
On the other hand, a recent study by Ang and Jia found that disputes relating to politicallyconnected firms are primarily those that do reach the courts’ doorsteps.522 The research was conducted
on disputes involving private firms but might still suggest that connected parties rely (and know that
they can rely) on their political connections to influence the court to rule in their favor. Either way,
whether cases involving connected listed firms are likely to be rejected by the courts or to be decided
in the connected party’s favor, it is not good news for public investors. Both options clearly show that
political economy has a determinant effect on the operation of legal institutions and supplants the
enforcement of legal rights.
A non-independent court system imbedded within the Party-state bureaucracy cannot work
to check and balance the power of corporate control parties over minority investors. Given that the
court system is formally and functionally a branch of government enmeshed within the broader
hierarchical network, it has an even a greater impartiality challenge when the control parties are at an
equal or higher position within the Party-state hierarchy—exactly the occasions where checks and
balances on abuse of power are most needed.
There have been efforts in the past few years to reform the People’s Court system.523 The
institutional structure was changed so as to centralize the management and funding of local courts at
the level of the provincial governments (rather than by lower-tier local authorities) and to create crossjurisdictional courts.524 Yet, to my understanding, these efforts focus on centralizing control over the
judicial system, not reducing it. The reforms focus on increasing professionalism and curbing local
protectionism, and most changes are limited to curbing courts’ dependence on immediate local
governments. These efforts may result in more autonomy in some lower-level cases, but nothing in
these efforts aims to increase the independence of the court system from the Party-state apparatus
more generally, nor to strengthen the autonomy of judges.
The institutional setting, legal framework, and academic research overall portray the People’s
Court system as a weak legal institution that is unable and unwilling to enforce legal rights against the
various elements in China’s controlling apparatus, be they the listed units of China’s national
champions and their corporate control parties, or the local governments as shareholders and their

Howson & Clarke, supra note 180, at 247.
Yuenyuen Ang & Nan Jia, Political Connections and Use of Courts in Dispute Resolution: A Survey Analysis of Chinese Private
Firms, 76 J. POL. 318 (2014) (on a dataset of 3,900 private firms, the authors show that politically-connected firms (firms
with government-appointed senior managers) are more likely to adjudicate in courts in case of a dispute, as opposed to
firms that are not politically-connected, which prefer other forms of dispute resolution).
523 See generally China Issues White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, CHINA DAILY, (Feb. 27, 2017, 2:29 PM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-02/27/content_28361584_3.htm.
524 Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era, 20 ASIA POL’Y 4, 7 (2015).
521
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appointees. The courts’ pronounced reluctance to adjudicate in such cases curtails the system’s ability
to restrain corporate control parties ex ante and to hold them accountable ex post as well.

*

*

*

This chapter has presented the institutional setting within which Chinese listed firms are
embedded and showed how this, along with China’s continued embrace of state capitalism, has
resulted in a structured predicament for public shareholders. There is a broad range of conventional
corporate governance mechanisms that are commonly entrusted with monitoring and disciplining
firms and their control parties, and China’s corporate governance framework appears to include many
of these traditional mechanisms, implying an investor-friendly approach. When examined up close,
however, the internal governance mechanisms are clearly captured by institutional barriers and
conflicting interests. Market institutions are similarly weak or altogether missing. Taken together,
corporate governance institutions in China are not designed to monitor insiders and protect investors
against abuse, nor to promote efficient allocation of capital. Rather, they are clearly aimed at ensuring
other goals: entrenching existing controllers and guaranteeing the continuous flow of outside capital
to state-controlled and otherwise politically affiliated PRC listed firms.
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CHAPTER 3: THE GREAT REVERSAL: POLITICIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
CHINA
Considering the rise of public firms in China and the corporate governance framework
described in chapters 1 and 2, China’s capital market growth conundrum can be stated thus: China
succeeded in fostering the growth of appealing and globally competitive firms, and its capital markets
advanced to take a spot among the world’s biggest and most meaningful markets, despite weaklyfunctioning “good” corporate governance institutions and strong “bad” ones.
What can explain this law and development conundrum? The answer lies within; the growth
of China’s public firms and the domestic capital markets within which they operate did not happen
despite bad institutions, but because of them. This is not to say that concentrated state ownership and
political control did not produce costs. Rather, along with its many obstructions, China’s political
economy also motivated the development of governance mechanisms that are perhaps idiosyncratic
but are apt to overcome its own growth-impeding elements. Thus, alongside the formal embrace of
weakly-functioning traditional corporate governance institutions, a parallel and much stronger political
governance system operated in the shadows. This system, rooted in China’s unique governance
structure, monitored corporate control parties, was perceived to hold them accountable, and often in
fact did so. The political governance system combatted theft, asset stripping, and corruption, and
thereby fulfilled some of the functions of traditional corporate governance institutions. This
alternative governance system provided assurances that helped firms grow and kept the cost of capital
sufficiently low for capital markets to develop.
China’s capital markets developed to function in different ways than expected compared with
capital markets elsewhere. Corporate control parties were perhaps effectively monitored by political
governance, but they were incentivized to abide by standards that are not necessarily the maximization
of firm value. Capital markets flourished, but with efficient allocation of capital as a marginal directive.
The political economic explanation still stands today, when side by side with the continuous
growth of public firms, the threats to Party-state unity have now intensified and again destabilize the
political-economic equilibrium. Facing rising concerns about its legitimacy, the Party-state is ever more
reliant on its ability to sustain growth. Yet, instead of aligning with global best practices and
development assumptions, its institutional response still goes against conventional law and
development predictions. China’s policy makers are opting for intensified political governance.
Perhaps most strikingly, this shift is occurring through the formal institutionalization of political
control. The Party is exercising an ever more expansive and transparently direct role in market
economic activity, through what some may view as a cynical use of the legal system. Public firms in
present day China are progressively being governed by what I call a politicized corporate governance.
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Conventional internal-governance institutions are undermined by political institutions that are
imported into firms, and the disciplinary role of markets is being supplanted in a similar fashion.
Legalized into corporate governance, this recent shift toward a politicized corporate governance
reflects a formal retreat from outwardly conventional, arguably convergent, corporate governance,
back to a loose form of the old divergent planned economy, now openly and “legally” declared.
The legalization of CCP institutions and political measures under the law perpetuates a pathdependent instrumentalist view of the role of law in China. Yet it also illuminates a meaningful fact—
the importance of law, that is, even within its utilitarian function, has evolved. Despite justified reasons
for alarm about these recent developments, perhaps in its institutionalized and legalized form, a
politicized corporate governance may still offer some benefits.525

I. POLITICAL-ECONOMY AND FIRM GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
Symbiotic interaction between the business sector and the polity is a well-recognized element
within any regime’s political economy. Businesses impact governments through lobbying and other
forms of political participation.526 In the opposite direction, geopolitical affairs, domestic politics, and
the political views of individuals inside the firm exert influence on the internal governance of firms,
and perhaps even on their performance.527 At the same time, ironically, the prevailing legal analysis
about corporate organization and capital market development still largely disregards politicaleconomic conditions. 528 Institutions of corporate governance and political economy are treated
distinctively, detached from one another. As observed in criticism by Milhaupt and Pistor, the legal

A quasi cost-benefit analysis of a politicized corporate governance is offered below. See infra Chapter 3, Section III.
Ike Mathur & Manohar Singh, Corporate Political Strategies, 51 ACCT. & FIN. 252 (2011) (offering a literature review
discussing corporate political participation); Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43
J. ECON. LIT. 655 (2005) (discussing economic entrenchment in markets held by elite groups as a political-economy
problem that creates functionally inefficient capital markets); Pierre-Yves Néron, Business and the Polis: What Does It Mean to
See Corporations as Political Actors?, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 333 (2010).
527 M. K. Chin et al., Political Ideologies of CEOs: The Influence of Executives’ Values on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 197 (2013); Joseph P. Kalt & L. Adel Turki, Political, Social, and Environmental Shareholder Resolutions: Do They Create or
Destroy Shareholder Value?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
(June 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/17/political-social-and-environmental-shareholderresolutions-do-they-create-or-destroy-shareholder-value/; Dimitrios Gounopoulos et al., The Consequences of Political
Donations for IPO Premium and Performance
(Nov. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3181171.
528 For notable exceptions, see Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 1005 (2005); Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its Political Economy, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 56 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); Ben Ross
Schneider, A Comparative Political Economy of Diversified Business Groups, or How States Organize Big Business, 16 REV. INT’L POL.
ECON. 178 (2009). For other works by Mark Roe that analyze the determinant role of political economy in corporate
organization and capital market development in the United States and in social democratic systems, see MARK J. ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2002); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS
(1994); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000).
525
526

107

A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
system is viewed in these endeavors as “a fixed and politically neutral institutional endowment.”529
The prevalent clean divide between law, markets, and politics that have guided legal harmonization
efforts around the world throughout the last decades seems perplexing, almost naïve, when confronted
with the Chinese context. A political-economic explanation for China’s capital market growth removes
any doubt about the interconnectedness between politics, law, and economic development outcomes.
In doing so, it challenges yet another paradigm thought about the determinants of corporate
organization and capital market development.
Surprisingly, however, even the relevant literature on China, while not overlooking the role of
politics in corporate governance and capital market development, tackles political economy only
narrowly. The studies so far have explored particular attributes within the political-economic system,
but no study provided a political economic framework. For example, financial studies have paid
significant attention to the potential effects of relational business exchange and of political
connections on firm performance. 530 Franklin Allen and coauthors attributed much of China’s
business growth to the role of non-bank financial intermediaries and their reliance on relationship
networks and reputation. While relational incentives, according to the authors, substitute for poor
legal mechanisms and support finance in the private sector, the authors reject a similar conclusion for
the public market (mainly because they reject the notion that the capital market in China is successful
to begin with).531 A few law scholars explored similar directions. Milhaupt and Zheng attribute the
success of large firms in China, regardless of their ownership, to their fostering of connections to the
state. Capturing the government by their growth potential, these firms were able to extract economic
rents while preventing the state from enacting rules that would limit their advantages.532 Howson’s
work on China’s publicly-listed but state-owned and managed commercial banks addresses the
political accountability system in firms. Based on a collection of media interviews with industry
officials and senior managers of China’s state-controlled commercial banks, Howson unveils a
corporate governance regime that takes form through the Party organization, despite the formal
powers bestowed on traditional governance institutions.533
To the best of my knowledge, however, no previous study so far has offered a systemic
account of China’s political economy and its determinant role in corporate organization and capital
See generally MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 12, at 1-14.
See, e.g., Joseph P. H. Fan et al., Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly
Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330 (2007) (treating political connections as a proxy for government interference
in firms and examining the effect on post-IPO market performance); Joseph D. Piotroski & Tianyu Zhang, Politicians and
the IPO Decision: The Impact of Impending Political Promotions on IPO Activity in China, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2014) (examining
the effect of provincial-level political promotions on the pace and scope of IPO activity in China).
531 Franklin Allen, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005); Franklin Allen et al., (2018)
Understanding
Informal
Financing,
J.
FIN.
INTERMEDIATION
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3369996.
532 Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 5.
533 Howson, supra note 278, at 145 (“It is not—as the corporate form might make us think—directors and senior officers
held accountable to shareholders. Instead, China’s banks (and other SOEs) evidence nomenklatura accountable to the Party
system, the same system that governs the nominal controlling shareholder of the banks: the state.”).
529
530
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market development. Additionally, my analysis moves away from treating political configurations as
constant. Taking a view that economic development, and particularly capital market development, is
a continuous, iterative process, my political-economic framework accounts for the shifts and
movements that not only shaped the process of development upon initial economic reforms but
continue informing it still. In so doing, my analysis explains the growth of firms and capital markets
throughout China’s transition and perhaps into the future.

A. Baseline Configurations
Known as China’s “Fragmented Authoritarianism,” the unique political structure of the
Chinese Party-state has been a focus of extensive research. The governance structure in China is that
of a unified, single Party-state with Party institutions shadowing formal state structures, and a
devolution of power from the center to local actors at various levels.534 Lieberthal’s analysis is the most
recognized description, positing that “authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is
fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform
policies…”535
The fragmented authoritarianism analysis on its prolific progeny describes the Chinese Partystate system as a network of power hierarchies within which administrative and economic decisionmaking authority is allocated. Authority and responsibility in the system are delegated from the central
state downward vertically to provincial and lower levels of government, as well as horizontally between
state ministries with different, often competing, functional responsibilities.536 Each level within this
complex network of administrative state organs is duplicated by a Party organization that operates in
tandem. The Party exercises ultimate control over the entire Party-state system in various ways,
including its control over China’s main armed forces (the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and, more
recently, the People’s Armed Police), its control over the appointment and promotion of Party and
state officials (through the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China), and finally
through party education and discipline (enforced among other organs by the Central Commission of
Discipline Inspection).
Several commentators have relied on the dynamics within China’s fragmented
authoritarianism network to explain the country’s overall economic development. 537 Whether
See generally LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 402 (describing the hierarchical horizontal (territorial) and vertical
(from central level down to localities) levels of authority within the Chinese government).
535 Lieberthal, supra note 41, at 8.
536 Paul Hubbard, ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ and State Ownership, EAST ASIA FORUM (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/01/23/fragmented-authoritarianism-and-state-ownership/.
537 From the 1990s, following the fragmented authoritarianism analysis, a prolific body of literature emerged to explain
how components within China’s Party-state network were incentivized to promote economic growth. For a synopsis of
the wealth of theories, see ANG, supra note 36.
534
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describing these dynamics as the practice of “market-preserving authoritarianism,”538 “Chinese-style
federalism,”539 “experimentation under hierarchy,”540 local governments’ “directed improvisation,”541
or “local states’ corporatism,”542 commentators share the view that since economic reforms began,
sub-national government levels and the state officials appointed on their behalf have become invested
in their local economies as direct economic actors. This shift in the political-economic equilibrium —
the allocation of administrative and economic decision-making power within the Party-state system—
resonated across the entire network and brought counterbalancing measures. It impacted the direct
incentives that different components (organizations and individuals) within the network had to
promote economic growth. The levers that facilitated this shift were primarily administrative: the dualtrack pricing and the fiscal contracting mechanisms, the cadre evaluation system, and management
contract responsibility arrangements, mentioned earlier.543
The same political-economic reasoning, so far applied generally, can explain the rise of firms
and capital market development specifically as well. Bearing responsibility for the economic success
or failure of the enterprises under their administrative and political authority, local government organs
and individuals guaranteed property rights and created the assurances needed to attract investors
during the first decades of economic transition.544 Thus, as seen in Chapter 1, changes in China’s
political-economic equilibrium when economic reforms ensued, enabled locally-developed
governance solutions that have functioned in lieu of the institutions traditionally entrusted with capital
market development (mainly, certain investor protections founded in legal rules).
Further changes in the equilibrium may also affect the incentives of Party-state organs and
individuals to continue to provide these assurances. Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter, the
attempts to reconsolidate economic authority with the central state during the second transition phase
Shuhe Li & Peng Lian, Decentralization and Coordination: China’s Credible Commitment to Preserve the Market under
Authoritarianism, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 161 (1999) (positing that economic decentralization and autonomy for local
governments, on the one hand, and coordination and political control by the center, on the other, operated in tandem.
This promoted competitive market behavior at local levels, while mobilizing resources and institutions by the center to
support the market and the legal system.).
539 See, e.g., Yuanzheng Cao et al., From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style, 7 ECON. TRANSITION 103 (1999)
(observing economic decentralization and local experimentation as elements of federalism, a form of “federalism Chinese
style”); Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis of Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50
(1995).
540 See supra note 35 (providing various sources by Sebastian Heilmann) (Enabling local experimentation under the confines
of hierarchical political control, tensions and political conflicts were avoided, and consensus was built on the main
directions of economic reform.).
541 ANG, supra note 36, at 49-89 (“directed improvisation,” achieved through feedback loops between vague central
command that produced adaptive response at the localities and fed back to the center, was a key in China’s ability to adapt
effectively; market-supporting institutions evolved from local improvisation, while the central leadership empowered (as
opposed to controlled) ground-level actors).
542 Jean C. Oi, The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy, 144 CHINA Q. 1132 (1995) (suggesting that Chinese
local governments operate as a corporate-like group organization. Local officials in each hierarchy manage the enterprises
within their jurisdiction like directors and executives. A meaningful role is reserved to the Party secretary at each level to
overhead operations and assess performance.)
543 See supra notes 40-46 and the discussion of economic decentralization therein.
544 Clarke et al., supra note 44, at 400-422.
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(1992–2007) directly affected ownership structures, firm governance, and the use of the legal system.
In turn, during the last decade, the incentives to promote economic growth and the explicit allocation
of economic (and to some extent even administrative) decision making authority are shifting within
the Party-state system once again. Increasingly, the element within the system that is best incentivized
to push for investment and growth is the Chinese Communist Party itself and its functionaries.545 The
explanatory power of China’s fragmented authoritarianism is therefore very much alive, but the focus
is now changing. Relatedly, the use of functional corporate governance substitutes has not receded
but only shifted away from local governments’ initiatives with central states’ balances, to overt political
governance.

B. Political Equilibrium Shifts Focus
A key premise in the fields of financial economics and corporate governance is that incentives
matter for the behavior of economic actors. If in early reform eras, the organs within the political
structure best incentivized to exercise and guarantee property rights in firms were local governments
and their officials, in later stages this shifted to the central government, which had vested interests in
its emerging national champions and other industrial policies. Efforts were made to reconsolidate
authority regarding the growth of firms and capital market development within the agencies of the
central state. However, in recent years, power tensions and shifts in the interests of the polity, driven
in part by the CCP’s intensifying legitimacy crisis, have caused the Party to assert economic (as well as
administrative and social) control more directly and transparently over firms and the market.
As a unitary political leadership body, the central Chinese Communist Party organization
strongly pronounces its commitment to economic growth.546 Beyond the rhetoric, many observers of
China believe that the legitimacy of the Communist Party rule in China today hangs on its ability to
sustain economic growth.547 Economic growth has become the main basis for the Party’s legitimacy,
I address the notion of separation between the Party and the State below.
The Communist Party Constitution specifically lists economic development as a central task of the Party and “all other
work of the Party subordinate to and serve this task.” Modernization and bringing the per-capita GDP to levels of
“moderately developed economies” are also mentioned as strategic objectives. See Zhonggua Gongchandang Zhangcheng
(中国共产党章程) [The Constitution of The Communist Party of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l Cong. of the
Communist Party of China, Oct. 24, 2017), Preamble [hereinafter The CCP Constitution], available at
http://www.pkulaw.cn/. More generally, see Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 404.
547 See, e.g., Zachary Keck, Chinese Elites: The Real Threat to the Communist Party,
DIPLOMAT (Jan 28, 2014),
https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinese-elites-the-real-threat-to-the-communist-party/ (emphasizing the challenge in
rebalancing the economy while maintaining benefits for the political elite); David Shambaugh, The Coming Chinese Crackup,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 6, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198
(pointing to China’s economic “systemic traps” and Xi’s reform efforts as one of the indicators to the regimes vulnerability
and instability); Joshua Stowell, An Economic Downturn in China is the Greatest Threat to Chinese Domestic Security—How Long
Can the Social Contract in China Endure?, GLOBAL SECURITY REV. (May 28, 2018) https://globalsecurityreview.com/degreechinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/; https://globalsecurityreview.com/threats-legitimacy-power-chinesecommunist-party/ (viewing “sustained economic growth” as a new mandate of heaven).
545
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on the one hand, and one of the main threats to its political unity and hold on power, on the other.
The Party has direct interests in keeping employment and production levels high, building strong
global champions, and preserving high state assets’ value. Additionally, the success of China’s firms,
particularly its state-controlled firms, helps maintain the Party’s legitimacy both domestically and
abroad.548 On top of that, increasing social gaps and the prominence of lavish crony capitalists among
its members, many of them linked to corruption, generate social criticism and reduce the usefulness
of ideology as an instrument of control,549 posing further legitimacy threats. Finally, in addition to
these general legitimacy concerns, the ability of the CCP to exert control over the state’s administrative
system and the individuals operating it is weakening as their economic incentive to defy unitary
discipline increases.550 The consequences of the prior three decades of devolution in administrative
and economic authority in the service of economic development still loom large551 and destabilize the
central Party-state organization.552
Bearing these complex realities in mind, the Party’s incentives to promote growth while closely
supervising and even restraining the power accumulated by components within its own system,
particularly at local levels, becomes clear. 553 Its control over firms and the financial system is a tool
that checks all the boxes toward this goal. Intensifying its grip over firms and the capital market can
ease the legitimacy concerns, facilitate monitoring and restraining potential political rivals, allow a
controlled-growth process around preferred industrial policies, and showcase the merits (or soft power)
of the Party-state system domestically and internationally.
This also explains the shift in equilibrium whereby the Party’s recent reassessment of its role
comes at the expense of state institutions. The power of central state administrative institutions—
See generally China Goes Global, 9 INT’L J. EMERGING MARKETS 162 (2014); Joshua Stowell, Global Shifts in Geopolitical
Trends, GLOBAL SECURITY REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://globalsecurityreview.com/global-shifts-geopolitical-trends/.
549 Lieberthal, supra note 41.
550 Andrew G. Walder, The Quiet Revolution from Within: Economic Reform as a Source of Political Decline, in THE WANING OF
THE COMMUNIST STATE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF POLITICAL DECLINE IN CHINA AND HUNGARY 1 (Andrew G. Walder
ed., 2004) (arguing for political decay in the Party-state system attributed to economic reforms).
551 Andrew Peaple, Think Local When It Comes to China’s Debt, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018, 10:25 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/think-local-when-it-comes-to-chinas-debt-11546269929?mod=wsj_harvard2. For local
protectionism, see Houze Song, Provincial Snapshot—Liaoning: The Smothering Effects of Local Protectionism, MACROPOLO, (Mar.
6, 2018),
https://macropolo.org/provincial-snapshot-liaoning-smothering-effects-local-protectionism/ (on the
connection between protectionism, local-government champions, and competition in Liaoning Automakers industry).
552 See supra notes 40-46 and the discussion of economic decentralization therein.
553 Following popular criticism against dubious investment activity by privately held Chinese companies abroad, Xi Jinping
declared financial stability to be a matter of national security. While this can be cynically viewed as an excuse to simply
exert control over private actors, this step seems motivated, at least partially, by a genuine concern for financial stability—
protecting public investors in highly leveraged firms operating dubious investments abroad and responding to the mass
protests against them. Minxin Pei, Xi Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles Gathers Pace—Beijing Will Pass off a Politically Motivated
Purge as Though Regulatory Enforcement, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/19810ea2-5814-11e780b6-9bfa4c1f83d2. See also Lucy Hornby, Chinese Crackdown on Dealmakers Reflects Xi Power Play, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/ed900da6-769b-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691. (“The regulators’ argument that shadow
banking posed a national risk found an unlikely ally in China’s security apparatus. Ordinary people who had lost money in
high-interest products have taken to the streets in every province over the past few years. Nothing captured the interest
of the Communist party like a mass protest.”).
548
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such as SASAC, the CSRC, and state anti-corruption enforcement agencies—seems to be declining,
while the CCP’s involvement in various aspects of corporate governance is increasing. In the last
decade, the CCP has been the institution that provides assurances to investors. It does so through its
own functional substitutes for conventional monitoring and accountability. The new politicized
corporate governance system, explained below, is also somewhat less opaque and signals the Party’s
commitment to growth to the different constituents in the capital market. Given these circumstances,
a degree of alignment of interests between the Party and corporate stakeholders, even public investors,
is forming.554
The CCP’s commitment to growth and its incentives to take a more direct role with respect
to firms does not necessarily mean that it now has an interest in promoting changes that benefit
investors specifically, but it is a possibility.555 This idea is certainly counter-intuitive. First, it may be
taken to suggest that individuals within the Party suddenly prioritize the “greater good” and will forgo
opportunities to enrich themselves for the sake of developing more efficient, deeper capital markets.
Second, it suggests that the Party can overcome the self-capture that inhibited the state in this area
and thus also implies that the Party and the state are distinct.
Indeed, many individuals within the political apparatus have personally enjoyed private
benefits from their clout or direct control of publicly listed firms556 through rent extraction, asset
tunneling, self-dealing, and other corporate malfeasance. A path-dependent corporate control in China
is certainly established on strong interest groups politics within the controlling apparatus. 557
Incumbent controllers have both the incentives and the power, through direct and indirect political
authority, to reject true reforms that could reduce their opportunities to extract rents and/or private
benefits of control.558 This almost impels us to assume that the controlling apparatus would reject
Mary Gallagher uses the expression “alliance of convenience” to describe the convergence of interests between the
central government and workers in China. See MARY GALLAGHER, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA: LAW, WORKERS,
AND THE STATE 6 (2017). Here, I suggest a similar alliance is forming between the CCP and capital markets investors.
While as pointed out by Prof. Gallagher, the alliance of the central government with workers has supported the
mobilization of workers and their empowerment to enforce their own rights, in the capital market sphere a similar
alignment seems so far to only shift the mandate of power from state institutions to the Party. Private individuals are still
excluded from fully utilizing their rights. See the discussion on coalition-building shareholder monitoring supra Chapter 2 pp.
59-61.
555 Victor Nee & Peng Lian, Sleeping with the Enemy: A Dynamic Model of Declining Political Commitment in State Socialism, 23
THEORY & SOC’Y 253, 273 (1994) (“analysts need to pay attention to the organizational health of the communist party”)
(attempting to explain why communist rule initiates reform, suggesting that the increase in opportunism and decline in
commitment to the party threatens the political organization).
556 Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-owned Enterprises), CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Winter 2011, available at https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-midterm-jockeying-gearing2012-part-4-top-leaders-major-state-owned-enterprises (tracking the top leaders of some major 130 companies in China,
their demographic background, the fortune of their businesses, and their career path in both business and government).
557 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 128 (depicting a role for interest groups politics as one of many causes of path dependence).
558 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) (suggesting a theory on the resistance of the established economic and political elite to growthpromoting reforms); Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth
Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (for a similar interest groups theory in the financial market development context, in
which incumbents oppose development reforms since these would breed internal competition); Lucian Bebchuk, A Rent554
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reforms that would reduce its ability to extract value. 559 Nonetheless, while these individuals might
not be motivated nor deterred by state legal institutions, they are certainly concerned about their
political future. Since the Party organization is now creating substantial pressures to adopt marketgrowth approaches, and political advancement is aligned with growth and greater efficiency goals, as
is increasingly the case, 560 then compliance with this Party-led reform is simply a way to protect their
vested interests.
Of course, and as the term “the Party-state” reflects, separating the Chinese state from the
CCP is artificial in many respects. Many of the positions in the government overlap with positions
within the Party, and the Party directs and controls the administrative system in many ways. However,
while 95 percent of civil servants in China (county level and above) are CCP members, there are many
more Party members who do not serve as government officials.561 There are millions of members that
at least theoretically (and perhaps superficially) are concerned with the political stability of the regime,
but detached from the state’s interests. More importantly, while the overlap between the Party and the
state is certainly present for senior positions, it does not feature as strongly among lower-level officials
and party members. This means that while the interests of the central state and the Party align to a
great deal, the conflicts of interests between central and local governments create a de-facto distinction
between what is formally viewed as the state but is really mainly local governments, and the Party
organization. At the individual level, this can create a sense of solidarity or submission to the Partystate, even with a sense of alienation from the government (local). Party-line education contributes to
this. This misalignment may explain why individuals could be incentivized to cooperate with the goals
advanced through the Party organization, while not being equally cooperative with goals promoted
through the state’s administrative hierarchy.
More concretely, it is the Party organization, rather than the state, that controls the
appointment and promotion of individuals in the Party-state system. Through its Organization
Department, the Party organization at each level of the state’s hierarchy, including in corporatized
SOEs, directs the careers, and therefore the reputation and economic prosperity, of the individuals in
the system. Added to that are the coercive methods of the Party that induce accountability through
Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999) (for a
theory of rent protection influences on corporate ownership and control).
559 Jinglian Wu, China’s Economic Reform: Past, Present and Future, 1 PERSPECTIVES 5 (2000) (arguing that the vested interests
of political and social elite in the old system lead them to hinder reform and restructuring).
560 See Alex Bryson et al., How Much Influence Does the Chinese State Have over CEOs and Their Compensation?, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION 1 (Jaime Ortega ed., 2014) (finding that the State’s influence extends beyond SOEs
into many privately-owned firms and that incentive schemes are typical in these firms and include contracts linking CEO
pay directly to firm performance); Canan C. Mutlu et.al., Corporate Governance in China: A Meta-Analysis, 55 J. MGMT. STUD.
943 (2018) (arguing that the quality of monitoring in state-owned corporations became more strongly related to firm
performance).
561 About 6.45 percent of the overall population in China are members of the Chinese Communist Party, about 90 million
people in 2016. See Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Members as a Share of the Chinese Population from 2007 to 2017, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/250090/share-of-chinese-communist-party-ccp-members-in-chinese-population/
(last visited May 23, 2019).
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discipline and fear governance. All these factors together make the Party organization stand out from
state institutions and perhaps induce firms and their control parties to submit more easily to goals,
growth performance or others, when these are advanced by the Party organization directly.

II. THE POLITICIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE — LEVERS OF CCP’S POLITICAL
GOVERNANCE IN FIRMS
It is a commonplace to criticize China’s political involvement in firms and the capital market.
This dovetails with the common expectations for China’s future convergence with more marketoriented governance standards. Instead, in recent years, China offers a complete deviation from these
orthodox views towards further politicization of corporate governance. Especially since Xi Jinping
rose to power, political involvement in corporate governance has been extended far beyond any scope
seen since the economic transition began. This political involvement has passed beyond the “normal”
overarching shadow control that the CCP has in the economy, beyond its influence over corporate
stakeholders (managers and employees), and even beyond the puppeteering of managerial
appointments in large state-controlled firms. An absorption (or even a takeover) of internal corporate
governing bodies by CCP institutions and a similar replacement of external market monitoring by the
Party’s disciplinary enforcement is now under way and already reflected in law. In these recent
developments, the Party has claimed a mandate over corporate decision making much more directly
and transparently. In this environment, the corporate form and the legal system itself are ever more
easily harnessed to advance the Party-state’s agendas, whether these are national industrial policy goals,
social and ideological targets, or sustainable economic growth.

A. The CCP’s Intra-Firm Governance Capacity: Personnel Management & Party Committees
The Party has ready tools at the firm level to monitor and steer corporate control parties. Its
ability to intervene in corporate decision making is nestled in the Party’s institutionalized intra-firm
presence, as well as in its control over corporate management. Both routes have recently been
formalized and broadened.

1. CCP Control Over Management
Authority over the management of personnel in the Party-state system was always one of the
main mechanisms that guaranteed the CCP’s central control over the state apparatus and society at
large. This includes authority over the appointment, promotion, transfer, and removal of leadership
115
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positions throughout the Party-state system. The CCP’s control over the Party and state apparatus
thus extends from the center through provincial organizations and down to the level of deputy bureau
chiefs in the counties. The main facilitators of this management control are the nomenklatura system,
conducted by the CCP Central Organization Department and its local branches, 562 and the cadre
evaluation system, conducted by the administrative bureaucracy and directed by the party
organization.563 Both of these personnel management mechanisms apply with respect to leadership
positions in state-owned holding companies and their state-controlled subsidiaries as well, including
some of their listed subsidiaries, whether they are traded domestically or off-shore.
The nomenklatura system has roots in Soviet communism. It prescribes a list of Party and
state positions and the closed group of elite political members that can potentially be appointed to fill
these positions. The list details positions that are directly appointed by the CCP Organization
Departments (the Organization Department of the Central Committee and the Party Committee
Organization Department within SASAC), as well as those that can be appointed, dismissed, or
transferred by other state bodies but with the Party’s prior approval.564 With respect to state-controlled
firms, the list not only includes the potential appointees for the positions of party secretary and deputy
secretary assigned at the top of the enterprise’s Party committee, but also the potential appointees for
senior managerial positions in these firms, including the chairman of the board and president, the
CEO, and in some firms also other senior positions, such as the chief financial officer and chief legal
counsel.565 The appointment of the CEO in (at least) the largest fifty-three corporatized SOEs is566
vested with Party organs despite the formal prescriptions in the Company Law and the SOE Assets
Law that assign such authority to the firm’s internal governance bodies (the board of directors or
SASAC, respectively).567 This appointment process explains why the general managers of some of the
John P. Burns, Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura, 138 CHINA Q. 458 (1994).
Ganbu Kaohe Zhidu (干部考核制度), commonly referred to as the “cadre evaluation system,” “cadre responsibility
system,” “personnel appointment and evaluation system,” “target responsibility system,” and more. See Zhen Wang, Who
Gets Promoted and Why? Understanding Power and Persuasion in China’s Cadre Evaluation System, (unpublished
manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, October 11-13 2013, New
Brunswick, New Jersey), available at https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2013conference/Papers/Zhen%20Wang.pdf.
564 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?, 211 CHINA Q. 624, 633 (2012).
565 Feng Liu & Linlin Zhang, Executive Turnover in China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Government-Oriented or Market-Oriented?, 11
CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 129 (2018). (The authors, however, find that executive turnover changes according to the level of
direct ownership and control by the government. The reliance on bureaucratic and political appointment is weaker in firms
with indirect state ownership, for which open recruitment is a growing trend.). See also Burns, supra note 562, at 468, 474491 (providing a full list of all economic enterprises).
566 Kjeld
Erik Brødsgaard, Can China Keep Controlling It’s SOEs?, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/can-china-keep-controlling-its-soes/.
567 See Brødsgaard, supra note 564, at 639 (providing details from interviews on how the process of CEO selection and
appointment is done in practice and the negotiations between the CCP Organization Department, SASAC, and the board).
See also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 737-743 (for how this differs from more conventional corporate appointment
rights and procedures). For a recent example of the allocation of nomination and appointment authorities of general
managers between SASAC and the board, see yangqi Zongjingli you Guoziwei renming gaiwei timing renming quanjiao Dongshihui
[The General Manager of the Central Enterprise Was Appointed by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
to
Be
Nominated
to
the
Board
of
Directors],
CHINA
ECON.
DAILY
(Jan
22,
2018),
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201801/22/t20180122_27848290.shtml (loose title translation).
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corporatized SOEs enjoy political clout and administrative status that is equivalent to that of a minister
(or vice minister) or of a provincial governor in the state’s bureaucracy.568
The cadre evaluation system has a more contemporary origin. It was created in the late 1970s
and early 1980s to rebuild China’s shattered bureaucracy after Mao’s era and was one of the
fundamental elements of reforms in China’s administrative system. The cadre evaluation system is
used to evaluate party leaders and cadres in leading positions at local levels of the government.569 It is
based on performance criteria, which are set by the CCP Organization Department and applied by the
immediate superior level of the relevant party or government units.570 The results of the evaluation
guide the decisions about officials’ appointment, promotion, transfer, and removal, and thus directly
affect their career trajectories.
This management control system also impacts the behavior of corporate control parties and
other insiders. Howson notes how “the real powers behind the firm are not monitored by the
shareholder at all, but instead by a separate and superior Party organization.” 571 Some of the
implications of this political governance system extend even to firms without any state ownership. It
operates mainly at two levels.
First, the performance of enterprises is inspected as an evaluation criterion. Overall economic
development and firm performance are measured by revenue growth, total profits, operating profits,
investments in technological innovation, environmental protection, legal disputes (for fear of social
unrest), and more. These are taken as factors in the assessment of both officials assigned to monitor
enterprises572 and agents appointed to manage state-controlled firms.573 This incentivizes local Partystate officials and managers to seek good economic results, motivates them to monitor against (or
avoid getting involved in) fraud and embezzlement, and discourages other corporate scandals that may

Brødsgaard, supra note 564, at pp. 624-648.
Prior to the introduction of the cadre evaluation system, Party and state officials were appointed and promoted based
on loyalty to Party leaders and other political considerations.
570 For a description of the system’s mechanics, see ANG, supra note 36, at 110 (“Through the cadre evaluation system, each
level of government designs a report card for leaders (party secretary and state chiefs) at the next lower level. Each year,
the higher level issues an internal formal document, typically restricted from public view, which specifies a list of targets
that subordinated leaders are expected to deliver in that particular year. Points are assigned to each target, usually totaling
one hundred points. To set up competitive pressures, local leaders are ranked relative to their peers annually.”).
571 Howson, supra note 278, at 143.
572 See Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法) [Interim
Measures for Remuneration Management for Central State-Owned Enterprise Executives] (promulgated by the StateOwned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the St. Council, May 13, 2003), available at
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477199/content.html; Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe zhanxin Banfa
(中央企业负责人经营考核暂行办法) [Interim Procedures on the Evaluation of the Financial Performance of Central
SOE Leaders] (promulgated by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the St. Council, Dec. 28
2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-01/22/content_1517096.htm.
573 Yubo Li et al., A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China’s Listed Companies, 6 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 211 (2013)
(examining executive compensation contracts in Chinese listed firms, including a description of evaluation measures for
executive performance in government-controlled listed firms).
568
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lead to social unrest. By implication, to some degree this also deters against stakeholder abuse that
could result in litigation, environmental scandals, and labor disputes.
Second, there is a substantial overlap between China’s business elite and its political elite, and
the career advancement trajectories in both are highly interconnected.574 SOE executives who have
become local government and party leaders are a sizable and increasing group.575 In turn, experience
in provincial government is a primary stepping stone to central party leadership,576 to which many of
these individuals aspire.577 In a sense, China’s rising crony-capitalism as it is embedded in its unique
governance structure means that corporate conduct, firm performance, and the political trajectory of
its elite are interdependent.578 This is true even for managers who are not currently subject to the cadre
evaluation system directly but have ambitions to enter the Party-state system. These incentives are
therefore relevant to corporate insiders regardless of the existence of any type of state-ownership in
the firm.579 Viewed somewhat optimistically, this element in China’s political-economy can incentivize
corporate control parties and insiders to perform better and even to increase productivity and firm
value.580
The CCP’s personnel management system is thus a political institution with monitoring and
incentivizing corporate governance functions. 581 It operates outside any mechanisms provided by
traditional corporate governance institutions or framework established in law. This Party system is
also far more centralized than the formal state system behind which it stands.

Bruce Dickinson’s book discusses the incorporation of China’s capitalists into the political system (terming this “cronycommunism”). BRUCE DICKINSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S PRIVATE
SECTOR (2008).
575 Brødsgaard, supra note 564, at 639-641 (pointing to the representation of industrial business groups in the CCP Central
Committee, and tracing eighteen corporate leaders who were appointed to high-rank government positions).
576 Cheng Li & Lucy Xu, The Rise of State-Owned Enterprise Executives in China’s Provincial Leadership, BROOKINGS (Feb. 22,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-rise-of-state-owned-enterprise-executives-in-chinas-provincialleadership/ (noting that provincial governors and party secretaries appointed following their leadership roles in SOEs
comprise sixteen percent (10 out of 62) of all provincial-level leaders, which demonstrates a rapid growth in this group
during Xi’s regime). Within the 18th Central Committee, seventy-six percent of Politburo members served previously as
provincial chiefs.)
577 See, e.g., Hongbin Li, et al., Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence from Urban Chinese Twins, 117 ECON.
J. 1504 (2007) (examining economic return of party membership).
578 Li & Xu, supra note 576. For a specific application of this in the energy sector, see Liou & Tsai, supra note 400.
579 Bryson et al., supra note 560 (finding that government involvement in the appointment of senior management extends
beyond state-owned firms into privately owned firms and across all industrial sectors).
580 Jerry Cao et al., Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship between Pay and Performance, MGMT. SCI., May 2018,
available
at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324958863_Political_Promotion_CEO_Incentives_and_the_Relationship_B
etween_Pay_and_Performance (finding that the likelihood of CEOs in Chinese SOEs to receive political promotion is
positively related to firm performance and that CEOs with higher likelihoods of political promotion have lower pay levels,
and concluding that political career concerns substitute for monetary incentives).
581 Downs and Meidan suggest that part of the motivation behind the reshuffling of top executives in the national oil
industry by the CCP in 2011 was to improve corporate governance in these firms. Erica Downs & Michal Meidan, Business
and Politics in China: The Oil Executive Reshuffle of 2011, CHINA SECURITY, 2011, at 3.
574

118

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

Having emphasized the corporate monitoring and incentivizing functions of China’s political
governance, some limits should be recognized. First, with respect to incentivizing officials tasked with
supervising firms, the portrayal of China’s SOE corporatization process and further organizational
reforms under SASAC exposed the weaknesses in monitoring by the state in its shareholding capacity.
This suggests that China’s personnel management system currently in place is not as effective at
discouraging corporate wrongdoing as it is with more explicit performance evaluation criteria. For
example, the system is successful at making local governments pursue research and development
opportunities for their region or bring their GDP figures up, but not as much at promoting good
corporate governance practices. One explanation could be that the personnel management system
mobilizes officials to monitor firms in their region only within the narrow confines of its defined
evaluation criteria. Corporate value maximization or production efficiency are not specifically
enumerated but rather are ancillary to other targets.
Second, with respect to incentivizing corporate insiders tasked with managing, to the extent
that the personnel management system is effective in governing the conduct of corporate insiders, it
does not necessarily follow that the direction pursued is toward firm value. It can instead direct
managers to pursue proxies of success (e.g., growing bigger not better), avoid risks at all costs, or even
toward fraudulent reporting. Additionally, other political concerns are tunneled through this system
and influence business decisions.582 The managers, aspiring for careers in the Party-state system, will
opt for business decisions that they believe serve the Party-state’s goals in each context.583
Thus, the personnel management system functionally substitutes for traditional corporate
governance to a degree. It does so mainly by an overall push for firms and insiders to be profitable
and invest in innovation, as well as by deterring against undesirable conducts. However, in order to
fully induce monitoring and incentives that lead specifically to greater operational efficiency or firm
value maximization, these would have to be expressly advocated through the system as specific criteria
by which officials and corporate control parties are assessed. While these specific goals are certainly
not at the top of the CCP priority list, there is some indication for their stronger advancement recently.
Judging by the Party-state leadership’s rhetoric, the Party’s policy emphasis is moving in this
direction. In October 2016, a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee with several leading SOE
leaders was dedicated to the subject of “building the role of the Party within SOEs.” In this meeting,
President Xi stated that SOEs should become important forces in implementing CCP decisions and
enhancing China’s national power. Beyond this, Xi stressed that the development of SOEs—including
specifically, improved corporate profitability, competitiveness, and preserving or increasing the value
of state assets—should become a criterion in evaluating the performance of Party organizations. Xi
also called to better define the Party’s power and responsibilities with respect to SOEs’ decisionSee Bryson et al., supra note 560 (also finding that where the government is involved in the appointment of senior level
managers, whether in state-owned or privately owned firms, managers have less decision making autonomy).
583 For further discussion on these “agency-costs”-type concerns, see supra Chapter 2, Section II.A.
582
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making and supervision against corruption, embezzlement and other corporate malpractice.584 The
release of the SOE Reform Guiding Opinions 585 and more recently the PRC Supervision Law 586
repackage these goals in a legal framework by giving the party-organization specific governance
capacities with respect to firms, as both a distinct internal corporate stakeholder and an external
disciplinary and accountability institution.587

2. Formal Stakeholder Capacity: Corporate Party Committees
The Party’s presence in firms is felt through its involvement with various stakeholders in the
firm, such as trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and other mass groups and organizations
formed within the corporate structure. 588 Yet the Party also has a distinct corporate stakeholder
capacity of its own, which facilitates the performance of the Party’s monitoring functions and other
goals. This capacity is addressed by several articles in the Constitution of the CCP.
Article 29 stipulates that a primary Party Organization (also known as the Party Committee)
will be formed in every enterprise, whether state or privately owned, where there are at least three full
members of the Party. Article 31 grants this intra-firm political institution a designated monitoring
role: to make sure that “Party and non-Party cadres strictly observe the law and administrative
discipline and the financial and economic statutes and personnel regulations of the state and that none
of them infringe on the interests of the state, the collective or the masses.”
Article 32 further stipulates: For public-sector firms: “In a state-owned or collective enterprise,
the primary Party organization acts as the political nucleus and works for the operation of the
enterprise. The primary Party organization guarantees and oversees the implementation of the principles
and policies of the Party and the state in its own enterprise and backs the meeting of shareholders, board of
directors, board of supervisors and manager (factory director) in the exercise of their functions and powers
according to law. … and participates in making final decisions on major questions in the enterprise.]” For
private-sector firms: “In a non-public economic institution, the primary Party organization carries out
the Party's principles and policies, provides guidance to and oversees the enterprise in observing the laws
and regulations of the state, exercises leadership over the trade union, the Communist Youth League

Xi Stresses CPC Leadership of State-Owned Enterprises, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2016, 11:25 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/12/content_27035822.htm.
585 Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Guoyou Qiye Gaige de Zhidao Yijian (中共中央、国务院关
于深化国有企业改革的指导意见) [CPC Central Committee and State Council Opinion on Deepening the Guidance
of State-Owned Enterprise Reform] (Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter “SOE Reform Guiding Opinions,” or “Guiding
Opinions”],
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/
content_2930440.htm.
586 See infra note 654.
587 I elaborate on the external disciplining and accountability functions of Party governance below.
588 For the relationship between trade unions and the CCP, see supra Chapter 2, p. 75.
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organization and other mass organizations, rallies the workers and office staff around it, safeguards
the legitimate rights and interests of all quarters and stimulates the healthy development of the enterprise.”589
At the top of this intra-firm Party organization, the Party appoints a party secretary and deputy
secretary as the senior political leadership roles within the firm. In many corporatized SOEs, the role
of the party secretary often conflates with other senior corporate positions, such as the chairman of
the board of directors or the firm’s general manager.590
In addition to these constitutional provisions, the PRC Company Law prescribes a role for a
Party Committee in any PRC-domiciled company591 and thus gives a legal basis for Party involvement
at the firm level if the Party so chooses. This makes clear that a political presence in firms is not new.592
A stakeholder capacity was long established by the CCP Constitution and was included in the PRC
Company Law at least since its 2005 revision.593 Under this legal framework, however, the functions
of the Party committee were undisclosed. Its relation to the formal corporate governance structure
was opaque,594 and it was not deployed systematically beyond several meaningful state-controlled firms.
Recently, the requirement to establish an intra-firm Party organization was reaffirmed as
statutory, and the CCP and the State Council jointly issued a “guidance” clarifying the operations of
this political institution. 595 Despite its somewhat misleading title, this guidance is an obligatory
document that applies to all SOEs,596 which in this context are enterprises with state assets, including
wholly state-owned firms and state-controlled firms, and also firms in which the state is a minority
shareholder. Indeed, the Guiding Opinions make clear that establishing a Party organization and
carrying out Party work is a prerequisite for enterprises with mixed ownership. 597 The corporate
governance roles of the Party organization explicated by this document extend far beyond political
The CCP Constitution, supra note 546, art. 32 (italics added).
On the overlap between Party elite and business elite, see Downs & Meidan, supra note 581; Li, supra note 556.
591 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, art. 19 (“The Chinese Communist Party may, according to the Constitution of the
Chinese Communist Party, establish its branches in companies to carry out activities of the Chinese Communist Party.
The company shall provide necessary conditions to facilitate the activities of the Party.”).
592 This is the case even with respect to private businesses as well. In 1999, three percent of private businesses had a
designated party organization. In 2012, the number reached thirteen percent. At the time, Zhejiang province declared that
all private firms with more than eighty employees had established a Party organization. See How the Communist Party is Trying
to Expand its Influence in the Private Sector, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2012) p. 43, (printed edition).
593 Article 19 of the Company Law remained the same throughout the law’s revisions. 2005 Company Law, supra note 147.
The article has roots in the 1993 Company Law, in which Article 17 states: “The grass roots organizations of the
Communist Party of China in a company shall carry out their activities according to the Constitution of the Communist
Party of China.” 1993 Company Law, supra note 66, art. 17. Note that intra-firm Party organization, however, was not
included in the earlier 1992 Normative Opinions. See 1992 Normative Opinions, supra note 59.
594 Howson, supra note 278, at 140-141 (extrapolating some details on the existence and operation of a Party Committee
in China’s Bank of Communication from a media interview with the bank’s chairman).
595 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585. For example, article 1 states: “the Party organizations of SOEs shall
enjoy a more solid statutory position in corporate governance, and fully display their core political role...”.
596 The title of the SOE Reform Guiding Opinions is misleading in another way. The State Council and the CCP issued
these opinions. Thus, where the document stands as a source of formal law is somewhat unclear. However, whether it is
viewed as an administrative regulation or a Party decree, its mandatory application as a normative document is
unquestionable. For a review of sources of positive law in China, see Keller, supra note 136.
597 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 7(24).
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and social responsibilities that would perhaps be expected for a body of this nature. They encompass
a direct and now explicit role in corporate monitoring and decision making, specifically addressing the
need to raise operational efficiency through the Party organization among other goals. (As an anecdote,
the Guiding Opinions mention operational efficiency fourteen times. Party ideology is mentioned two
times, education two times, and corruption five times.)
3. The Party Organization Internal Corporate Governance Functions—Recent Developments
The SOE Reform Guiding Opinions are full of what most Western observers would view as
complete contradictions. The document claims to resolve some of the most acute problems in the
management of SOEs and remove “institutional obstacles,” and identifies economic development as
its central task. Its rhetoric emphasizes corporate autonomy and market-led governance in SOEs.598
Yet one of the main mechanisms to achieve this, according to the Guiding Opinions, is to enhance
Party leadership over SOEs.599 Thus, while the autonomy of internal corporate governance bodies is
repeatedly emphasized,600 at the same time so is the utter lack of independence of these bodies from
the Party’s intra-firm institution — the Party committee.
This political dependence is grounded on three paths:
1) an openly-declared and legitimized authority granted to the Party organization with respect
to personnel management, including recommending, assessing, and nominating candidates for leading
corporate positions (directors and managers);601
Section 1, Article (2) Basic Principles states the goal: “to promote SOEs to become independent market players in the
true sense where they engage in autonomous operations, make profits and assume losses independently, bear risks on their
own, practice self-discipline and pursue self-development pursuant to the law.” Article (3) Main Objectives states: “to finetune the market-oriented mechanisms featuring the survival of the fittest under which SOEs engage in autonomous and
flexible business operations, and promote and demote internal management personnel, employ and let go staff members,
and increase and cut remunerations according to market practices.” Id. arts. 2-3.
599 This appears as part of Section 1, Article (1) Guiding Thoughts, SOE Reform Guiding Opinions. Id. art. 1.
600 Article (8) states: “give full play to the decision-making role of the board of directors, the supervisory role of the board
of supervisors, the operation and management role of the management, and the core political role of the Party organization
of a SOE, and effectively resolve the phenomenon where the boards of directors of certain enterprises exist only in name
and decisions are solely made by top leaders, so as to achieve standardized corporate governance. In addition, it is vital to
effectively enforce and safeguard the lawful exercise of the rights to make material decisions, select and appoint personnel,
distribute remunerations, etc. by the board of directors, and guarantee the operational autonomy of the management. No
government department and agency may intervene unless authorized by law.” Id. art. 8.
601 This authority is scattered along the provisions. Here are a few apt examples: Article (9): “It is important to combine
the principle of Party management of cadres with the requirements that the board of directors of a SOE shall be selected
pursuant to the law, that the board of directors shall select persons in charge of operations and management in accordance
with the law, … Superior Party organizations and State-owned assets regulatory authorities shall strengthen the
management of SOE leaders according to their respective scope of management, broaden the channels for personnel
recommendation, assess and nominate candidates in accordance with applicable provisions, and go through selection and
appointment procedures strictly as required.” Article (25): “reinforce the responsibilities of the Party organization of an
enterprise in the selection and appointment, training and education, management and supervision of the enterprise's
leaders, support the board of directors to select persons in charge of operations and management.” See id. at arts. 9, 25.
598
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2) encouraging cross-representation of board members and supervisory committee members
with members of the firm’s Party committee,602 and setting a formal assimilation of the position of the
chairman of the board with that of the Party secretary as the default.603
3) setting the explicit capacity of the Party organization as one of the firm’s internal governing
bodies, with the authority to oversee, audit, and assess major corporate decisions.604
What is clear from this is the Party’s utilization of the corporate legal form itself and the legal
system more generally. Corporatized SOEs are viewed not only as a ready venue through which Party
leadership can be disseminated (upon different corporate stakeholders such as workers, investors, and
consumers), 605 but also as a legal vehicle through which the Party now legitimizes its economic
involvement in firms. From a practical point of view, now that the Party’s corporate clout has been
openly established, any legal requirement that procedural decision making will follow the law only
emphasizes the weakening of traditional corporate governing bodies. Thus, the Party has practically
hijacked corporate governance in these firms, and it has done so with the help of the legal system.
Other institutional measures to sidestep traditional corporate governance bodies have been
taken in the past, particularly through the SOE Assets Law. 606 Yet the Guiding Opinions offer
something significantly different. The Guiding Opinions practically import the Party’s personnel
management system (nomenklatura appointments and cadre evaluations) formally into corporate
governance. 607 Moreover, the scope of involvement in internal governance that was authorized by
Similar promotion of cross-representation and assimilation of political and corporate roles existed previously only with
respect to central enterprises under SASAC. It was internally promoted by the Organization Department and Party
Committee within SASAC and thus not part of the SOEs Assets Law or a formal SASAC administrative regulation. See
602

Guanyu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Zhongyang Qiyedang Jian Gongzuo de Yijian (关于加强和改进中央企业党建工作的意见)
[Opinions of the Organization Department and Party Committee of SASAC Concerning Strengthening and Improving
the Party Construction Work in the Central Enterprises] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t Communist Party of China &
Party Comm. SASAC, Oct. 31, 2004), §2 art. 5, available at here.
603 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 24 (“uphold and improve the leadership framework featuring twoway access and cross-representation, allow members of a SOE’s Party organization leadership…to be included in the
board of directors, the board of supervisors or the management … and, engineer an appropriate cross-representation
between members of the management of a SOE and those of its Party organization leadership. In principle, a SOE shall
set the position of the chairman of the board of directors separately from the position of the general manager, and its
Party secretary and chairman of the board of directors shall generally be served by the same person.”).
604 Id. arts. 21, 23, 24. This alone can naturally lead risk-averse corporate managers to at least consult with the Party
organization before making any corporate decision that might be considered meaningful.
605 See id. art. 2 (Basic Principles) (“The Party's leadership over SOEs shall be upheld. This is the political direction and
principle that must be held fast to in deepening SOE reform. It is critical to enforce the guidelines of comprehensively
tightening Party discipline, give full play to the core political role of the Party organizations of enterprises, build up the
leadership teams of enterprises, innovate grass-roots Party building work, carry out the campaign to build clean Party
governance in an in-depth manner, continue to wholeheartedly rely on the working class, and safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of workers...”).
606 See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 31, at 743-744 (referring to SASAC “super control rights” granted by the SOE Assets
Law beyond any control rights SASAC otherwise has as a shareholder based on the Company Law).
607 It should be noted that the level of intervention as well as the criteria for performance assessment vary according to
the industry in which the business operates and not according to the level of state shareholding. For SOEs belonging to
“major industries and key fields concerning national security or national economic lifeline,” performance evaluation criteria
include various national interests. For enterprises outside these key fields but still with state shareholding and even a
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the SOE Assets Law was far narrower than what is now covered under the Guiding Opinions and
entrusted to the Party committee.608 Furthermore, these two normative documents advance different
interests. The SOE Assets Law is focused on enabling state involvement mainly in decisions that can
have an impact on the value of state assets. In contrast, the Guiding Opinions advance Party-state
interests more broadly, encompassing industrial policy goals, social and ideological targets, and
sustainable economic growth.
Most importantly, the organ authorized to engage in corporate governance is different as well.
The SOE Assets Law regulates the state’s capacity as a shareholder. Thus, the added authority that the
law assigns to the state in corporate decision making609 is confined to its shareholding capacity and
exercised formally through the shareholders’ assembly following defined corporate procedures, and
therefore subject to potential scrutiny. 610 The Guiding Opinions, on the other hand, legalize the
omnipresent authority of the Party over firms by granting it a distinct corporate stakeholder capacity
that is otherwise not regulated and is not subject to any transparent procedural (or other) checks and
balances. The CCP itself, beyond any traditional shareholder role the state may have, becomes a legal
corporate constituent with unique interests and a distinct capacity to convey, direct, and monitor the
ways these interests will be pursued:
The core political role of the Party organizations of SOEs shall be fully displayed. It is critical
to unify the efforts to strengthen Party leadership with those to improve corporate governance,
include the overall requirements on Party building into the articles of association of SOEs,
make clear the statutory role of the Party organizations of SOEs in their corporate governance
structures, and innovate the channels and means for the Party organizations of SOEs to play
their core political role.611
As noted above, the open door for the CCP to have a corporate committee presence is old
news. However, the Guiding Opinions take China’s politicized corporate governance to a new
operative level. They clarify the goals that this political governance institution should advance in firms
and elucidate in some detail its organization, operation, and governance relations with other corporate
institutions. Moreover, corporatized SOEs are also required to have this inserted in their governing
controlling stake, the assessment seems more market-oriented and emphasizes appreciation in the value of state-owned
assets. See SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, § 2 art. 5, § 4, art. 14.
608 Compare id., with SOE Assets Law, supra note 183, art. 22 (3) (whereby SASAC or similar state shareholding bodies are
authorized with “Proposing the director and supervisor candidates to the shareholders' meeting”), and SOE Assets Law,
supra note 183, art. 24 (“assess[ing] the candidates…to be appointed or proposed…”), and SOE Assets Law, supra note 183,
art. 27 (“determine the standards of remuneration for the managers … appointed by it.”).
609 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 186-187 and my reservations in notes 188-192.
610 Articles 13, 30, and 33 of the SOE Assets Law make clear that the state in its shareholder capacity will follow shareholder
deliberation and voting even with respect to major corporate decisions. See SOE Assets Law, supra note 183, arts. 13, 30,
33. Only in limited circumstances, and only when the state is a sole or controlling shareholder, should the issues first be
reported or approved by the relevant department of the local people’s congress. See id. arts. 24, 25. Moreover, monitoring
functions are granted to the state-shareholding body itself and mentioned in the context of the right to appoint an external
audit firm to audit the company’s financial reports. See id. arts 63-67.
611 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 24.
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documents, a change that entails public disclosure and that would have been the purview of
shareholders under the Company Law.612 In so doing, the operation of a Party committee inside firms
is disclosed to foreign and domestic corporate stockholders and to the market at large. It is still too
early to tell what this will signal to investors and how it will be perceived by the market. A greater
Party-state commitment to economic growth, greater monitoring against rampant corruption and
expropriation, a more direct platform to advance industrial policies through the corporation, or
political suppression are only some of the ways that investors could interpret this move, and each
could affect the market differently.613
While the economic effects are still to be seen, publicly-listed firms, and not only national
champions, are complying with the requirement.614 Before the introduction of the Guiding Opinions,
the Company Law provision on corporate Party committees was often overlooked, especially among
corporatized SOEs that are listed in foreign markets.615 Recent reports indicate that more firms are
now complying with the requirement and amending their bylaws.616
The case of Tianjin Realty Development Group Co. Ltd. (Tianjin Realty) illustrates how firms
have treated these new Guiding Opinions in practice and the limited ability of investors in
corporatized SOEs to resist them.617 Tianjin Realty, whose shares are listed for trade on the SSE, is
the listed arm of the Tianjin local government’s commercial real estate development division. In
January 2017, Tianjin Realty called a special shareholders’ meeting to approve amendments in its
Articles of Association following the CCP and State Council’s Guiding Opinions. Among other
According to Article 37 of the 2005 Company Law, revisions in the bylaws are under the authority of the shareholders’
meeting. Article 18 requires a company to solicit the opinions of its employees through their labor unions when drafting
an important bylaw provision. 2005 Company Law, supra note 147, arts. 18, 37.
613 I discuss these different options and the available empirical studies below. See infra Chapter 3, Section III.A.
614 Examples include FAW Group Corp., whose Shenzhen-listed subsidiaries FAW Car and FAW Xiali Automobile Co.,
Ltd. both added a section of “Party Building” to their bylaws stating that the Party Committee in the firm will oversee
work related to production and management of the company, and that their board of directors should consult with the
Party Committee before deciding on major issues. Similar bylaw revisions were disclosed by Sinoma Science & Technology
Co., Ltd. and by Zhonghang Electronic Measuring Instruments Co., Ltd., also listed for trade on the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange. See Greg Levesque, China’s Evolving Economic Statecraft, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/chinas-evolving-economic-statecraft/; Mark Schlarbaum, Xi Boosts Party in China’s $18
Trillion
State
Company
Sector,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(July
7,
2016,
5:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-07/xi-boosts-party-say-in-china-s-18-trillion-state-company-sector.
615 The application of the Guiding Opinions extends to Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong, which previously were able to
avoid establishing Party committees in practice and are now required to establish Party institutions in their articles of
association. Shirley Yam, Regulators’ Silence on Communist Party Presence in Listed State Companies is Deafening, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (July 22, 2016, 5:07 PM), http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1993277/regulators-silencecommunist-party-presence-listed-state-companies. o
616 Supra note 614. Moreover, with respect to off-shore listed firms, a Hong Kong–based media website recently
reported that in the past eighteen months, 123 Hong Kong-listed Chinese firms amended their articles of incorporation
to implement the Guiding Opinions and expand the authority of their Party Committees. Sun Leqi, yu 120 Zhongzigu sheli
Dangwei quanli kong lingjia Dongshihui [More than 120 Chinese Stocks Set Up Party Committee Power to Overthrow the Board of
Directors], APPLE DAILY (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/realtime/article/20180926/58722466.
617 Alice Yan, Chinese Company Shareholders Vote ‘No’ to Corporate Role for Communist Party, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Jan. 14, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2062061/chinese-companyshareholders-vote-no-corporate-role.
612
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elements, the proposed amendment included the following: establishing a (apparently new to the
company) Party committee within the firm and determining the position holders that would serve on
the committee; adding a requirement to solicit the opinions of the Party committee and its leaders
before making major corporate decisions; allowing the Party committee to be involved in any decision
of the board of directors regarding the appointment, dismissal, and remuneration of senior managers;
and allowing the Party committee to carry out additional supervisory, auditing, and disciplinary
responsibilities.618 The proposed amendment was rejected by the shareholders after only 62.5 percent
of shareholders present in the meeting approved the change, which required a two-thirds approval.619
At the time of the meeting, the Tianjin local government only held approximately 25 percent of the
shares. The company’s minority shareholders (those having below 5 percent equity) fiercely voiced
their objection—90 percent of those present voted against the amendment. And yet the company held
another extraordinary shareholder meeting only a few months later, at which the shareholders
miraculously reversed their vote, and the amendment was approved almost unanimously (99.8
percent).620
The Tianjin Realty case is an example of the reduction in the power and relevance of traditional
corporate governing bodies against the obligatory nature of the Guiding Opinions. Presumably,
corporate organs within a firm will be similarly powerless against the actions of the Party organization
once one is installed. This raises the question of whether this political institution and its members
could be held accountable for corporate decisions that they directed but went awry, and by whom?
Given that state enforcing institutions do not have even a formal authority over Party organizations,

See Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., Disclosure of Information Report on the 2017 First Extraordinary
General
Meeting
of
Shareholders,
SHANGHAI
STOCK
EXCHANGE
(Jan.
5,
2017),
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2016-12-30/600322_20161230_1.pdf.
619 See Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., Announcement of Resolutions of the First Extraordinary General Meeting
of
2017,
SHANGHAI
STOCK
EXCHANGE
(Jan.
5,
2017),
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-01-07/600322_20170107_1.pdf.
620 Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., Announcement of Resolutions of the Second Extraordinary General Meeting
of
2017,
SHANGHAI
STOCK
EXCHANGE
(May
6,
2017),
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-05-06/600322_20170506_1.pdf. A few weeks
before the second extraordinary meeting, the local state shareholder started increasing its holding in the company and also
declared its intentions to increase its holding by at least three percent within the next year. Given that the local government
only held twenty-five percent of the votes and that the vote required a two-thirds supermajority, this was likely a signaling
move of what was to come rather than a true effort to secure the missing votes. Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group)
Co., Ltd., Announcement of the Largest Shareholder Increase Shareholding Plan, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 5, 2017),
http://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-04-05/600322_20170405_1.pdf.
Although the two proposed amendments were phrased slightly differently, substantively they were the same. For the exact
wording, compare Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group) Co., Ltd., 2017 First Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders,
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/201612-30/600322_20161230_1.pdf (preparatory material for the first meeting), with Tianjin Real Estate Development (Group)
Co., Ltd., 2017 Second Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-04-27/600322_20170427_1.pdf
(preparatory
material for the second meeting).
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including in their corporate capacity,621 the institutionalization and regularization of Party committees
only substantiates a law-based-governance approach but not legal accountability. It is safe to assume
that Party committee members will not be subject to any review or enforcement by either the CSRC,
the People’s Court system, or the Procuratorate. Clearly any accountability measures will be external
to both the firm and the legal system, and would have to derive from the political organization itself.
This could explain why the CCP’s disciplinary apparatus is now becoming more involved in corporate
supervision, a matter that I address next.
The obligatory nature of the Guiding Opinions and the absence of internal and external real
checks and balances over the Party committee are certainly disconcerting. Yet there is still much that
is unknown about how Party committees will function and how they will be accepted by corporate
constituents. Investors, for example, might value them negatively but remain invested for the lack of
better structured alternatives in the Chinese market. Or, it may well be that investors will be indifferent
to this institution, the way they have been oblivious to the governance in Chinese firms many times
before, even when facing disclosures of corporate malpractice and sheer fraud.622 On the other hand,
Party committees might be added to the list of unconventional institutions that provide reliable
assurances, secure investors’ confidence, and support further growth.

B. The CCP’s External Corporate Governance Capacity—Monitoring and Accountability through
Disciplinary and Enforcement Functions
Another form of the recent politicization of corporate governance in China is the substitution
of external market monitoring and legal enforcement with another system external to the firm—the
disciplinary and accountability institutions of the CCP. Enforcement of political and social discipline
is one of the cornerstones of the CCP’s control over its 90 million members and 4.5 million grassroots
organizations.623 In the last decade, and especially since Xi rose to power, the Party’s disciplinary
inspection and enforcement efforts have been intensified, not only toward social control in general,

See Yam, supra note 615 (taking this question further by expressing concerns about the ability of foreign regulators to
hold these CCP corporate institutions accountable for their actions and mentioning the potential conflict of laws in cases
of Chinese subsidiaries incorporated off-shore).
622 GREEN, supra note 104, at 118-153; Howson, supra note 278, at 150-151.
623 In 2016, the CCP employed approximately 26 million members as public officials or staff. Numbers are drawn from
Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 - Part Five: Party Apparatchiks, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR,
Summer 2011, available at https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-midterm-jockeying-gearing-2012-part-five-partyapparatchiks; China – Statistics & Facts, STATISTICA, https://www.statista.com/topics/753/china/ (last visited May 23,
2019) (providing statistical information from Xinhua News Agency).
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but also specifically with respect to firms and their insiders.625 Corporatized SOEs and their group
structure organization are being harnessed to facilitate the Party’s disciplinary efforts.
Campaign-style enforcement against corruption and embezzlement of state assets is the main
feature relevant here.626 The Party’s focus on enforcement against corporate corruption is achieved
through two main paths. The first is aligned with the recent expansion of the CCP’s intra-firm
corporate governance functions discussed above. Here, the corporate governance role of an intra-firm
Party committee was formalized, specifying the discipline-inspection roles that a corporate Party
committee should perform within its firm. The second is by intensifying the CCP’s drive against
corporate corruption externally. In doing so, the CCP strengthens enforcement against corruption by
harnessing corporatized SOEs and corporate governance more generally.627 The Party is utilizing the
corporate legal form to gain access to information and to detect, punish, and prevent corruption.
This change in discipline and enforcement strengthens the CCP’s overall market control while
also fortifying its new legal mandate in the realm of corporate governance. The strains this may place
on managerial discretion, risk taking, and possibly on firm performance are to be expected, but the
positive effects this could have on firms and their stakeholders are less apparent and should be noted
as well. Moreover, while a political disciplinary institution cannot replace external markets and
enforcement functions completely (e.g., party discipline does little in the way of promoting efficient
allocation of capital as external markets do, nor addresses individual stakeholders’ grievances as legal
institutions are expected to do), still the interests of the Party and firms could be mutually served
provided that this form of external oversight and accountability is subject to some operational
constraints.628

1. Party Discipline and Anti-Corruption Work
i. Party-Level Incentives to Combat Corruption
Having change-averse individuals within the administrative and political controlling apparatus
who have thrived economically based on their affiliation with corporatized SOEs (whether or not they
By 2016, the anti-corruption campaign had led to 100,000 prosecutions, including prosecution of many high-level
officials for their business conduct. On the scope related to SOEs, see infra notes 669, 679.
625 See Samson Yuen, Disciplining the Party—Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Its Limits, CHINA PERSP., no. 3, 2014,
at 41 (pointing out how Xi’s campaign is different from previous anti-corruption campaigns in that respect).
626 On the rationale behind a “campaign-style enforcement,” see Andrew Wedeman, Anticorruption Campaigns and the
Intensification of Corruption in China, 14 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 93 (2005).
627 The causality here is hard to determine and requires empirical research. Is it that the CCP tries to detect corruption and
happens to find it in corporatized SOEs due to, perhaps, their group structure, the high-level position suspects involved,
or crony-capitalism? Or, is it that the Party indeed targets corporatized SOEs and their group structure, perhaps due to
the reasons I emphasize next? I take the latter view and offer the rationale behind it but cannot support it empirically.
628 This is discussed further below, where I address the potential contributions of a politicized corporate governance.
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themselves engaged in corruption) 629 raises the question of who would be incentivized to enhance
external supervision over firms and their insiders. Furthermore, why would a political disciplinary
system succeed where the legal system has failed? Here, I believe, corruption holds key answers.
Rampant corruption in China, facilitated through China’s crony capitalists and intensified by
corporatized SOEs and their affiliated business network, poses substantial threats to Party unity and
legitimacy. These threats, which intensify the more growth is pursued and economic leeway enabled,
unites Party-state leaders around a common goal—their political survival.
Since economic reforms began, China has endured a reputation for widespread corruption.630
Perhaps inevitable to an economic transition,631 corruption is often viewed as a major impediment to
the growth of businesses and an unfavorable condition for development.632 This has been a common
understanding even though the evidence for it, at least with respect to China, is inconclusive at best.633
However, aside from a general economic motivation to minimize potential negative effects on growth
and development, enforcement against corruption in China is highly political in nature. 634 AntiThe People’s Bank of China estimated that between the mid-1990s and 2008, 16,000 to 18,000 Chinese officials and
executives at state-owned companies took a total of $123 billion from companies (presumably illegitimately). And the
Winner Is, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2012/01/21/and-the-winner-is
(“State capitalism often reinforces corruption.”).
630 The Corruption Perception Index, published by Transparency International, ranked China 77 out of 180 country spots
in 2017. This is a much-improved position from the country’s rank in 1995 (when the Index was established), when China
ranked one above Indonesia, which was the most corrupt country in the world. Importantly, this Index does not measure
actual corruption, but rather perceptions about corruption according to various indices. For the Index, see Measuring
Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L
UK,
http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/measuringcorruption/#.Wue3JYjwY2y (last visited May 23, 2019). Despite what may be an improvement, many still perceive
corruption to be endemic to contemporary China, with some referring to it as an “epidemic.” Andrew Wederman, The
Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 CHINA Q. 895 (2004) (referencing Michael Johnston & Yufan Hao, China’s Surge of
Corruption, 6 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 4, 1995, at 80; Minxin Pei, Will China Become Another Indonesia?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Autumn
1999, at 94; Hilton Root, Corruption in China: Has It Become Systemic?, 36 ASIAN SURV. 741 (1996)).
631 Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inevitable Corruption of Transition, 14 U. CONN J. INT’L L. 509 (1999).
632 Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995) (finding that corruption has a significant negative effect
on the ratio of investment to GDP); Mo Pak Hung, Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON 66 (2001) (finding
that one unit increase in the corruption index reduces the growth rate by 0.545 percentage points. Also finding that
corruption reduces the share of private investments.).
633 This perception is rather deeply rooted even though the Chinese economy has performed remarkably well since reforms
ensued. See supra note 630. See also Xi’s Crackdown on Corruption ‘Will Help Boost China’s Economy’, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (Nov. 3, 2017, 12:04 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2118245/xis-crackdowncorruption-will-help-boost-chinas-economy. For an exception to this view revealing empirical evidence to the contrary, see
Chiung-Ju Huang, Is Corruption Bad for Economic Growth? Evidence from Asia-Pacific Countries, 35 NORTH AM. J. ECON & FIN.
247 (2016) (examining corruption and growth in thirteen Asia-Pacific countries during the 1997–2013 period and finding
a significant positive correlation between corruption and economic growth in South Korea and China). At the other end
of the spectrum, there is also a view that it is the fight against corruption that contributes to the economic slow-down in
China. See, e.g., Huan Jun Chan & Xueling Lin, Corruption Clean Up is Top Reason for China’s Slowdown: Former Central Banker,
CHANNEL NEWSASIA (July 27, 2017, 8:46 PM), https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/corruption-clean-up-istop-reason-for-china-s-slowdown-former-ce-7928988 (citing a former PBOC policy maker); JieYang, Is Anti-graft Antigrowth? Weighing the Economic Impact of the Anti-corruption Campaign, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21610316-weighing-economic-impact-anti-corruption-campaign-anti-graftanti-growth. For a more comprehensive overview on the complex relationship between corruption levels and economic
growth, see ANDREW WEDEMAN, DOUBLE PARADOX: RAPID GROWTH AND RISING CORRUPTION IN CHINA (2012).
634 MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG
KONG (2004) (analyzing the (former) system of anti-corruption in China, suggesting that it is influenced and captured by
629
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corruption campaigns have been used to consolidate power by new leadership 635 and to suppress
factional power struggles between political rivals within the Party-state system.636
In addition to these political and economic motivations in combating corruption, public
criticism of corrupt officials also seems to fuel enforcement against corruption. Criticism against
corrupt officials is on the rise, especially with increasing gaps in income distribution.637 Public criticism
is a concern primarily because it reflects badly on the Party-state’s own integrity and viability,638 and
alienates the Party from the people. Research has shown that while public opinion in China functions
differently than it does in liberal democracies, it is nevertheless a meaningful consideration639 and has
an impact on the design of CCP-directed reforms.640 Public opinion was found to be a major motivator
in anti-corruption campaign enforcement specifically, and even in subsequent criminal procedures.641
The Party itself declares that corruption is an imminent threat to the regime’s stability,642 Party
unity, and legitimacy.643 The need to combat corruption is repeatedly emphasized by Party leadership

local Party leaders, and suggesting that this led to its failure); Lin Zhu, Punishing Corrupt Officials in China, 223 CHINA Q. 595
(2015) (arguing that anti-corruption campaigns have been applied selectively and for political purposes).
635 A strategy taken by China’s leaders, Hu Jintao and Jian Zemin, long before Xi, to establish their new leadership
following transitions. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is known to be a continuous but more pervasive effort that
systematically penetrates leadership layers not touched before, including the highest ranks of the Party-state system, leaders
of the strongest national champions and financial industry, as well as military leaders.
636
David Barboza, Politics Permeates Anti-Corruption Drive in China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global/04corrupt.html; Andrew Wederman, Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt and
the
Politics
of
Corruption, 13 CHINA RES. CTR.,
no.
2,
Oct.
15,
2014,
available
at
https://www.chinacenter.net/2014/china_currents/13-2/xi-jinpings-tiger-hunt-and-the-politics-of-corruption/;
Jing
Rong Goh et al., Force Behind Anti-Corruption: Evidence from China (January 12, 2019), available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3227368 (examining the political considerations behind anti-corruption investigations
and subsequent political punishment).
637 Luan, China Focus: Income, Corruption Top Concerns for Two Sessions: Polls, XINHUA (Mar. 4, 2015, 8:14 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180220164857/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/04/c_134037974.htm
(reporting public polls that show corruption as the second most concerning issue in China, following income distribution.
This news report also reveals that corruption was voted by the public among the three most concerning issues for the past
ten years.).
638 Wederman, supra note 630.
639 GALLAGHER, supra note 554.
640 Yun Sun, Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 13, 2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinese-public-opinion-shaping-chinas-foreign-policy-or-shaped-by-it/.
641 Ira Belkin, Justice in the PRC: How the Chinese Communist Party Has Struggled with Managing Public Opinion and the Administration
of Criminal Justice in the Internet Age (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series Working Paper
No. 18-01, 2018).
642 China Must Root out Corruption or Communist Party Will Be Erased from History, Graft-Buster Warns, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (Nov. 11, 2017, 12:03 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119431/china-must-rootout-corruption-or-communist-party-will.
643 For example, President Xi Jinping’s expositions stating that corruption if not treated “will inevitably lead to the downfall
of the party and the state” (wangdang wangguo). China’s Xi Amassing Most Power since Deng Raises Reform Risk, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:07 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-30/china-s-xi-amassing-mostpower-since-deng-raises-risk-for-reform.
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and was incorporated in the Constitution of the CCP.644 Anti-corruption efforts and their high-profile
results are continuously reported to the public through state-owned media.645
ii. Corruption and Relevant Institutions
Under the existing framework, corruption is one of several offenses by officials that are forbidden
by different PRC laws and CCP rules.646 Yet the fine lines that define corruption and distinguish it
from other forms of economic malfeasance by officials are unclear.647 It is often interpreted broadly
to capture many different forms of “improper” behavior by state officials and Party members.648 In

See The CCP Constitution, supra note 546, Preamble.
Daniel C.K. Chow, How China's Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transparency in the Enforcement of China's AntiBribery Laws, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 685 (2015) (discussing media coverage but arguing that while new laws and media
coverage have increased transparency, the Party’s strengthened control actually leads to less transparency in enforcement
against corruption).
646 For the main laws, see Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People's
Cong.,
Apr.
27,
2005;
amended
Sept.
1,
2017),
art.
53,
available
at
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=23929&lib=law; PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm.
Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
Nov.
4,
2017,
effective
Jan.
1,
2018),
available
at
http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=304262. The new law sets out clear parameters for commercial bribery.
See China’s New Anti-Unfair Competition Law Redefines Bribery, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Nov. 2017),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/158149/chinas-new-anti-unfair-competition-lawredefines-bribery.
See also Amendments to the Criminal Law, supra note 150, arts. 91, 163, 165-169, 385-389. Section 3 is dedicated to
“Offenses Against Companies and Enterprise Management Disorder” and includes various actions within the context of
enterprises and other institutions, including companies, that result in improper demand of receipt of gains. In particular,
article 163 addresses, among others, situations whereby personnel performing public duties in state-owned companies and
enterprises, and personnel assigned by state-owned companies and enterprises to non-state-owned companies gain
personal benefits in the course of their affiliation with an enterprise. Article 165 handles the use of enterprise for personal
gain by corporate insiders (directors and managers) in SOEs. Article 166 is focused on situations within SOEs whereby
work personnel used their position for private gains and caused harm to state interests. Articles 167-169 focus on the
criminal accountability of “people directly in charge of state-owned companies” for events that caused great damages to
national interests. Articles 385 – 389 connect these actions with the crimes of embezzlement and offering or accepting
bribes. Interestingly, with respect to corruption in the form of embezzlement (appropriating, stealing, or swindling public
money or property, article 382 of the PRC Criminal Law), article 91 defines “public property” as property owned by the
state, including private property that is being managed, used, or transported by state-organs, and state-owned corporations
and enterprises. This means that embezzlement in joint ventures or in corporatized SOEs where the state has only a
minority stake (or even no ownership, apparently), is still considered embezzlement of public property.
The connection between the use of public authority for private gains and the bribery offense was made clearer by Notice
No. 33 of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Issuing the Opinions on Issues concerning the Application
of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Commercial Briberies (Nov. 20, 2008). Furthermore, the 2011 amendment to the
Criminal Law amended Article 164, which penalizes employees of PRC companies who bribe foreign officials and is
known as China’s own foreign corrupt practices act.
See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa (中华人民共和国监察法) [The Supervision Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter PRC
Supervision Law], http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/21/content_2052362.htm, art. 11(2), listing corruption
among the “duty-related violations” that a Supervisory Commission is entrusted to investigate and enforce against, together
with “bribery, abuse of power, neglect of duty, power rent-seeking, tunneling, practice of favoritism and falsification, as
well as the waste of state assets.”).
647 As clearly reflected from the variations in the provisions of the various laws and regulations above. See supra note 646.
648 Wederman, supra note 630, at 897, 901-903 (pointing out how the authorities assigned to handle official malfeasance
(including corruption) extended their authority in practice beyond the list of actions defined in Chinese law and Party rules
644
645
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the context of corporatized SOEs, I treat corruption as the illicit use of public authority (by either
Party member or state official, or their employees and assignees) for private gain, in the course of their
formal or informal affiliation with corporatized SOEs.
Until recently, corruption cases involving corporatized SOEs typically resulted in separate
administrative and criminal enforcement proceedings through the various agencies of the state
(including the People’s Procuratorate, and SASAC and CSRC in embezzlement cases),649 as well as in
parallel Party disciplinary enforcement measures applied to Party members.
The Party’s oversight and enforcement, often considered “extra-legal,” is directed by the
Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI), which performs both oversight and
enforcement roles, following a framework established in various inner Party norms and disciplinary
codes of conduct applicable to Party members.650 Inner Party disciplinary methods are known to be
harsher than investigative and enforcement devices under the legal system. The methods applied by
the Party’s extra-legal system do not have to comply with transparency and predictability standards
nor with due process required under the law. Known as Shuanggui, the CCDI is authorized to perform
undeclared inner-Party detentions, involving investigations techniques that are often undisclosed and
for prolonged durations (forced disappearances) with no ability for legal representation. The Shuanggui
system is widely criticized for being opaque and brutal.651
The state’s supervisory system has formal authority to oversee state institutions and civil
servants, including with respect to corruption, following the framework established under the legal
system.652 The monitoring functions were until very recently led by supervisory bureaus under the
State Council (the executive government), including the Ministry of Supervision and its local
supervisory bureaus, as well as various Bureaus for Corruption Prevention at the national and local

to also include categories such as “privilege seeking” or the “use of authority for private gain.”). Notably, however, the
recently enacted Supervisory Law seems to provide the necessary legal basis for authority over these offenses as well.
649 For examples of cases pursued by SASAC and the legal system, see Wei Chen, 1 ge yue 12 wei Gaoguan Luoma—shangshi
Gongsi neibu jianguan lingren danyou [The Fall of 12 Senior Managers in One Month—Insider Supervision of Listed Companies is
Worrisome],
CAIJING
DAILY
(Feb.
5.
2005,
10:19
AM), http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/stocktalk/20050205/10191351494.shtml.
650 President Hu Jintao promulgated the primary normative framework on January 12, 2004. Zhonggong Zhongyang banbu
Dang nei jiandu tiaoli he jilu chufen tiaoli [The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of China Promulgated Inner-Party
Supervision
and
Disciplinary
Regulation],
PEOPLE'S
DAILY
ONLINE
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/8198/32062/index.html ;http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2
346251.html. Earlier versions of inner Party supervision regulations are documented for early stages of reforms as well.
See Dongmei Xu, Dang nei jiandu tiaoli chutai qian qian hou hou [Regulations on Inner Party Supervision Came before and after],
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 4, 2004), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2278488.html (tracking the
various stages of trial inner party supervision regulations since 1987). Most recently, following the 18th Party Congress,
the CCP Central Committee issued new disciplinary regulations that are considered much stricter and more comprehensive.
See infra note 675.
651 See generally Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFO. 7 (2008).
652 For the main relevant laws, see supra note 646.
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levels.653 The legal system (People’s Procuratorate and the People’s Courts) carried out enforcement,
subject to the rules of procedural justice.
Recently, however, these institutions went through a fundamental structural reform, which
stands as additional indicia of the political-economic equilibrium shift I identified earlier. In this
reform, the various state institutions assigned to battle corruption in the state sector were merged and
are now centralized under the National Supervisory Commission and its local-level commissions,
whose operations are now established under a new law—the PRC Supervision Law. 654 The new
Commission also integrates the National Audit Office, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s anticorruption unit, and the CCDI. The new commission thereby has an all-encompassing authority to
not only supervise and investigate, but also sanction misconduct of both Party and state agents.655 This
new agency is a Party-led state organ. In the administrative governance hierarchy, it is situated directly
under the National People’s Congress, but the new Commission’s chief sits on the CCP Politburo
Standing Committee. Thus, a new enforcing legal institution656 was created with an administrative
position in the state-hierarchy that is equal, and some argue higher, to that of the Supreme People’s
Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.657 The CCDI, now under the Supervisory Commission,
performs all investigatory powers, including with respect to violations by state functionaries. It is also
authorized to directly apply sanctions for administrative violations and minor legal violations. At least
formally, corruption cases involving criminal offenses (such as bribery, embezzlement, and seeking
improper gains) still must be transferred to the People’s Procuratorate and the People’s Courts, and
pursued according to the criminal law following a CCDI investigation and in addition to any disciplinary
sanctions the CCDI applies. 658
This of course sparked broad concerns among human rights groups, lawyers, and academics.659
Commentators argued that this new legal institution was a tool through which the Party was brought
into the law, rather than under the law, as there seem to be no real checks and balances on its powers.
Yuen, supra note 625.
PRC Supervision Law, supra note 646.
655 Id. arts. 15-18, 41, 43.
656 Legal positivism at least would consider the Supervisory Commission a “new legal institution.”
657 The creation of the Supervisory Commission faced opposition by Chinese legal scholars, who argued that the new
institution would violate the PRC Constitution since it would be a new Party body whose powers exceed those of legal
system institutions and as such will be above the law. Chris Buckley, In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency Will Be
Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jinpinganticorruption.html.
658 Before the recent institutional reform, there was a similar reliance in corruption cases involving criminal offenses. For
data from before the structural reform, see Yuen, supra note 625, at 45 n.35 (“The majority of officials placed under
investigation are described as ‘having violated both Party discipline and the law (weiji weifa 违纪违法)”) (pointing out
that of 67 cases released between May and June 2014, Xinhua reporters found that 47 cases violated both Party discipline
and the law, 17 cases violated Party discipline only, and three cases violated the law only). For a description of authority
under the structural reform, see Jeremy Daum, Unsupervised – Initial Thoughts on the Supervisory Law, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/unsupervised/.
659 See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 657; Zongzhi Long, Wanhan Jiancha Fa Zhong zhiwu fanzui diaocha zhidu de ba xiang jianyi [Eight
Suggestions for Perfecting the System of Crime Investigations under the Supervision Law], POL. & L. (forthcoming), available at
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/oBJrzR4fWRVS_8karZtZyg.
653
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(For example, the rank of the new commission is higher than that of the Ministry of Public Security
(police), and its powers apply on members of the People’s Congress—its own nominating body.)660
There is also support for the government’s formal view, opining that such legalization in fact
represents an enhancement of rule of law in China.661 Either way, it seems accurate to describe the
state supervisory organs as being absorbed under a now legalized form of the CCDI, rather than the
other way around, since the leadership of the CCDI is now assigned to lead the new National
Supervisory Commission, and its scope of authority is in line with Party investigative powers and
methods.662 This also means that under the new Supervisory Commission, Party investigative norms
and methods (albeit, under the guise of the legal system with a new and now “legalized” name, liuzhi,
“detention in custody,” traditionally applied as administrative detention outside the criminal legal
system) is given a free rein to perform anti-corruption work.663
This consolidation of anti-corruption powers also has direct implications on corporatized
SOEs. The recent institutional reform expands the scope of Party anti-corruption and disciplinary
authority and methods over additional millions of public sector organizations and individuals, many
of whom are not party members.664 Corporatized SOEs and their state-appointed managers and other
functionaries are now formally included as well. 665 This change also potentially subjects all employees
of SOEs that could be viewed as civil servants or as performing public roles to CCP disciplinary
enforcement.666 Note that the term “SOE” is interpreted broadly and often includes firms in which
the state has even a minority equity stake, thus potentially further broadening the scope of individuals
under CCP disciplinary supervision as well.667
Id. See also Daum, supra note 658.
See, e.g., Criminal Practice, Thoughts on Issues Related to Supervisory Committee Liuzhi, WECHAT (Apr. 16, 2017),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4oMQiA8vshxWENRV7-mAtA.
662 On the shift and consolidation of powers under the Supervisory Commission, thus under central CCP control, see
Jinting Deng, The National Supervision Commission: A New Anti-Corruption Model in China, 52 INT’L J.L. CRIME & JUST. 58
(2018).
663 See the various threads of interpretation and discussion on this subject on the ChinaLaw blog:
https://hermes.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=CHINALAW percent3be6ee03af percent2e1711&X=D6555913969718A6F9;
https://hermes.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=CHINALAW;e753c272.1711.
664 Jun Mai, How China’s New Anti-Graft Super Body Will Work, and Why Calling a Lawyer Won’t Be an Option, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (Nov. 17, 2017, 9:31 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120175/howchinas-new-anti-graft-super-body-will-work-and-why.
665 PRC Supervision Law, supra note 646, art. 15.
666 Id. (especially article 15 (1) & (6)).
667 While the Supervision Law itself does not define the term SOEs, this broad interpretation is reflected in the SOE
Reform Guiding Opinions. See id. Moreover, the SOE Assets Law refers to state invested enterprises. See SOE Assets Law,
supra note 183.
SOEs in many other occasions are viewed by Chinese authorities in the broader sense to include enterprises with state
capital. See, e.g., Criminal Code, Guojia tongji ji guanyu dui guoyou gongsi qiye rending yijian de han, Guo Tong Han [2003] 44 hao
[National Bureau of Statistics Opinions on the Recognition of State Owned Companies [2003] No. 4], WECHAT (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIzNTg5MDU5Mg==&mid=2247483940&idx=2&sn=e5f35bf2b76b81944f841
d6000398c2a&chksm=e8e170ebdf96f9fd6c4f00093f5df8124d88c15f1dfc20dce44e368f75801695e8b539a84654&mpshar
e=1&scene=21&srcid=0925SXZAhbMNO75u65uaPVHi#wechat_redirect. By the Bureau’s interpretation, SOEs can be
divided into: 1) (narrow sense SOEs) enterprises in which the state has wholly state-owned enterprises; 2) (broad sense
SOEs) state-controlled enterprises (direct or indirect ownership, including by agreement, of more than fifty percent of the
660
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Thus, while the personnel management system discussed earlier serves as an incentivizing
force for corporate control parties to improve corporate performance and results, Party disciplinary
enforcement, especially in its new, institutionalized form, plays a role of monitoring and deterring
corporate wrongdoing by blurring the organizational lines between political enforcement against
corruption and legal enforcement of corporate wrongdoing, and by creating fear governance
throughout the firm and its network of affiliates.

2. Harnessing Corporatized SOEs in the Battle against Corruption
China’s crony capitalism, the overlap between its business and political elites, 668 amplifies
opportunities for corruption and increases the volume of cases in which corrupt conduct is exercised
through, or simply involves, firms and corporatized SOEs, thus making corporatized SOEs key venues
for corruption.669 Moreover, corruption through corporatized SOEs amplifies reputational damages
to the Party-state system more than other corruption cases in several dimensions.
Not only is the number of corruption cases involving corporatized SOEs relatively high, but
the “quality” or substance of these cases is alarming as well. In many of these cases, corruption also
entails the waste of public resources and economic loss to the state through embezzlement. 670 As
opposed to other cases of corruption where officials are usually on the supply side, here the Partystate may find itself on both sides of the corrupt conduct, perhaps even at the same time. The supply
shares, or such ownership of less than fifty percent of the shares where no larger shareholder is present, or where there is
a larger shareholder but control rights are vested with the state according to agreement); and 3) (broad sense SOEs)
enterprises with state capital in which the state is not a controller.
668 On the relationship between China’s private sector elite members and Party-state officials and resulted corruption, see
China’s
Graft-Busters
Investigate
Sinopec
Chief
Wang
Tianpu,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1778090/chinas-graft-busters-investigate-sinopec-chiefwang.
669 Statistical data shows that throughout 2016 (from December 2015 to November 30, 2016), there were 1458 cases of
criminal violations in business enterprises with 1827 individual offenders involved. Out of these cases, 203 cases involved
state-owned enterprises and 1255 cases involved private enterprises, accounting for 13.9 percent and 86.1 percent of cases,
respectively. 12.9 percent of cases involving SOEs also involved individual offenders. The number of individual offenders
in these cases reached 236 individuals. 87.1 percent of the total number of cases involving private enterprises also involved
individual offenders, for a total number of 1691 individual private offenders involved.
The more striking and relevant figures, however, are the ones detailing the type of criminal offenses involved: the most
common crimes committed in SOEs are corruption and bribery crimes, 229 cases, accounting for 78.2 percent of the cases
(but 90.3 percent in 2015); while with respect to private enterprises, corruption and bribery crimes accounted for 170 of
the cases, 9.9 percent (but 15.3 percent in 2015) only.
Other crimes committed in SOEs (/private enterprises), were “crimes against socialist market economic order” accounting
for 9.6 percent (/58.7 percent); and property infringement, accounting for 7.5 percent (/24.3 percent) of cases.
(The remaining percentages seems to represent miscellaneous criminal offenses not described in the data.)
For the full report, see Yuanhuang Zhang, 2016 Zhong guo qi ye jia xing shi feng xian fen xi bao gao [2016 Chinese Enterprises
Criminal Risk Analysis Report], 26 J. HENAN POLICE C., no. 4, 2017, at 17.
670 The Honeycomb of Corruption – A Little Reform in the State Sector Has Proved a Dangerous Thing, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2000),
https://www.economist.com/node/299621 (pointing to data on the misuse of state funds and assets generally and in
various industries).
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side (officials using their authority to receive private gains from corporatized SOEs) and the demand
side (corporate control parties and insiders appointed by the state, who are willing to bribe officials to
gain advantages in transactions) are held by agents of the Party-state in one capacity or the other. As
one commentator recently put it: “For the past three decades, the state has always been directly
involved in running businesses. Corruption, tunneling, shirking, malfeasance, nepotism, and collusive
or conspicuous wrongdoing—basically any type of misconduct imaginable—has occurred in the
government’s direct or indirect business operations. As a result, anti-corruption drives have always
been a major theme and a common expectation of the public.”671 These cases often involve high-level
Party-state figures and glorified crown jewel firms. Corruption at these levels reinforces public
perceptions against the Party-state uniformly (as body-politic). Tainting the success of these crown
jewels with corruption inflicts doubts on the viability of China’s economic growth and the regime
itself.
Adding more complexity in the context of corporatized SOEs, the lines of what constitutes
“the use of public authority” become vague (e.g., think of the corporate power of a firm’s Party
secretary), and the illicit conduct itself is likely harder to detect. Corporate wrongdoing often requires
coordination or at least acquiesces by top managers or board members.672 Research on corporate fraud
has found that connectedness levels within the firm, and especially appointment-based connectedness,
increase the likelihood of wrongdoing and helps conceal violations.673 Agents of the Party-state are
often highly connected (if not the same person) with corporate control parties and insiders who can
easily coordinate and conceal their actions. Given the weakness of traditional monitoring mechanisms,
they can even do so while at the same time formally complying with corporate law and procedures,
such as approval requirements for related-party transactions.
Finally, corruption through corporatized SOEs amplifies threats in another dimension. The
use of some of China’s most important corporatized SOEs for personal gains empowers the
individuals involved and can create powerful rivals within the Party and facilitate factions.
These reasons suggest that corruption related to corporatized SOEs is a particular threat to
the Party-state. The motivations behind the battle against corruption are strengthened when
corporatized SOEs are involved. At the same time, corporatized SOEs can be subjected to greater
control and can disseminate anti-corruption detections and potentially strengthen enforcement. 674
Deng Feng, Indigenous Evolution of SOE Regulation, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? 3, 9 (Curtis Milhaupt & Benjamin
Liebman eds., 2016).
672 Vikramditya Khanna et al., CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud, 70 J. FIN. 1203 (2015) (examining the implications of
appointment-based and network ties-based CEO connectedness to senior managers and board members, on the likelihood
of fraud and the detection of fraud in the US market).
673 Id. Note, however, that the authors’ research specifically examines cases of corporate fraud and with respect to CEOs
in the US market. Nevertheless, the implications seem valid in any corporate wrongdoing, including corruption, and in
other markets with high connectedness. Here, connectedness within a Chinese corporatized SOE is especially high due to
overlapping positions and the overall influence of the personnel management system.
674 Statistical data shows a 12.1 percent decline in criminally prosecuted corruption cases from 2015 to 2016 with respect
to SOEs and only a 5.4 percent decline for private enterprises. This gap may support an argument that supervision and
671
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This combination explains the rationales behind harnessing corporatized SOEs and the corporate
group organization to facilitate anti-corruption efforts.

i. Anti-Corruption Work and Its Effect on Corporate Insiders
Several signals suggest that the CCP is intensifying its anti-corruption enforcement efforts
with respect to firms and corporatized SOEs specifically. The first is a change in the normative
framework—the norms that guide the conduct of Party members and according to which its enforcing
institutions operate. The Central Committee of the CCP revised its inner-party disciplinary norms
twice in the last few years. 675 The revisions included specific provisions that deal with various
misconducts by Party members and state employees in the course of their business involvement and
positions within SOEs.676 The CCDI as well formally dedicates a specific section of its “investigative
work plan” to central SOEs and financial institutions.677
Another signal for this recent focus is the change in practices that reflect an increase in the
number of corruption investigations related to corporatized SOEs. Immediately after President Xi’s
anti-corruption campaign began and over a short period of eighteen months, 124 executives in SOEs

enforcement against corruption is more effective with respect to SOEs. There could be other explanations, of course, such
as issues pertaining to the reliability of the data involving SOE, or that there was a shift to resolve such matters in SOEs
outside the criminal legal system.
675 The former document was in place since 2004. Supra note 650. A new comprehensive framework was revised twice
since the 18th Party Congress. For the revisions, see Zhongguo Gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli “Xiuding Jiedu” “Yan” zai nar?
[Interpretation of the “Regulations on Disciplinary Actions of the Communist Party of China”: Where is “Strictness”?],
XINHUANET (Oct. 21, 2015, 7:53 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-10/21/c_1116897613.htm. See also
Zhonggong Zhongyang yinfa “Zhongguo Gongchandang jilü chufen tiaoli” (中共中央印发, 中国共产党纪律处分条
例) [Regulation of the Communist Party of China on Disciplinary Measures] (promulgated by the Central Comm.
Communist Party of China, Oct., 21, 2015, effective Jan. 1, 2016), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/201510/21/c_1116897567.htm. This was recently replaced by another normative document of the same title, effective October
1, 2018. See Zhingging Zhongyang Yinfa “Zhongguo Gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli” [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China Issued the “Regulations on Disciplinary Measures of the Communist Party of China”], XINHUANET (Aug. 26, 2018, 10:33 PM),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-08/26/c_1123331165.htm [ hereinafter CCP Disciplinary Measures].
676 See id. Ch. VIII (Acts Violating the Rules of Integrity and Self-Discipline), arts. 88-101, Ch. X (Disciplinary Actions for
Violations of Work Discipline), arts. 121-127 (articles 88, 89 (engagement in profit making activities in violations of laws
and regulations while doing business; buying, selling, or investing in stocks and other securities; establishing a company or
investing in shares offshore; undertaking compensated intermediary activities; holding securities of a non-listed enterprise;
other violations related to profit making activities. Including the use of power to benefit the business activity of family and
friends), article 90 (the wrongful influence of business activity of family and friends in the execution of officials’ duty),
article 91 (the responsibility of “leaders” for violations conducted by state organs and enterprises under their responsibility);
article 126(2) (violations of regulations by leading cadres during which the officials have interfered with market economic
activity and caused a negative effect, including interference with major business activity of state owned enterprises:
restructuring, merger, bankruptcy, asset valuation, property rights transfers, major project investments).
677 See CCDI, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/jdbg3/zyhgjjj/ (last visited May 23, 2019).
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were investigated for corruption through the Party disciplinary system.678 Media reports also indicated
that SOEs and their insiders have been “targeted.”679
A particularly interesting method taken by the CCDI to expose corrupt corporate insiders and
Party-state leaders is its use of the business-group organization and its access to intra-firm governance.
It appears that the CCDI has applied targeted “inspection tours,” starting with lower level enterprises
within a business group, collecting information, and building an “evidence” line while climbing up the
group ladder until it reaches the top leadership.680 To facilitate this tactic, it steers the group’s internal
governance, which often means enlisting the help of Party institutions at the group or firm level. Until
recently, anti-corruption work and other disciplinary inspection within central SOEs were in the hands
of internal disciplinary teams (qiye jiwei- jijian zu).681 These teams were either formally dispatched by
SASAC (for certain corporatized SOEs) or were self-organized by firms under SASAC’s
encouragement and guidance. Either way, SASAC trained and supervised them with CCDI guidance.
The Party criticized this intra-firm disciplinary mechanism for lacking real powers within the corporate
and administrative hierarchy.682 To rectify this, the SOEs Reform Guiding Opinions assign the lead
authority over disciplinary inspection to the firm’s Party committee. This has shifted supervision and
investigative authorities from SASAC-organized intra-firm supervisory teams to the firm’s Party
committee, a legalized yet political corporate-institution. This recent move surely opens a more direct
route for CCDI involvement in firms.
The role of the intra-firm Party committee with respect to discipline inspection was reinforced
as one of the main responsibilities of this corporate governing body.683 Meaning, aside from its new
and expanded roles in corporate decision making discussed earlier, the Party committee is also the
Angela Meng, A Quarter of Chinese SOEs Executives Investigated for Corruption Work in Energy Sector, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Apr.
28,
2015,
3:45
PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1778702/quarter-chinese-soe-executives-investigated-corruption.
679 Id. See also Frank Fang, Anti-Corruption Campaign Targets China’s State-Owned Enterprises, EPOCH TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.theepochtimes.com/anti-corruption-campaign-targets-chinas-state-owned-enterprises_1256832.html
(reporting that the CCDI had marked twenty-six central SOEs as targets for next round of investigations); Lucy Hornby,
China Anti-Corruption Drive Targets Sinopec—Oil Group Among Several State-Owned Enterprises to Face Probe, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/f0cc6d0a-7b82-11e4-a695-00144feabdc0. See also my comment with respect to the
decline in criminally prosecuted cases related to SEOs supra note 674, a decline that might derive from a parallel increase
in alternative enforcement measures with respect to these firms.
680 This is not a comprehensive empirical observation, but rather one based on my impression from CCDI investigations
covered by media reports and CCDI pubic announcements.
681 On the work and training of such inspection teams, see Guozi wei juxing Zhongyang Qiye jiwei shuji jijian zu zhang perixun
bankai banshi [The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Held the Opening Ceremony of the Central Enterprise
Disciplinary Committee Secretary and the Discipline Inspection Team Leader Training Class], SASAC (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878219/c3747868/content.html; Guozi wei juban Zhongyang Qiye jiwei
shuji (jijian zuzuzhang) [The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Held a Training Course for the Secretary of
the Central Enterprise Disciplinary Committee (the Leader of the Discipline Inspection Team)], SASAC (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878219/c3747633/content.html.
682 See Xiangfu Meng, Guoqi jijian jiguo yaodanghao “zhuomuniao” [State-Owned Enterprises Disciplinary Inspection System Should Serve
as “a Good Woodpecker”], NAT’L PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC CHINA CEN. DISCIPLINE INSPECTION COMMISSION (June 26, 2018),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/201806/t20180626_174459.html.
683 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 585, art. 1(3).
678
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leading organ within the firm assigned to party line education, disciplinary inspection work, forming
an intra-firm accountability system (linked to firm-assessment), investigating the conduct of enterprise
leaders, strengthening tour inspections in SOEs, and basically facilitating the work of external anticorruption institutions (i.e., CCDI).684 In the context of corporate corruption, therefore, the Party
committee therefore functions as a type of a Trojan horse or a whistleblower for the Party.
Another factor that facilitates the work of CCDI within corporatized SOEs and their business
groups is the corresponding roles that some high-level CCDI agents have within major firms and/or
state institutions. For example, Chen Chaoying, a CCDI Standing Committee member, was dispatched
by the CCDI to be the chief external inspector over SASAC. He also has a high position within China’s
newly established National Supervisory Committee and is a member of SASAC’s own internal Party
committee.685
The points above reflect how the use of the corporate form and SOE group organization
make the CCDI’s work in monitoring and enforcing against corporate corruption a highly
collaborative network.686 Recent cases demonstrate this vividly.

ii. Recent Cases
In examining the ways that the corporate group is being utilized to facilitate work against
corruption, the following patterns seem common. The CCDI starts its probe with a “disciplinary tour,”
during which it dispatches investigators into a specific state-controlled group and presumably activates
the Party committees within firms in a systematic search for corruption (“crackdown” in the media).
The “evidence” collected leads to the investigations of several subsidiaries within the group and its
affiliates, including private firms. The investigation includes interrogations of corporate employees,
individual business affiliates, and finally corporate insiders. The primary targets are often high-level
public figures with parallel positions at the group organization.
Examples of how this works are the targeted probes in one of China’s most valuable sectors—
energy. By targeting two of its most important corporate groups, the CCDI opened a hornet’s nest
Although the CCDI is not mentioned formally. See id. art. 7(26) (“The Party organizations of SOEs shall earnestly
perform their duties as the primary players responsible, while their disciplinary inspection agencies shall effectively perform
supervisory responsibilities.” It includes a fanfare instruction to “keep using the thinking and methods of the rule of law
to fight corruption, fine-tune anti-corruption institutions and systems, strictly enforce the provisions against formalism,
bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance, and strive to build effective mechanisms where enterprise leaders dare not to,
are not able to, and do not want to, engage in corrupt practices.”).
685
His
biography
is
available
under
the
“Leadership
of
SASAC”
webpage.
See
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408570/c8860160/content.html.
686 Recent discipline and inspection work reports in both SASAC and specific SOEs also reflect this. See Zhuwei jijian
jianchazu
yaowen
[News
of
the
Discipline
Inspection
and
Inspection
Team],
SASAC,
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878219/index.html (last visited May 23, 2019); Yewu Gongzuo [“Business
Work”], SASAC, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877928/n2878221/index.html (last visited May 25, 2019).
684
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that led to the exposure and punishment (both disciplinary and legal enforcement) of several corrupt
Party members and state officials at the national and local levels, as well as senior business
executives.687 One of the cases is that of Jiang Jiemin, who rose through the ranks of the oil industry
to head China’s biggest oil business, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 688 and was
appointed as the head of SASAC. The pursuit of Jiang (which some opined was motivated by his ties
with Zhou Yongkang, a political rival of Xi)689 involved the detention, investigation, and punishment
of dozens of senior managers in the parent holding-company CNPC, its listed subsidiary PetroChina,
and even in private affiliated firms.690 A similar inspection was taken thereafter into another of China’s
centrally controlled energy champions, Petroleum & Chemicals Corporation (Sinopec Group) and its
main listed subsidiary, Sinopec Corp Ltd.. The inspection into Sinopec Group led to the detention of
managers in several subsidiary firms, 691 finally reaching the president of the group, Wang Tianpu.
Wang, who chaired the Group’s board at the time and was also the general manager of its listed
subsidiary, was put under Party disciplinary proceedings for taking bribes and abuse of power. Wang
was removed from his corporate positions, expelled from the Communist Party, and eventually
prosecuted under criminal law.692
Meng, supra note 678; Former China Energy Chief Jiang Jiemin Jailed for Corruption, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34503469 (presenting a “family tree” style illustration of the cases involved
in this investigation into the oil industry).
688 Jeremey Page et al., China Probes Former Oil Company Head, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 2:56 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-probes-former-oil-company-head-1378018593.
689 Willy Lam, With Zhou’s Circle Down, Xi’s Purge May Turn to Hu, Jamestown Brief, Vol. 14, No. 13, 3 July 2014,
https://jamestown.org/program/with-zhous-circle-down-xis-purge-may-turn-to-hu/.
690 The proceedings against private affiliated firms are worth noting since they instigated from, and likely rely on, evidence
obtained during the political disciplinary enforcement process, thus reflecting the high collaboration between the Party
and state enforcing institutions. Donny Kwok & Charlie Zhu, PetroChina Supplier Wison Says Record Seized, Can’t Contact
Chairman,
REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:49
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-wison-cfoidUKBRE98I01120130919 (in which the chairman and subsidiary executives of HK listed private firm Wison Engineering
Services Co Ltd., a major supplier of PetroChina, were investigated as part of the Chinese corruption investigation in
PetroChina and its parent company CNPC). In March 2014, Wison’s founder, primary shareholder, and chairman of the
board was formally arrested. He was accused of conspiracy to commit a “tender-offer fraud,” as well as for offering bribes
for state officials. In August, 2015, he was found guilty for offering bribes. Brian Spegele, Wison Engineering Says Chinese
Police Arrested Chairman, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wison-engineeringchairman-hua-bangsong-was-arrested-by-chinese-authorities-1394425858; PetroChina Supplier Wison Says Found Guilty of
Bribery in China, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2015, 9:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/wison-petrochinaidUSL3N10H08120150806.
691 Such as the case of Xue Wandong, the vice-chairman and CEO of Sinopec Oilfield Services Corp who was detained
and investigated by the CCDI and dismissed from his role in Sinopec immediately. See Hornby, supra note 679.
692 Zhongyang Zhongguo Shihua Dangzu Guanyu Xunshi Zhenggai Qingkuang Tongbao (中共中国石化党组关于巡
视整改情况的通报) [Circular of the Chinese Communist Party on the Inspection and Ratification in China Petroleum
Chemical
Corporations],
(promulgated
by
the
CCDI,
Apr.
30,
2015),
available
at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201504/t20150430_55638.html; Zhongguo Shiyouhuagong Jituangongsi Zongjingli
Wangtianpu Shexian Yanzhong Weijiweifa Jieshou Zuzhidiaocha (中国石油化工集团公司总经理王天普涉嫌严重违
纪违法接受组织调查) [Notice by the CCDI on the Disciplinary Investigation of Wang Tianpu, April] (promulgated by
the CCDI, Apr. 27, 2015), available at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201504/ t20150427_55436.html; Zhongguo Shiyou
Huagong Jituangongsi Yuan Dongshi, Zongjingli, Dangzuchengyuan Wangtianpu Yanzhong Weiji Bei Kaichudangji (中
国石油化工集团公司原董事、总经理、党组成员王天普严重违纪被开除党籍) [Notice by the CCDI on Wang
Tianpu’s Expulsion from the Party, September] (promulgated by the CCDI, Sept. 18, 2015), available
687
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Similar recent probe targets include firms in the healthcare sector, commercial and investments
vehicles operating off-shore (state-controlled as well as private),693 and currently, the financial sector.
Some recent cases against ostensibly private firms, such as Dalian Wanda, Fosun International, HNA
Group, and Anbang Insurance, emphasize how Party-led disciplinary enforcement influences and
determines the operations of state enforcement actions in the private sector as well. Some
commentators posit that these purges serve multiple purposes, including cleaning and improving the
financial system, enforcing against dubious business practices, and “getting rid of tycoons with
dubious political loyalties” at the same time.694 These cases reflect that a CCDI investigation has ripple
effects throughout the investigated group and its web of affiliates. They also reflect that Party-led
enforcement receives a high-level of collaboration from state institutions. For example, SASAC, CSRC,
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission assisted in confiscating documents, freezing bank
accounts, stopping the trade in shares of firms under investigation, and other measures. 695 This
assistance is given even before the case formally reaches the legal system. We can assume that this
inter-agency cooperation will further increase after the recent consolidation of authority under the
National Supervision Commission.
Consequences within firms are also apparent. Once the Party’s disciplinary inspection
apparatus has signaled that an individual is suspected of a disciplinary violation, whether this has been
disclosed to the public or not, the individual will be removed or forced to step down from his
corporate positions. This happens in many cases before any legal accusation has been made and
regardless of any proof of damage to the corporation or its stakeholders. Disciplinary punishment by
the Party (e.g., admonition, a downgrade in rank, revoking their parallel Party positions, and finally
expelling them from the Party altogether) will also often precede criminal charges.696 In these cases,
at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201509/t20150918_62038.html. On the consequent legal criminal prosecution, see China
to Prosecute Former Top Executives for Alleged Graft, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2016, 5:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-corruption-sinopec-idUSKCN11W0VX.
693 One example of an investigation of a state-owned commercial firm is the case of Song Lin, the former chairman of
China Resources, a Hong Kong based trading company and one of China’s largest state-owned enterprises, who was
accused of power abuse in corporate dealings and was arrested in April 2014. The Party removed Lin from his positions
in the firm and the Party. Two years later, he was charged under criminal law. James T. Areddy & Laurie Burkitt, China
Communist Party Ousts Chairman of Major State-Owned Firm, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22, 2014, 1:34 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/communist-party-fires-song-lin-chairman-of-china-resources-holdings-as-corruptionfight-expands-1398187916; Choi Chi-yuk, Song Lin, Former Chairman of China Resources, is Formally Charged with Corruption,
SOUTH
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Dec.
8,
2016),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/2052971/song-lin-former-chairman-china-resources-formally. For other examples of SOE executives
investigated for corruption and released from their corporate role, see 9 Chinese SOEs Slammed for Discipline Violations,
XINHUA (JUNE 17, 2015), http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-06/17/content_35840376.htm. Examples of
investigations against private firms that seem to also entail Party disciplinary investigative work include Dalian Wanda,
Fosun International, HNA Group, and Anbang Insurance. See Lucy Hornby et al., Big China Companies Targeted over ‘Systemic
Risk’, FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/23c8ba54-5710-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f.
694 Minxin
Pei, Xi Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles Gathers Pace, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/19810ea2-5814-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2.
695 Id. Wison Engineering Services Co Ltd. bank accounts were frozen, and the trade in its shares was suspended.
696 Brian Spegele &Wayne Ma, Wison Engineering Says Chinese Police Arrested Chairman; Hua Bangsong Is Accused of Bribery,
According to Oil-Services Firm, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 10 2014, 11:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wison-engineering-
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we can see further examples of the connection between China’s personnel management system and
the Party’s disciplinary assessment.
Thus, while corporatized SOEs and the web of affiliated businesses surrounding them might
be especially prone to corruption and other corporate malfeasance, the use of the same organizational
structure facilitates anti-corruption efforts and expands the Party’s enforcement reach into the market
more broadly. In this process, the separation between political and legal enforcement against certain
corporate offenses becomes blurry, so that the Party performs many of the monitoring, accountability,
and deterrence functions otherwise provided by external markets and legal institutions.

III. POLITICIZED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA—A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?
More than a decade ago, scholars lamented the “absentee principal” problem in China, due to
which state organs as dominant shareholders of publicly listed firms seem to “either abuse their control
or fail to exercise it entirely.”697 We have seen, however, that where dominant shareholders, legal
institutions, and even market mechanisms fail, institutions of the Chinese Communist Party fill in the
void. These sui generis institutions are claiming an increasingly overt role in corporate governance,
replacing to a degree both internal and external monitoring mechanisms. The evolving nature of these
institutions makes a full judgment of their effects impossible, but some early assessments can be made.
Conceptually, the daylight takeover of the powers of corporate governing bodies by political
institutions is alarming, not only for those who believe in market liberalism of any degree but even for
those who support economic interventionism and developmental state governance. The perils of a
politicized corporate governance go beyond those that are commonly expressed about state
ownership.698 They include concerns about having an unruly economic control in the hands of a
political Party and essentially in the hands of a limited number of individuals. In this case, the political
party is above the law, and thus the powers of the individuals operating therein are bound only by
internal checks and balances offered within the political system itself (as opposed to the common
misconception that Party members lack any checks and balances whatsoever). As a conceptual matter,
this politicization therefore manifests the rejection of the rule of law, as the term is normally
understood, in the realm of corporate governance specifically.
There could be firm-level practical concerns as well. The recent developments formally shifted
an unrestrained power from corporate insiders to corporate Party committee members. It is possible
that the individuals operating therein will use their powers in ways that add favoritism, arbitrariness,
chairman-hua-bangsong-was-arrested-by-chinese-authorities-1394425858 (“Neither Mr. Jiang nor several other oil
executives removed from their posts in recent months have been formally charged.”).
697 Clarke, supra note 3, at 197.
698 The effect of state-ownership on firm value and performance in China is still inconclusive. For various studies on the
matter and the controversy, see Clarke, supra note 71, at 139-143.

142

UNRAVELING CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKET GROWTH

T.G.O

and simply misguided enforcement into the system, not to mention the fact that human rights can be
easily subjugated in the process of political enforcement. Moreover, now that the Party has more direct
access to corporate decision making and is a distinct stakeholder irrespective of the state’s role as a
shareholder, new conflicts of interests and additional institutional costs could emerge within firms
more markedly.699 Managers, now formally directed through Party committees (or simply being the
same person), could continue facilitating exploitation of public shareholders for political goals, but
now in broad daylight.
It should be noted, however, that these firm-level concerns, while justified, are not
substantially different from those that have materialized under corporate organization in China so far
and before the recent overt politicization. These firm-level concerns, if they were to materialize, would
be nothing new.
What is different in the recent politicization is the reversal from the apparently convergent
corporate-capitalism governance model toward a version of a planned market economy, in which
Party institutions are openly deployed within and outside firms, ready to act on command. A tightly
controlled corporate environment and the awareness to a closer Party presence will impact managerial
discretion and will likely create fear governance that was less present when Party control was in the
shadows. Fear governance could lead to risk-averse management. Concerned with political
surveillance and retribution, managers could become paralyzed.700 If this does indeed occur, not only
would this prevent value-increasing transactions, but it could also have a chilling effect on developing
market forces, such as the managerial labor market, product market competition, and innovation.
These effects would lead to further market inefficiencies, stagnation in business expansion and in
capital market development,701 and would slow down general growth. Some would argue that we may
already see signs of that in the lower growth rates in China during the past few years.
These firm and market-level concerns are indeed valid, but there are also counter measures in
the recent politicization drive, mainly the incentivizing force of the personnel management
mechanisms. While the risks of political intervention are rather straightforward and recognized, not
enough attention is given to a similarly possible scenario in which China’s politicized corporate
governance could result in added value and serve the interests of firms and the market. The general
wisdom has dismissed this possibility by the simple doubt that the Party will choose to exercise its
power in ways that benefit firms and their stockholders,702 and by the assumption that interest group
politics influence reforms only in one specific direction. Yet the opposite possibility should be
The opposite could happen as well, since less opaque Party presence could facilitate better information flow. See
further discussion infra in Chapter 2, Section III.A. Relevant empirical studies noted in infra notes 724-726.
700 On the influence of anti-corruption enforcement on policy makers, see Daniel Bell, China’s Corruption Clampdown Risks
Policy Paralysis, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/293d3b2a-2f1c-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a.
701 Jamil Anderlini, China’s War on Graft Leads to Drop in Outbound Investment, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014,
https://www.ft.com/content/58d0cb22-421b-11e4-a9f4-00144feabdc0.
702 But see Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 404 (providing a refreshing discussion of the possible economic commitment of
some dictatorships and authoritarian governments to growth).
699
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recognized as well and is perhaps more plausible when one considers the complex interests of the
Party and its functionaries in promoting strong and appealing capital markets. As shown time and time
again with respect to decisions in economics,703 firm governance,704 and public policy,705 incentives’
alignment matters—even if these incentives are structured in idiosyncratic ways. As presented
throughout this work, a certain alignment of interests between the political controlling apparatus and
firms and their stakeholders (including shareholders) is forming. This alignment of interests may be
the source for further growth-supporting, even if political, institutions. Especially given the economic
results of unconventional governance in China so far, the possible positive effects of a politicized
corporate governance should be explored. A politicized corporate governance could have positive
effects for both firms and the market, and even for the role of law in China.

A. Potential Positive Effects at the Firm and Market Levels
As a practical matter, the level of Party involvement in corporate decision making will depend
on the type of firm or the specific situation. The SOE Reform Guiding Opinions prescribe a different
scope of involvement for particular industries, types of firm, and situations.706 Thus, while all firms
with state investments are compelled to formally install political institutions into their internal
governance system, the active political involvement in daily decision making will likely be limited in
most firms. The daily situation for most firms would thus remain as it was; managers will be controlled
indirectly through decisions on their career path while being relatively free to handle operations. These
firms will continue to be operated the way their managers believe could best promote their future
careers in the Party-state system, much as it was under Party shadow control before the recent
politicization.
In firms or situations where the Party committee will opt to exercise its corporate powers
more fully—which are now likely larger in number than before the recent developments in
politicization, but still limited—the costs of coordination would presumably decrease. Party-state goals
will be articulated more frequently through the Party committee and will be less opaque and less open
to managers’ interpretation. Despite the possible effects of risk-averse managers and the rising costs
of conflicts between shareholders, this can lower the costs of monitoring insiders.
Furthermore, and as seen throughout the development process, in its efforts to keep the value
of state assets high and the cost of capital low, the Party has repeatedly steered capital market activity
ex-post in order to remedy share-price declines. This has had broad market implications. Unnecessary
Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where It Is Headed, 146 DE ECONOMIST 23 (1998).
Martijn Cremers et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 44 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1345 (2009).
705 Carolyn Heinrich & Gerald Marschke, Incentives and Their Dynamics in Public Sector Performance Management Systems, 29 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 183 (2010).
706 See supra note 607 and the accompanying text.
703
704
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market-level effects could perhaps be prevented through a tailored and more controlled intervention
from within firms, ex-ante.
Putting the uncertainties of greater involvement of corporate political institutions in daily
decision making aside, three main changes still stand: 1) under the recent politicization, personnel
evaluation is expressly linked with economic performance; 2) disciplinary enforcement, assisted by
firm-internal Party committees, will increase, which will likely spill over to enforcement against
corporate wrongdoing more generally; and, 3) the awareness among corporate constituents and
potential investors of the presence and the roles of Party members deployed within firms will likewise
increase. These changes point to some important contributions that a politicalized corporate
governance offers to firms and the capital market through aligning interests, enforcement and
deterrence, and a market-commitment-signaling mechanism.
With respect to personnel evaluation and economic performance: The tightening link
following the recent politicization between economic performance measures in firms and the career
trajectory of individuals that manage or supervise them707 points to an increasing alignment of interests
between firms, their stockholders, and corporate control parties. While studies and recent market
volatility have shown that the Chinese capital markets are not informationally or fundamentally
efficient, 708 and thus share price movements are not strictly determined by an issuer’s market
performance, the public share price of a corporatized SOE will be taken into account for personnel
evaluation and likely more now than ever before. A drop in the share price of a PRC issuer, whether
or not reflective of actual economic performance, may deny Party members who are firm managers
from future advancement within the Party-state. This can serve to discipline the behavior of powerful
corporate officials and also incentivize them to increase shareholder value even in an inefficient market.
The opposite results, in which managers are incentivized to further misconduct, whether engaging in
false or misleading disclosure to prop up a public share price or being more deferential to political
commands,709 are also possible, of course. Still, this development is striking, especially considering the
starting point. Not long ago, capital market investment-based revenues were frowned upon,710 and
only a little more than a decade ago, state ownership and the managers of state-controlled firms were
still shielded from the disciplinary effects of the capital market.711 The attributes that were so strongly
rejected in the past are now embraced and even harnessed by the Party.
This aspect of a political governance in firms and the capital market illuminates how the capital
markets themselves—even in the absence of a market for corporate control—can affect the
See supra notes 560, 580-587 and the discussion therein.
See, e.g., Chen, supra note 428 (“[T]he Chinese stock market as a whole has acted to determine stock prices in a way
totally detached from the economic growth process.”). Generally, on the “inefficiencies” in the Chinese stock markets, see
Guoping Li, China’s Stock Market: Inefficiencies and Institutional Implications, 16 CHINA & WORLD ECON., no. 6, Nov.-Dec.
2008, at 81.
709 See, e.g., the Nanjing Textile Import & Export Co. fraud case mentioned in note 473, infra.
710 See supra note 70.
711 See supra notes 77-81.
707
708
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advancement of human agents inside the Party-state personnel system and vice versa, thereby having
a disciplinary function on corporate insiders that mitigates shareholders’ concerns.712 It also highlights
the interdependence of political institutions and market development in China.
With respect to disciplinary enforcement and its externalities: More stringent disciplinary
enforcement against corporate corruption and asset embezzlement removes bad managers. It could
also spill over to market monitoring and enforcement more generally, 713 raise the overall level of
compliance, and deter others from additional forms of corporate misconduct, such as self-dealing,
waste, and fraud. Anti-corruption tour inspections in corporate groups could also decrease the number
and scope of undesirable related-party transactions, which are presently extremely frequent within
SOE business groups.714 Corporate wrongdoings not only siphon firm value and harm the state and
other shareholders, but also raise the cost of capital in the economy and hinder growth. In these
respects, political disciplinary enforcement and its deterrence effect would benefit firms and capital
market growth. Enforcement has a more direct effect on firms and insiders that participate in the
Party-state system and on those that aspire for such careers. Yet, its deterring effect also diffuses to
the network of private affiliates surrounding them and can have implications on the market at large.715
In terms of a market-signaling effect: While the possibility that investors will view greater
politicization negatively cannot be ruled out, the opposite seems more plausible. Since it appears that
investors in the Chinese market are not dissuaded by state ownership and control,716 there is no reason
to believe that they will assess greater Party control as potentially more abusive of their rights and will
refrain from investing. The primary concern of public investors today is not the expropriation of their
property rights by the Party-state, but rather their abuse by corporate insiders and rogue officials. The
politicization of corporate governance is therefore instead likely to signal to investors that the Partystate is committed to economic growth and that self-dealing, related-party transactions, and corruption
are now kept at bay by a strict enforcer. Particularly since the capital market in China is informationally

This part draws heavily on my prior work in. See Groswald Ozery, supra note 101.
As exemplified in recent Party-led enforcement actions against suspicious investment activities off-shore, which has
been said to be motivated by concerns for the stability of the financial system. Tom Mitchell et al., Wang Qishan: China’s
Enforcer, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d82964ba-6d42-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa (“The larger
economic policy goal behind Mr. Wang’s investigations, the official explains, is to ‘stop using the financial system as an
economic growth lever.’”) (referring to cases of speculative asset and stock pricing bubbles whereby business managers
used the financial system and listed companies under their management to drive up share prices and enrich themselves
and others – e.g., the allegations against private businessman Xiao Jianhua.).
714 See supra notes 217-219 and the accompanying text.
715 For the indirect effect of sanctions on non-punished peer firms in China, see Francesco D'Acunto, Punish One, Teach a
Hundred: The Sobering Effect of Punishment on the Unpunished (University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics
Working Paper No. 2019-12, 2019).
716 As mentioned in the section “Equity Markets,” supra pp. 86-89, investors prefer investing alongside Party-state
dominant shareholders. See also Charles Calomiris et al., Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from
Chinese Asset Sales, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (2010) (documenting negative market responses to unexpected announcements
on sales of government shares in listed SOEs and conversely a positive effect following relevant policy cancellation. The
authors argue that the benefits of political ties outweigh efficiency costs of state-shareholdings.).
712
713
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inefficient, 717 suppliers of capital look for alternative sources of information about corporate
performance instead of stock price and accounting measures. In this sense, political institutions are
filling a crucial signaling “intermediary” role in an environment where information is scarce and
unreliable.718 A politicized corporate governance thus can increase market confidence and provide the
assurances needed for investors to supply capital even in an environment of continued limited
transparency.

Available Evidence

The evidence of the economic effects of the politicization of corporate governance (intra-firm
governance through political institutions and external monitoring and accountability through anticorruption enforcement) is presently very limited, as these changes are still unfolding. A few recent
studies examine the economic effects of the anti-corruption campaign, and they largely corroborate
my hypotheses. A 2018 study examined the characteristics of firms investigated between 2012 and
2015 as part of the anti-corruption campaign. The study constructed a sample of 150 Chinese listed
firms in which top executives were investigated. Eighty-seven percent of the investigated firms were
found to be state-owned firms. The authors found that firms with characteristics that are commonly
associated with poor governance, such as self-dealing and inefficiencies, were more likely to be
investigated. This suggests that the anti-corruption campaign has enforcement spillovers on corporate
wrongdoing more broadly and indeed captures firms with weak governance. The authors also found
that the likelihood of investigation is negatively associated with managerial connections with top Partystate leaders (less so with connections to the local-government), reflecting the parallel force of political
motivations in place.719 Another recent study examined the effects of corruption on entrepreneurial
activity in China. The authors found that corruption may stifle entrepreneurial activity and by
implication economic growth by increasing the rents of a few established connected firms and
decreasing the ability of small entrepreneurial firms to grow and compete. The study also found that
this negative effect was mitigated by the anti-corruption campaign, concluding that the anti-corruption
campaign is an effective “step forward towards” entrepreneurial market-entry, efficient allocation of

See the discussion about the Equity Market as monitoring mechanism and the sources therein (including reservations)
supra Chapter 2, pp. 86-89.
718 Miwa and Ramseyer discuss how in twentieth century Japan, monitoring and quality certification by reputable
industrialists recruited to the boards of Japanese firms compensated for informational inefficiencies in the market. See
Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 124.
719 John M. Griffin et al., Is the Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaign Authentic? (Dec. 19, 2018) (paper presented at the
29th
Annual
Conference
on
Financial
Economics
&
Accounting
2018),
available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779429 (Despite these results, the authors also found that anti-corruption campaign
enforcement did not result in greater information transparency nor increased foreign direct investments.).
717
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resources, and ultimately sustained growth.720 A third study linked the anti-corruption campaign with
an additional aspect of increased competition—the availability of credit. According to this study,
CCDI investigations improve the access of non-SOE firms (defined by the authors as firms in which
the largest ultimate shareholder is neither a central nor local government entity) to credit. The authors
posit that anti-corruption enforcement reallocates credit from less-productive SOEs to more
productive non-SOEs.721
With respect to the signaling effect I alluded to above, two recent studies performed an eventstudy methodology that tracked cumulative abnormal returns of Chinese listed firms following
different announcements in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The results show that the overall stock
market responses to announcements of CCDI inspections were significantly positive.722 One of these
studies looked at firms that are listed both in China and on the Hong Kong stock exchange, concluding
that the expectation of reduced corruption adds value to listed firms overall in both markets.723 A third
study examined the effect of the anti-corruption campaign on market reaction concerning what the
authors call “relational spending” (measured by business entertainment expenses). The authors found
a weaker effect of relationship spending on share-price crash risk following the anti-corruption
campaign. They posited that the anti-corruption campaign reduced information opacity and
minimized investors’ perception of risks from relationship spending and concluded that the campaign
contributes to monitoring. 724
The possible effect on information flow in the capital market is controversial, however. One study
has found that firms in inspected provinces are more likely to withhold negative information during
anti-corruption inspections, suggesting that the information environment is weakened.725 Conversely,
another study found that when the anti-corruption campaign is carried out against government
Mariassunta Giannetti et al., The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Firms in China (European
Corporate
Governance
Institute,
Finance
Working
Paper
No.
536/2017,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897558 (among the findings of the study: 1. “entertainment
expenses”—a common measure of potential corruption and a way for control parties to siphon private benefits of
control— in big firms decreased following Xi’s anti-corruption campaign; 2. anti-corruption measures have alleviated
barriers for small businesses and made it easier for them to compete; 3. following Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, state
subsidies for R&D became significantly positively associated with future innovation (higher innovative efficiency and lower
influence of corruption-related expenditures); Mariassunta Giannetti & Xiaoyun Yu, The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption
Campaign on Small and Incumbent Firms in China, CEPR POL’Y (Oct. 30, 2017, https://voxeu.org/article/anti-corruptionand-entrepreneurial-activity-china.
721 Bo Li et al., China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from SOEs to NonSOEs (PBCSF-NIFR, Research Paper
No. 17-01, 2017, rev’d July 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908658.
722 Haoyuan Ding et al., Equilibrium Consequences of Corruption on Firms: Evidence from China’s Anti-Corruption
Campaign (Dec. 7, 2017) (working paper presented at the NBER-CCER Conference 2018), available at
http://papers.nber.org/conf_papers/f100913.pdf.
723 Chen Lin et al., 2016. Anti-Corruption Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study Evidence from China (National Bureau
of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 22001, 2016, rev’d 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22001 (The study
also identified different impact levels depending on prior market liberalization. Firms in capital markets that are better set
to allocating recourses efficiently experienced higher cumulative abnormal returns.).
724 Hu, Li, Duncan, Xu, Corporate Relationship Spending and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China's AntiCorruption Campaign (Feb. 3, 2019) (on file with author).
725 Xiaping Cao et al., Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Corporate Information Release in China, 49 J. CORP. FIN. 186 (2018).
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officials in a certain municipal level, firms in the same jurisdiction experience a long-run decrease in
risks associated with share-price crash. The authors posit from this that the information environment
in which businesses and the capital market operates has improved.726 The contradictory results about
improved information only add validity to the signaling effect of political enforcement. Whether or
not the anti-corruption action improves information availability, this form of enforcement by political
institutions signals commitment to the market and substitutes for limited or questionable information.
The anti-corruption campaign as an element in the recent politicization of corporate
governance has another, more unexpected, result. It seems to have a direct effect on the corporate
conduct of multi-national U.S. firms.727 A recent U.S. SEC report found a surge in China-domiciled
whistle-blowers with respect to misconduct in multinational and U.S. firms, which is presumably
related to China’s anti-corruption efforts.728 Strikingly, a politicized corporate governance in China is
contributing to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform!. This effect on foreign
domiciled firms and on investors outside of China indicates the possible positive externalities of a
politicized corporate governance in China, even when the consideration of investors’ interests and
market efficiency were incidental among the many motivations behind its development.

B. Legalizing Political Institutions—Contribution to the Role of Law
As we have seen, Party monitoring and accountability institutions are embedded into the
corporate legal system rather than being kept in the realm of extra-legality. This reaffirms the
instrumentalist role law and jurisprudence play in contemporary China, no doubt, but it also reflects
the rising significance of law in Chinese society and for Party functions specifically.
The CCP certainly did not need the legal system to grant it influence and even control over
firms and the market. Similarly, the CCP could certainly handle corporate corruption outside the legal
system, just as it had previously. Unlike the practical necessity that guided the establishment of legal
institutions during the first and second stages of economic transition, which was motivated by the
need to attract capital to the SOEs, reconsolidate economic and administrative control, and satisfy
commitments in the global market, the current choice to enshrine political governance in law must
find an explanation elsewhere. The use of a legal framework here provides a layer of protection that

Yunsen Chen et al., Does Crackdown on Corruption Reduce Stock Price Crash Risk? Evidence from China, 51 J. CORP. FIN. 125
(2018).
727 Matthew S. Erie, Anticorruption as Transnational Law: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, PRC Law, and Party Rules in China,
AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2971092. (discussing how the overlapping systems
of anti-corruption in the United States and China form a transnational law compliance system).
728 Andy Rickman, How China and the US Are Emboldening Whistle-Blowers in the Fight Against Corporate Corruption, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (Nov.
27,
2017,
12:38
PM),
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/2121681/how-china-and-us-are-emboldening-whistle-blowers-fight.
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stabilizes the Party and normalizes it as a legitimate governance system.729 As the CCP has no intention
to situate itself under the law, it has found another legitimatizing path using the law to establish its
political governance upon firms and the market.730
The implications of this for the legal system itself and for the role of law are controversial.
Some view it as a second-best beneficial step. Having a clearer and out-front framework for Party
influence can be a positive development for legality in China. 731 Here, for example, enforcement
against corporate corruption by political institutions under the guise of law adds transparency and
popular trust not only in the Party but also in the legal system. Others, in contrast, see these
developments as merely window dressing, pointing to the underlying fact that the Party is still above
the law. Lacking any real checks and balances on Party power, there will always be room for extralegality, protectionism, and abuse of power. Some, such as Minzner, have even opined that these
developments represent a step back from legality: “This removes the fig leaf of a divide between the
party and the state. … Instead of it being a step toward imposing greater legal constraints, I think it
arguably represents the partial absorption of the legal system by the party apparatus.”732
In my view, the concerns about having a certain apparatus above the law are justified but they
should not overshadow the importance of the recent legalization of political influence, which I believe
go beyond positivists attitudes. Establishing a rule of law as perceived in Western liberal democracies
was never on the agenda. The legal system in China cannot be expected to advance the functions
prescribed to it in liberal societies. It can only be expected to advance the functions designed for it in
the Chinese context. Pointing at the recent steps as a retreat from the ideals of rule of law does not
add much and is blind to the true meaning of these developments; the importance of law is increasing
Framed by Liebman in a different context as a matter of “populist legality,” the instrumentalist approach toward the
legal system serves the need for positive public opinion by “aligning outcomes with perceived dominant social norms.”
See Benjamin Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 165 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds.,
2011). A similar related concept is Gallagher’s “authoritarian legality.” See GALLAGHER, supra note 554.
730 This reality is echoed in policy propaganda to strengthen “stabilization efforts,” a palatable ongoing rhetoric that is
expressed to justify enhanced Party leadership through the use of law. See, e.g., Report to the 17th Party Congress, supra
note 25, Ch. 6 (“Unswervingly Developing Socialist Democracy”):
“坚持依法治国基本方略，树立社会主义法治理念，实现国家各项工作法治化，保障公民合法权益；
坚持社会主义政治制度的特点和优势，推进社会主义民主政治制度化、规范化、程序化，为党和国
家长治久安提供政治和法律制度保障”
729

This excerpt translates:
We must uphold the rule of law as a fundamental principle and adopt the socialist concept of law-based
governance to ensure that all work of the state is based on the law and that the legitimate rights and interests of
citizens are safeguarded. We must maintain the features and advantages of the socialist political system and define
institutions, standards and procedures for socialist democracy to provide political and legal guarantees of lasting stability for the
Party and the country. [italics added]
731 The views here were expressed more generally with respect to the recent legality of political governance in China, but
they apply by implication specifically to the politicization of corporate governance. See, e.g., Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg,
Legality in Contemporary Chinese Politics, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3250948.
732 Buckley, supra note 657 (Carl Minzner expressing his views on the (draft) Supervision Law).
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even as it retains its instrumentalist role. This should not be viewed as a step backward, rather, as a
step in a different direction. From a law and development perspective, these recent developments
stand as the most contemporary affirmation of the iterative dynamics between law, economic
development, and political economy.
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A POLITICAL-ECONOMY ACCOUNT
CONCLUSION
With modern, successful firms that operate globally and a capital market that is the second
largest in the world, corporate governance in China has long passed the point of an “adjust or perish”
prognostic. Yet its firm governance and capital market functions maintain strong idiosyncrasies that
go against many fundamentals in economics and legal thought. These idiosyncrasies are products of
the underlying configurations of China’s political economy and the shifts within it. Political economy
in China has a determinant role on the ways corporate ownership is organized, firms operate, and the
capital market functions. It is responsible for many of the infirmities in the Chinese market, yet at the
same time also holds the key for China’s puzzling growth.
Inspecting China’s development conundrum through a political-economic lens reveals that
there is a parallel governance system at work in China that is distinct from the legal or administrative
governance system advanced by the state. This parallel system is actively present at every level of
society, the administrative state, and the economy. Likewise, it has governance oversight, participation,
and accountability functions at the individual enterprise and business group levels, by which it impacts
upon the behavior of firms and their insiders. Political institutions supplant many of the oversight
functions traditionally provided by firm internal-governance bodies. Political institutions also supply
external monitoring and accountability, buttressing legal enforcement and the monitoring functions
of weak markets. In doing so, this politicized corporate governance system credibly signals the
regime’s commitment to growth and provides assurances against various forms of investor abuse.
These assurances, despite their political nature, seem to reduce the cost of capital and attract external
finance, thereby supporting the growth of firms.
China’s political economy therefore supports firms and capital market growth in ways that go
beyond developmentalist industrial policies and the attributes associated with state-controlled
economies (such as state capture by cronies, fostering connections with entrepreneurs, largesse, and
protectionism). It produces a novel form of governance that mobilizes political and economic
incumbents to advance reforms and to curb their own abusive behavior.
This resolution for China’s law and capital market development conundrum brings forth new
possibilities on the menu of what is now an obsolete convergence/path-dependency discourse. The
politicization of corporate governance not only counters convergence predictions in showing how
systems can “diverge back”, in form, but also challenges path-dependence theories in showing how
systems evolve, in function, even within fixed institutional confines. China’s capital market
development compels us to view development as an iterative mode of constant change.

*

*
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Capital market development is an iterative process, a mutual interaction between politics, legal
response, and economic outcomes. In this process, corporate governance can be advanced in ways
and for reasons that are fundamentally different from those offered by corporate capitalism. Different
systems of governance are possible, while the system applied must be able to adjust to change. A
responsive corporate governance system that aligns itself with shifts in a dynamic political economy
can enjoy greater legitimacy and be followed through. Such a system can survive even if its
configurations are strikingly unfamiliar and patently political.
Economic development and the growth of the large public firm are not conditioned on one
specific menu of rules, legal or otherwise. Public firms can prosper even under heavy state ownership
and political control. Capital markets can develop and thrive with concentrated ownership and even
while bearing functions that divert from efficient allocation of capital. External finance will flow to
where the opportunities are, provided that effective assurances exist—no matter their form or original
motive—to fend off exploitative forces.
China’s capital market development is a potent example of this fact. Its political-governance
system allows just enough flexibility to develop coordinated responses to the changing interests and
demands within its own political-economic equilibrium. This enables the system to provide the needed
growth stability while deflecting political and economic incursions, and to survive even at the price of
lesser efficiency.
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